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VOL. II.

Vol. II.

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EXTRACTS

FROM

Colonel Templemore's HISTORY

OF THE

SEVEN YEARS WAR.

His Remarks on General Lloyd.
On the Successes of Arms; and
On the March of Convoys.

DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.

Place the Quarter Sheet of REFERENCES, and Plates
N^o I. II. and III. opposite to Page 336.—[The Re-
ferences are by mistake paged 366.]

Plate IV. to be placed opposite to Page 400; and the
Plate of St. LUCIE, at the end.



E X T R A C T S
FROM
Colonel TEMPELHOFF's HISTORY
OF THE
SEVEN YEARS WAR:

His REMARKS on General LLOYD:
On the SUBSISTENCE of ARMIES; and
On the MARCH of CONVOYS,

ALSO
A TREATISE on WINTER POSTS.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

A Narrative of EVENTS at St. LUCIE and GIBRALTAR,

AND OF

JOHN Duke of MARLBOROUGH's
March to the DANUBE,

With the Causes and Consequences of that Measure.

— Forsan et hæc olim meminisse juvabit. VIRG.

By the Honourable COLIN LINDSAY,
Lieutenant Colonel of the 46th Regiment.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

L O N D O N:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND.
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EXTRA

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OF THE

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ERRATA.

- Page 245, line 1. *dele* all.
 280. — 29. *for* extent *read* distance.
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 432. — 21. *for* fixed *read* fired.
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 508. — 21. *for* galleys *read* gallies.
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ON THE

MARCH of CONVOYS.

From Colonel TEMPELHOFF.

IT is certainly one of the most important, as well as one of the most difficult things in war, to conduct some thousand waggons from one place to another with safety, and even without great loss, in the presence of an enemy, and while they are every moment exposed to his attacks.

Without the strictest attention, a strong presence of mind, and a nice judgment of the intentions of the enemy, and of the movements which he has in his power to make in order to carry them into effect: without a just and skilful military eye, without a perfect knowledge of the country, and great abilities to discover a resource in every difficulty, it is hardly possible to preserve a convoy, if the enemy knows his advantages, and has activity and resolution enough to make a perfect use of them.

In

In order to attain a true idea of the difficulty attending this service, we need only consider the extent of ground which such a train must necessarily cover upon a march. For each waggon with four horses, fifteen paces at least must be allowed, even should they follow each other without interval. Reckon then one thousand seven hundred and sixty paces to an English mile*, one hundred and seventeen waggons will occupy a mile, if they go in one column, or row; but as there must be two or three paces at the least between each waggon, we may say, that one hundred waggons in a single row will cover one mile.

Suppose a train of one thousand waggons with no obstruction, in the road or from the nature of the country, they may move at the rate of a mile in half an hour. If every waggon follows without intermission, one hundred are on the road in half an hour, two hundred in one hour, three hundred in an hour and a half, six hundred in three hours, and one thousand in five hours.

* The German mile has been considered as five English, and the calculations have been applied to English measurement at that rate through this translation. There are various lengths of miles in different parts of Germany: According to RICARD, *Traité de Commerce*, tom. ii. p. 379. there are to a degree at the equator $10\frac{5}{10}$ miles of Brandenburg; $14\frac{3}{10}$ of Prussia; $12\frac{2}{10}$ of Saxony; $17\frac{1}{10}$ of Silesia: but the German mile which Tempelhoffe alludes to, is defined page 70, to be 2,000 rhineland rods, or 24,000 feet, which is $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles 1 furlong 11 poles 13 feet English.

TRANSLATOR.

In

In many circumstances this calculation will not hold good. In general you may go one mile in three quarters of an hour in tolerable roads, but amongst defiles, or over mountains, or on bad roads, particularly when the horses are bad, it will require one hour to go one mile. This makes the time of arrival and departure so distant, that in a march of nine miles, when the train consists only of one thousand waggons, a great part will not have driven off when the first waggon has arrived at the place of destination.

When three quarters of an hour is the time allowed for the going one mile, one hundred waggons are driven off in that time; in an hour and a half two hundred, in three hours four hundred, in seven hours and a half one thousand. The first waggon, after a march of nine miles, comes in at the end of six hours and three quarters, the hundredth after seven hours and a half, the two hundredth after eight and a quarter, the five hundredth after ten and a half, and the thousandth after fourteen hours and a quarter. From hence we may easily judge how slow the march must be when the train consists of some thousand waggons.

The following Tables are added for the better comprehension of this subject:

TABLE I.

Time for the Departure of the Waggon.

Time for each Mile.	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000	1500	2000	4000	5000
Hours.	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	2	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	5	$7\frac{1}{2}$	10	20	25
	$\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$	3	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$	6	$6\frac{3}{4}$	$7\frac{3}{4}$	$11\frac{1}{2}$	15	30	$37\frac{1}{2}$
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	15	20	40	50

Time for the Arrival of the Waggon.

TABLE II.

Time for the Arrival of the Waggon.

Time for the Arrival of the Waggon.	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000	1500	2000	4000	5000
Hours.	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	2	$2\frac{1}{2}$	3	$3\frac{1}{2}$	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	5	$7\frac{1}{2}$	10	20	25
	$\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$	3	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$	6	$6\frac{3}{4}$	$7\frac{3}{4}$	$11\frac{1}{2}$	15	30	$37\frac{1}{2}$
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	15	20	40	50

TABLE II.

Time for the Arrival of the Waggon.

Time for the Arrival of the Waggon.																	
Miles of the Route.		100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000	1500	2000	3000	4000	5000	
Hour	1	1	1½	2	2½	3	3½	4	4½	5	5½	8	10½	13	18	23	
	2	1½	2	2½	3	3½	4	4½	5	5½	6	8½	11	13½	18½	23½	
	3	2	2½	3	3½	4	4½	5	5½	6	6½	9	11½	14	19	24	
	6	3	4	4½	5	5½	6	6½	7	7½	8	10½	13	16½	21½	26½	
	9	5	5½	6	6½	7	7½	8	8½	9	9½	12	14½	17½	22½	27½	
	12	6½	7	7½	8	8½	9	9½	10	10½	11	13½	16	18½	23½	28½	
	1	1½	2½	3	3½	4	4½	5	5½	6	6½	8½	10½	13½	19	24	
	2	2½	3½	4½	5½	6½	7½	8½	9½	10½	11½	14	16½	19½	24½	29½	
	3	3½	4½	5½	6½	7½	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	15½	18½	21½	26½	31½	
	6	5½	6½	7½	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	17½	20½	23½	28½	33½	
	9	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	15½	16½	17½	20½	23½	26½	31½	36½	
	12	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	15½	16½	17½	18½	19½	22½	25½	28½	33½	38½	
Hour	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	16	21	26	31	36	
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	17	22	27	32	37	
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	18	23	28	33	38	
	6	5½	6½	7½	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	19½	24½	29½	34½	39½	
	9	7½	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	15½	16½	21½	26½	31½	36½	41½	
	12	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	15½	16½	17½	18½	23½	28½	33½	38½	43½	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	16	21	26	31	36	
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	17	22	27	32	37	
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	18	23	28	33	38	
	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	21	26	31	36	41	
	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	24	29	34	39	44	
	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	27	32	37	42	47	

From the first of these Tables we may observe with ease, in what time any given number of waggons can be marched off in one line, when we know exactly the number of miles marched in an hour. Suppose the train consists of five hundred waggons, moving one mile in an hour, look in the first Table for the column of time, viz. one hour, then look in the column of waggons, suppose five hundred, and in a direct line under this last is the required number which is five.

In order to find in how many hours five hundred waggons will get in after a march of six miles, moving at the rate of one mile an hour, look in the second Table in the column of distances, then in that of time, and in a line with them, directly under the number of waggons, is the number required, which in this case is eleven; so that five hundred waggons in marching the distance of six miles, at the rate of one mile an hour, will require eleven hours before they all arrive.

We may always find the time that any given number of waggons requires to be all driven off, by dividing their number by one hundred, and multiplying by the time of going one mile. To know the time of arrival, divide likewise by one hundred; add the number of miles. The product, multiplied by the time of going one mile, gives the answer.

From the foregoing principles it follows, that when a march must be made in one column, or row, the whole of a numerous train should never be

be ordered to set out at once, nor the horses to be put to the waggons all at the same time, for nothing is thus gained in point of expedition, but much is lost as to the preservation of the cattle. The troops which compose the escort, will also be fatigued without necessity. In fact, it is not bad roads, bad forage, nor heavy burthens, which seldom exceed four hundred weight to each horse, which knocks up the cattle, but this detestable and almost universal practice, which with all these mischiefs has not one single advantage to recommend it. Not unfrequently has this been the cause of a General's being stopped in the midst of his conquests, and hurled from the highest situation to the lowest.

Considering the present strength and composition of armies, always encumbered with a numerous train of carriages for various purposes, the preservation of the cattle is an object of the first importance: nor can a General, let his genius be what it may, expect that his projects shall have full success if due attention be not paid to it; for all undertakings, all operations in war, must have a very close dependence on the means employed in furnishing subsistence. If there be no rivers that are navigable in the country, this becomes infinitely more difficult, as the necessary supplies must undergo various transportations from magazines established from time to time in different places of strength, in the choice of which, as well as in all his future motions, a General has to weigh all circumstances

circumstances with the most minute attention. Then it is that his convoys become a chief object, lest the enemy shall find means to destroy them, and draw great advantages from the faults which are frequently committed upon such occasions.

It seems, indeed, that a commander scarcely can do better than regulate his motions by the convoys of his opponent, for he places him thereby in the disagreeable necessity of weakening his main body by strong detachments, and often of making manœuvres, from which he can propose no farther advantage than that of securing himself against want for a certain time.

The best method for the preservation of the horses, seems to be to form the whole train into several divisions, and to determine, from the knowledge of circumstances, the hour for each division to proceed. Suppose a train of fifteen hundred waggons, with the road so good that they can go two miles in an hour, it will be most advantageous for the waggons, as well as the escort, (which should be taken from the advance-guard, and divided into as many divisions as the waggons,) if every division sets out two hours and a half after the time that the preceding division began its march. This supposes the divisions to be of five hundred waggons each. If we chuse to march at three in the morning, the first division will have orders to strike tents, and put the horses to the waggons at half after twelve, the second at three, the third at half after five. They will then have driven off in the

following order; the first at three, the second at half after five, and the third at eight; let the column at half an hour per mile. Should the roads be so bad as only to admit of travelling at the rate of one mile an hour, the first division must be ready two hours and a half sooner, because five hundred waggons will then require five hours to drive off, so that the first division being ready at ten, the second at four, and the third at nine, they will have driven off at four, at nine, and two in the afternoon: the same with respect to the divisions of the escort.

Should the train be greater, and amount to four thousand waggons, it then becomes advisable to make two or three grand divisions, the conductor of which can afterwards form sub-divisions of five hundred, and drive off in the manner above mentioned. Suppose each grand division to consist of two thousand waggons, and that the first sets out on good road at two in the morning, the second grand division will remain at rest till ten o'clock, and the sub-divisions will set out in their proper order. If three grand divisions are formed, namely, one of fifteen hundred, and two of one thousand each, the first sets off at two in the morning, the second at eight, and the third at two in the afternoon.

In the first table we find the time for the different divisions to drive off at the rates of half an hour, of three quarters, or of one hour, per mile; but should the days be rather short, as in autumn,

a train

a train of some thousand waggons cannot possibly travel ten or a dozen miles in one day, unless they move in the night-time, which ought generally to be avoided, except particular circumstances, among which the approach of an enemy may be considered as the most pressing, shall render it absolutely necessary. Even in this case, each grand division should set out one day later than the preceding one, especially if the roads are bad, when fifteen hundred waggons will require fifteen hours to travel ten miles; so that if all the divisions were under orders to move, the day would be entirely spent, and part of the night, before a single waggon of the rear division could be put in motion.

It will also contribute to the preservation of the cattle, if the grand divisions, and even the subdivisions, change places, so that if they march this day in the order of 1, 2, 3, they may tomorrow be in the order of 2, 3, 1, and the next day 3, 1, 2. For as the roads are always cut up by the foremost waggons, the horses in those that are to follow must necessarily be more fatigued and worn down. This inconvenience is avoided by the above precaution, which renders the labour more uniform, and prevents any one part from suffering more than another. This should always be the practice, though the train should be comparatively small, as in a train of artillery of one hundred cannon and their attendant waggons, from three to four or five hundred. Some waggons of a certain description, such as carry money for example,

ample, are generally kept in the front on account of their being better covered by the advance-guard, as an enemy commonly chuses to attack the middle, rather than the head of a convoy.

All this is to be understood as applying to the case of the convoy having only one road. Should there be more, each grand division with its escort will take its separate road. But these roads must not run into one another at any point of the march, as that would be gaining nothing, and would in the end be exactly the same as if the whole had driven in one line. For suppose they could for one mile drive in two lines a-breast, and then came to a bridge, a defilé, or a village, where all the waggons must again get into one line, the first waggon of each division must come to the same place, but the first of the second division cannot drive off till the fifteen hundred of the first have passed this point, which will require two hours and a half, if at the rate of two miles an hour, or five hours, if at the rate of only one mile an hour. The being able to go part of the way in two rows, is therefore no reason for altering the hour of the departure of the second division. But if an attack should be apprehended upon the rear-guard, it will be necessary to drive in as many rows or lines as possible, even although they should afterwards be obliged to halt; at all such halting places, however, let the carriages be driven up wherever there is room to form a body of waggons; by which means they will be in a compact situation, and the escort will

not be dispersed. But this leads to a case of no less importance, which is the keeping of the train together. Let the roads be ever so bad, yet there will be only particular places where some of the worst appointed waggons will be unable to advance: this generally happens when the roads lie over mountains, or through defilés. Suppose a waggon halted, from this or any other cause, whether from the weakness of the horses, or the breaking of any part: according to the usual practice, the whole train will halt, in hopes that the obstacle will soon be removed; the consequence will be, that the foremost waggons will drive on; a separation will ensue; those which follow will lose much time, and, in the end, be completely left behind. Should this happen in many places, there will be a part here and a part there, and all connection both in the train and escort will be destroyed. For this, the following remedy may be applied: Whenever any waggon halts, those which follow must drive up into the nearest open place, in as large division as it will contain, and the remainder must do the same as soon as they find space. For instance, suppose that after driving three miles, the train comes to the foot of a mountain, where the waggons cannot continue without interval, and where some must halt. If there happens to be a spot, near the road, two hundred paces wide and forty long, two ranks of forty waggons each may be here drawn up. In this case, notwithstanding the halt of a waggon, those which follow may continue

tinue under way during the time that will be required for the eighty waggons to be driven up. Suppose at the interval of thirty waggons another halt takes place, and that they come to a spot six hundred paces wide and three hundred long; an opening of this size will admit of two thousand waggons being drawn up upon it. By this method there will be two thousand three hundred and eighty waggons in the length of three thousand and forty paces; but otherwise there could be no more than two hundred and fifty, and the whole of the remainder must have continued in camp. From this method, other advantageous circumstances will arise contributing to promote expedition. When a number of people and horses are assembled, the horses can be taken from the hindermost waggons, which will not require them for a considerable time, and can assist in forwarding those which are the worst appointed in respect to horses; a number of men may also be employed in repairing the roads; that part of the train, the conductors of which are not likely to move for the space of two or three hours, may refresh their horses, by giving them forage and water, or by letting them graze, if the season of the year admits of it. By these means the whole are more under the protection of the escort, which, being likewise more compact, are in a better posture of defence, and in the presence of an enemy can post themselves to advantage.

When the halt is caused by obstacles in the roads, or from the nature of the country, and not by the condition of the horses, or the breaking of car-

riages or harness, then the whole train will be cut asunder. Such waggons as have ascended a hill, or have got through a defilé, or other pass, will advance singly, so that sometimes there will be an interval of two or three hundred paces between each waggon. The escort, which consists of a certain number of men, appointed to a proportionate number of waggons, attaches itself either to the first or the last carriage of the line. In consequence of this practice, it frequently happens that for the space of a mile not a single platoon is to be seen; so that the mere appearance of a party of the enemy's hussars, or light troops, might be sufficient to disperse or even to destroy the whole train. I was witness myself to a case of this sort, which I would willingly relate, if I were not apprehensive of being led into too long a digression by a detail of the circumstances. When the carriages, from one cause or other, cannot reach their place of destination, and when some of them are under the necessity of halting, such as have passed the mountain, defilé, or other difficult passage, should not advance singly, but should halt whenever they come to a proper place, and should wait till a considerable number are collected together before they put themselves in motion. Those which are still behind, and which cannot advance on account of the halt of those before them, must drive to the foot of the mountain, or the entrance of the defilé, in the manner above-directed, as nearly as circumstances will permit. At the same time their proportion of the escort must take possession of every

every post which may be of advantage in keeping off the enemy.

Safety is undoubtedly the principal object of a General who is conducting a convoy, if he is exposed on either side to the attack of the enemy; and if he cannot advance by any other means than by fighting his way, he should oppose to the enemy as strong a body as the circumstances will allow. But he will be totally unable to oppose to them any adequate force, if the train be suffered to extend itself to a length disproportioned to the strength of the escort. It is evident therefore, that under these circumstances the whole train must not occupy upon their march more space than is capable of being sufficiently protected; and for this purpose, the single platoons must be within musquet shot, or at furthest within four hundred paces of each other: the main body of the escort, the advance-guard, the center and the rear, must be within such a distance as to be able to join in the space of an hour.

It is difficult, however, to put the above rule in practice, when the train occupies a longer space than about five miles. If, therefore, the convoy consists of several thousand waggons, it must either march in different columns, or (if it must of necessity march in a single column) its march must not exceed five, or at most seven miles in a day, let the road be ever so good. By this method, if the time at which the convoy should reach the army is not precisely fixed to a minute, it may

maintain itself till the arrival of succours, or perhaps even without succours; for the above-mentioned measures would probably be found so effectual and sufficient, that I really believe an enemy, unless with an extraordinary superiority, would find it difficult to make an impression upon a convoy under similar circumstances.

In order to explain myself more clearly upon this point, I will suppose a convoy of four thousand waggons to be conducted to the army under an escort of ten battalions and fifteen squadrons. Intelligence arrives upon the march that the enemy is approaching in force to attack the convoy. Upon this I determine to order the carriages to drive up in a body at the end of every five miles, and when they are all assembled, to move forward again; but since on account of the badness of the roads it may become necessary to halt before the train can have gone that distance, the officer commanding the advance-guard must have orders immediately to make the carriages drive up, whatever the cause of the halt may be, and however small the distance that has been travelled; and if the halt is occasioned by a mountain, a defilé, or any other particularity of ground, immediately to post his troops to the best advantage.

I would dispose the escort in the following manner: Four battalions and five squadrons, in the advance-guard, should march at the head of the train, and on the side where the enemy were seen. Upon the march they will take up fifteen hundred paces,

paces, viz. each battalion two hundred and fifty, and each squadron one hundred, being nearly as much as seventy-five waggons following close. Two battalions I would divide into platoons, extending along the train at the distance of four hundred paces from each other. For the same purpose I would also divide five squadrons each into four parts, extending along the convoy at the distance from each other of four hundred paces. These platoons and squadrons will form a chain of posts along the road, mutually supporting one another. Two battalions should protect the center, and four battalions and five squadrons form the rear-guard, and remain halted till all the waggons are driven off. I would regulate the march thus: First the advance-guard, then the battalions and squadrons divided as above among the waggons, which will move at the same time. When the last or tenth platoon of the second subdivided battalion has marched eight hundred paces, it halts and takes post; the ninth stops at twelve hundred paces, and so on regularly at the distance of four hundred paces, till all the platoons have taken post on the whole extent of five miles. The squadrons in like manner will take post between the intervals of the platoons, by quarter squadrons checquer-wise. The two battalions which protect the center will march with the advance-guard, and move with them, till they come to the spot where the General who commands the whole convoy shall shew them their post, which will be be-

tween two and three miles from the place of their departure. When the advance-guard has marched five miles they halt, and take post upon the most advantageous ground, while the train is advancing. The rear-guard sets out with the last waggon, and as they move they join with the platoons and squadrons, which increase the strength.

It is obvious, that by this mode of marching, a convoy is so well protected, that an enemy will not attack it without due deliberation; and if he should make the attempt, there will be troops at every point to make a very effectual opposition. Should he gain any advantage, it will most probably be trifling, such as the plundering of a few waggons, while the greatest part are either already driven up, or have not yet driven off; since only five hundred can be upon the march at once. Small bodies of light troops will not dare to make the attempt, and no corps that is not superior to the escort can hope for success.

According to this disposition, the march will certainly advance but slowly, especially in a single column. In this case, eighteen hours will be required to move ten miles, and to bring up the train to the spot where the advance-guard have taken post, even though the road should be so good that they could move at the rate of two miles an hour. But I must again desire to be understood, that I am supposing the enemy to be at hand, when the General who leads the convoy must

must look for an attack at every step. The whole then may be reduced to this single question: Whether it is better to march slowly and in security, or rapidly, and with the risque of losing the greater part, if not the whole, of the convoy? A question by no means difficult to decide.

However, even in these circumstances, the length of the day's march may be regulated by farther considerations; for suppose that the commanding General has intelligence either that the enemy is not in sufficient force to undertake any thing of importance, or that he is not yet near enough, or finally that he has taken post in front of the advance-guard, where he waits the arrival of the train. In this case it is unnecessary that the advance-guard should halt till the whole train be driven up; it will be sufficient to halt till two thousand waggons are assembled, which in good roads will be done in ten hours. Then the advance-guard sets out again with the train and single companies, whose post must be replaced by two battalions from the rear-guard.

It is scarcely necessary for me to observe, that the necessity of moving in one column can proceed only from some peculiar difficulty in the country, such as a rugged and narrow defilé. But if the country admits of moving in two columns, four thousand waggons may march five miles in ten hours, since they will only take up the time and space of two thousand. If the march can be made in three columns, there will be in each but thirteen hundred and thirty-four waggons, and in seven
hours

hours and a half the distance may be accomplished by the whole convoy; so that in either of these cases a double distance, namely ten miles, may be travelled, without losing any thing in point of security.

By this mode, the advance-guard comes to their post in two hours when their distance is five miles, as does likewise the first battalion, divided into platoons, and the two battalions which protect the center, reckoning from the time of their setting out. But the rear-guard will be sixteen hours upon the march when in one column, eight when in two, and five and a half when in three. If it be intended to march farther, this does not prevent the escort and the train from having their several accommodations, the troops of dressing their provisions, and the horses of being fed and watered. Even the platoons posted along the line of march may send men for wood or water, and if the enemy is not so near as to oblige them to keep their arms in their hands, they may likewise dress provisions; but the rear-guard has the greatest advantage from the time they have to remain in camp. The divisions of cavalry are in the worst predicament, for, until the rear-guard marches off, each division must consider itself as a vidette, and must regulate itself accordingly: nevertheless, if circumstances are not very pressing, they may send a few men from each troop, while their divisions remain in perfect order on the ground.

Those Generals of the Austrians, who attacked the convoy of four thousand waggons on its march

to

to Olmutz with so much success near Domstaedtel*, were now again united in command; but they did not appear at this time in so advantageous a light†. When they saw the train advancing, they were too precipitate in shewing themselves upon the heights, and beginning their fire. Instead of this, they should have suffered the advance-guard to have passed through the village, while the train continued their march; they should have kept back, and concealed their troops in the woods, till the critical moment when the train were advancing loosely, and then have rushed on with impetuosity. In the attack of a convoy, suddenness determines every thing, and at such a time a General must run every risk. The loss that he may suffer cannot materially affect the operations of his main army; but the success of such an enterprise will probably destroy the whole plan of the campaign on the part of his adversary. It appears as if the Austrian Generals here waited the attack, intending first to repulse their enemy, and then to come down in force upon the train. It is certainly true, that when a part of an escort advances against an enemy and is repulsed, a very serious impression cannot fail to be made upon the rest, especially upon the drivers, so that little more may be necessary than to follow the fugitives, in order to

* Namely, Generals Laudon and Ziskowitz.

TRANSLATOR.

† In the King's celebrated retreat from Olmutz, with a train much more numerous.

TRANSLATOR.

scatter

scatter the convoy if moving loosely, and to throw the whole into disorder. This was the case at Domstaedtel, but it did not follow that the same was to happen again. Perhaps, upon the whole, it is in most circumstances more advisable for the escort of a convoy to wait the attack, than to make it themselves; their only object is to bring the convoy through.

I have dwelt upon this subject longer perhaps than I ought to have done as an historian, in which character I confess a fault; but on the other hand, subjects of so material importance appear to be well worthy of the most complete discussion. The disposition I have here exhibited, may certainly admit of variation, according to circumstances, to which the leader of a convoy will duly attend, but the principles upon which it is founded are invariable: that the divisions of troops composing the escort must regulate their conduct by the nature of the country; and that the length of march which a convoy can with security make in a day, must depend upon the situation of the enemy. I am persuaded that these reflections upon the subject are just; and I would direct my conduct according to them, if I were placed in such a situation of command. Besides, I ground them not on simple theory: they were formed in the course of the most laborious experience.

HISTORY OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR.

Continued by Col. TEMPELHOFF.

*Bellum maxime omnium, quæ unquam gesta sunt, me scripturum.
Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque
contulerunt arma; neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium
aut roboris fuit; et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed
expertas—conferebant bello, et adeo varia belli fortuna
ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculo fuerint qui vincere;
odiis etiam propè majoribus certarunt quam viribus.*

LIVY.

THE prospects of the King of Prussia's enemies never appeared so flattering as after the battle of Kollin. Every circumstance seemed conspiring to accelerate his fall, when the battles of Rosbach and Lissa suddenly threw down the fabric of their hopes. On the one side, the army of the Empire is dispersed, the pride of France laid low, and the King in complete possession of Saxony. On the other, the great Austrian army in Silesia is completely

pletely ruined, and the Empress Queen no longer in possession of a single town or village in that country, which but a few days before she believed was again to be her own, with the single exception of Schweidnitz, and this with its whole garrison was now looked upon as lost. Prussia is cleared of the Russians, and the Swedes are driven to the gates of Stralsund; the French alone remain in possession of Hanover, and of other countries belonging to the King's allies.

But upon Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick obtaining the command of the allied army, the scene is changed as suddenly to the disadvantage of the French, and that they are not driven out of all their conquests is only to be attributed to the severity of the season.

In order to place in a clear point of view the situation of the King's enemies, it is necessary to take a retrospect of the operations of the allies in the last months of the preceding campaign.

After the battle of Hastenbeck, in which the allied army under the Duke of Cumberland was obliged to leave the field to the French, commanded by Marshal D'Etrées, the former were so circumscribed on every side by the superior numbers of the enemy, that the Duke of Cumberland found himself under the necessity of concluding, upon the 9th of September, the famous convention of Closterseven with the Duke de Richelieu, who had succeeded Marshal D'Etrées in the command.

By

By this it was stipulated, that hostilities should cease on both sides in twenty-four hours, and, if possible, still sooner; that the Hanoverian troops should retire to Stade, and to Saxe Lauenberg, on the other side of the Elbe; the Hessian, Saxe Gotha, Brunswick, and Buckebourg troops should return to their own country, and not be considered as prisoners of war.

The idea of having overcome an army, and the fame of having concluded the war in that country without bloodshed, flattered Marshal Richelieu to such a degree, that he forgot the dictates of common prudence. He bestowed his whole attention on the march of those troops towards their own country, and delayed their dispersion in their respective territories till the ratification of the treaty by the Court of France. The Duke of Cumberland endeavoured to protract the negotiation relative to the extent of their quarters. By the articles, under which the troops were not to be considered as prisoners of war, they were to keep their arms on their return home. The French, however, reserved to themselves the right of remaining in possession of the conquered countries, which was as much as to say, "These troops, with arms in their hands, shall patiently behold the misery of their native country." How Marshal Richelieu could suppose the possibility of any thing so unnatural, is incomprehensible. The King of Prussia had lately given a lesson upon this subject at Pirna,

Pirna*, which might have been instructive, but which made no impression on the Marshal. The desire of gathering golden laurels in the Prussian territories, appears to have impelled him to these precipitate measures.

The French ministry, instead of withholding their consent to articles so absurd and contradictory, thought it more advisable to involve them in obscurity, and in the mean time endeavour underhand to bring some of the allied troops into the pay of France; but having failed in this attempt, they endeavoured to explain away the articles, so as to oblige those troops to lay down their arms on their return home.

At length, after many fruitless attempts, the ratification was signed at Versailles, at a time, however, when the affairs of the allies began to wear a better aspect, a few days after the battle of Rosbach. But the ratification of the Court of London was also necessary, and it had been already declared on their part to the King of Prussia, that the convention had been framed without the participation of the British Government. Although this plainly shewed that it depended on their confirmation, yet any farther discussion was perfectly unnecessary, since the conduct of the French had

* To the King of Poland's proposal, that his troops surrounded at Pirna might keep their arms, the King wrote in the margin, with his own hand—"No; we do not chuse to have the trouble of taking them prisoners a second time."

TRANSLATOR.

rendered

rendered the observance of the convention impossible *.

According to the first articles of the convention, all hostilities between the armies were to cease. This seemed to imply that the situation of the Hanoverian, Hessian, and Brunswick countries, was to be made as tolerable as circumstances would permit; at least that they were to be exempted from acts of violence and plunder. That the French army should be supplied with provisions and forage

* The French acted as if this country had been a conquered province, and it actually received this appellation in all their edicts. Richelieu was not contented with exacting enormous contributions; and also considerable sums for himself; but a man of the name of Guatier was sent from Paris as farmer general of all the countries which might be conquered in Germany; and, by this French method of *farming*, was the whole Electorate of Hanover completely pillaged. The prime agent there was Foulon†, and who, after exacting considerable sums for many months, made a farther demand of an exorbitant contribution. This being refused, he caused ninety-three persons to be shut up in one chamber, where he kept them for three days and two nights, without giving them any thing to eat or drink; nor could they lie down to sleep on account of their numbers. On the third day, a new species of rigour was added to this inhuman treatment. Orders were given to the guard, to suffer no one to go out to ease the calls of nature; and when the Counsellors Gunderode, Hugo, and other prisoners of distinguished rank, intreated that they might have but a little bread and water: "You shall have a little to-day," said Foulon, "but do not expect that you are to have a similar indulgence any more."

ARCHENHOLTZ.

† The same who was massacred at Paris in July 1789.

TRANSLATOR.

R

till

till a full reconciliation should take place, was reasonable and necessary: but Marshal Richelieu did not appear inclined to let slip so favourable an opportunity, and which might not occur again, of turning his conquests to a profitable account, and of repairing those fortunes which the expence and pleasures of his modes of life had nearly ruined. Accordingly, these countries were subjected to the most immoderate contributions, which, by threats of fire, of sword, and of desolation, were exacted with the most hardened inflexibility. The people employed to levy them were insatiable beyond all bounds; perfect masters of the science of plundering systematically, these grasping tools invented the most unheard-of and the most rigorous methods of exaction, from which their army did not reap the least advantage. The forage and provisions were often sold, and soldiers in possession of the richest and most fertile countries were in want, being furnished with no article which was not of the most inferior kind, and such as could not be converted into money. The most dreadful consequences followed; the soldiers gave into the practice of marauding and the most unrestrained licentiousness; all military order was neglected, the desire of gain became the only principle of action; and although certain commanders, such as a Duke de Randau, or D'Armentieres*, might exert themselves to put a stop

* Archenholtz relates, that the Marquis d'Armentieres having taken a considerable town in the Electorate of Hanover, and

to such practices, and call their people back to order; yet, with respect to the whole army, their exertions were almost fruitless. The soldiers forsook their colours to escape from punishment, and to enjoy the fruits of robbery at ease. Hence that numerous army which Marshal D'Estrées had led on with so much reputation, were melted away in their numbers, sinking under disease and sloth; without discipline, without order, as incapable of enterprise, as devoid of resolution, of patience, and of all steady spirit of activity.

The heart of every patriot revolted at conduct so unprecedented, and the more so as all complaints from the unfortunate sufferers, so far from gaining them relief, seemed but the more to determine the entire ruin of their country.

Under such circumstances did the Sicilians give their Vespers * to the French. And in their own

and Deputies having come before him to implore his clemency, replied, "Gentlemen, I certainly did not come here to do you good; but you may rest assured, that I will do you as little harm as I can."

TRANSLATOR.

* Voltaire, in his *Essai sur l'Histoire*, vol. ii. p. 194. says, That every Frenchman on the island of Sicily was massacred upon this occasion, except one Gentleman, and the Governor and Garrison of Messina, who retired to Naples. A Frenchman offered violence to a woman in Palermo, while the people were going to vespers. The woman cried out; the people assembled and killed him, and in their fury proceeded to put every Frenchman to death. Voltaire adds, "That there was no formed conspiracy, but that the first act of private vengeance

own defence, and for self-preservation, the allies now at last resumed their arms. The troops assembled, and waited only for commands to recommence their operations. The Hanoverian ministry, in a manifesto of the 26th of November 1757, published the grounds on which this unexpected event had been permitted.

Immediately after the signing of the armistice, the Duke de Richelieu had marched with the greatest part of his army into the Bishoprick of Halberstadt, and there remained totally inactive, except in plundering, till the end of October. When he had exhausted the countries of Halberstadt, Magdebourg, and the Old Marche, and the severity of the weather had become intolerable to

“geance called forth and animated the general hatred.” The causes of this hatred, proceeding from conduct similar to that in Hanover, may be found in GIANNONI, *Istoria del regno di Napoli*, vol. ii. p. 413 to 416. At the moment that this sheet is under the press, it appears from the *Moniteur*, a French newspaper, of November 19, 1792, the name of which seems well chosen, that a Member of the National Assembly has the courage to complain of similar atrocities now practising at Nice by the French. “Thefts, robberies, and rapes,” he says, “the most arbitrary exactions, violation of the rights of hospitality, infractions of all good faith, the poor insulted and plundered in their cottages, the asylum of the farmer laid waste; these are the scourges which afflict a country to which liberty has lately been restored by your arms.” Lest the Orator should be torn to pieces for this too faithful picture, the period is rounded with the ridiculous assertion, that the adherents to Monarchy have bribed certain soldiers in their patriotic army to commit these actions. TRANSLATOR.

all the French in camp, he sent them into winter-quarters in Westphalia, Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse. He went himself from Halberstadt to Brunswick on the 6th of December, and there received the account of the overthrow of Soubise's army at Rosbach. At the same time he had intelligence that the allied army still remained unseparated, and thinking it probable that the convention might be now infringed, he drew together a body of troops near Soltau, under the Marquis de Villemur, which were to march to Harburg. He himself with another corps, which he had with all expedition assembled at Zell, went on the 19th from Gyfhorn to Lunenburg, and took up his head-quarters in that city on the 24th. On the same day Duke Ferdinand went from Brunswick by way of Hamburg to Stade, and there took upon him the command of the allied army, the Duke of Cumberland having quitted the command, and having set out for England on the 5th of October.

Duke Ferdinand wrote immediately to Marshal Richelieu, to inform him that the King of England had entrusted him with the command of his army, with orders to put them again in motion: that he forbore from expatiating on the causes of this measure, and that with much personal consideration he had the honour to be the Marshal's humble servant.

Richelieu was beside himself on the receipt of this letter. He threatened to lay in ashes all the

royal houses and possessions if the convention were broken, to level to the ground all towns and villages, without leaving the smallest hut, and that all the horrors of war should lay waste the country.

Duke Ferdinand, thinking it better to answer with the sword than with the pen, exerted his activity to turn to advantage the present extension of the French army through the different provinces. On the 26th of November he quitted Stade, and invested Harburg, leaving Lieutenant General Hardenberg with two thousand five hundred men to undertake the siege in form. General Diepenbrock was detached with another small corps towards Bremen and Verden. The Duke himself advanced with his main army of about twenty-five thousand men against Marshal Richelieu, who had taken his head-quarters at Winsen.

This unexpected march threw the Marshal into the greatest consternation; and as his troops now flocked in to him, he determined that the measure most expedient for him to adopt, was to evacuate the country between the Elbe and the Aller, and to abandon his well-stored magazines in that district to the enemy. At length when he had somewhat recovered from his first alarm, he began to form designs of making head against his opponent. The greatest part of his troops lay in the town of Zell and the neighbouring villages, but about fifteen thousand men were encamped with the right flank to Wester Zell, and the left towards the sheep folds.

In

In the mean time the allied army, led by their new commander, who was the idol of the soldiers, followed close the footsteps of their enemy, took possession of Lunenburg, and of other towns which had been abandoned, and on the 13th of December came in sight of the French near Altenhagen. The Duke took up his quarters in this village, and the army lay with their right wing opposite to Garsten, and the left towards Bostel. His advance-guard attacked the post in the village of Fritzenwiese. Richelieu would not undertake to defend it, but gave orders to lay the town and all the magazines in ashes, and drawing back, began to destroy all the bridges across the Aller, and to burn all the vessels which he could find on that river.

When the Governor of a besieged town is under the sad necessity of taking a step of this nature, he justifies himself by the rules of war, that a part shall be sacrificed for the preservation of the whole; but a commander at the head of an army more numerous by one half than that of his opponent, and having his front covered with a great town and river, who can adopt such measures merely to shew that it is in his power to exercise barbarity, exhibits an ample proof that something is defective either in his head or heart. Precipitation seems to have been the strongest feature in the Marshal's character.

Thus both armies remained opposed to each other till the 24th day of December, and suffered all the inconveniences arising from the nature of the season. Duke Ferdinand seeing the impossibility of extending his conquests, from the setting in of the severest cold weather, resolved to give some rest and refreshment to his troops, who with the greatest steadiness and patience had borne every inconvenience. In the night between the 24th and 25th of December he broke up his camp, and marched in three columns to Weyhausen, and from thence towards Weltzen. On the 28th the whole allied army were in winter-quarters between Weltzen and Ebsdorf. On the 29th the fortress of Harburg surrendered with its garrison under the Marquis de Perouse, and, after a brave resistance, obtained the liberty of free departure, on condition of not serving against the King of England and his allies during the war.

Marshal Richelieu followed this example, and his army hastened to winter-quarters. Thus ended the campaign in that country.

CAMPAIGN OF 1758.

This happy commencement, which seemed to promise to the allies the superiority over the French, added to the late overthrow of the great Austrian army, seemed to place matters upon more equality between the Belligerent Powers, but

but did not cause any change in the system of the King of Prussia's enemies.

Austria, which was still the most conspicuous character on the theatre of this unnatural war, grounded her expectations partly on the colossal strength of her alliances, but more upon the hope that by the mere continuance of the contest, the resources of the King must fail, and that after the greatest display of undaunted courage, firmness, and activity, he would finally be obliged to submit, and leave the greatest part of his dominions to the mercy of his enemies. Instead of reason and moderation in their demands, they determined that every proposal from the King, short of unconditional submission, should without farther consideration be rejected; and they prepared with all their strength for a continuance of hostilities, in which however they proposed to employ a greater degree of activity and intelligence than they had hitherto displayed.

Russia likewise gave the Empress Queen the strongest assurances, that a more numerous army than that of the former year should advance against the King. On account of the retreat from Prussia, the Empress Elizabeth removed Field Marshal Apraxin from the command, and gave orders for the strictest inquiry into his conduct during the campaign. In his justification, he produced the commands of the Prime Minister Bestuchef, who was deprived of all his dignities, and sent into imprisonment. Count Woronzoff obtained his place, and General Fermor was appointed to the command of the army. At the same time he received
positive

positive orders to take immediate possession of the kingdom of Prussia, out of which the King had withdrawn his forces, in order to employ them against the Swedes. Nothing was easier than this. Fermor arrived on the 22d of January at Königsberg, and before the end of the month the whole of Prussia was in the hands of the Russians.

The other powers forming this alliance, France, Sweden*, and the Empire, likewise declared to the Court of Vienna, that they would bring into the field such armies as would be sufficient in point of numbers to accomplish the objects of alliance as soon as possible, and they all appeared disposed to sacrifice their own interests to those of the Empress Queen.

The efforts of the Court of Vienna, to re-establish their army, which had been nearly annihilated, and to render it truly formidable, were proportioned to the greatness of their projects. They intended to take the field in still greater force this campaign, and with this view made a considerable augmentation to each regiment. Their plan of operations was concerted with Russia and France, and three armies were to be set in motion against the King from Austria alone: one under Marshal Daun of sixty-four battalions, forty-five companies of grenadiers, and seventeen regiments of cavalry: The second under Marshal Bathiani of thirty battalions, twenty-eight companies of grenadiers, and

* See the article respecting Sweden at the end of this Miscellany.

forty-eight squadrons: The third under Marshal Nadaſti of ſix battalions, four companies of grenadiers, and twenty-four squadrons. The light cavalry and infantry were not included in this number, but of themſelves, without reckoning the huſſars, were to conſiſt of forty thouſand Croats, twenty thouſand Raitzens*, ten thouſand Boſniacks, ſix thouſand Imperial troops from Italy, ſix hundred Piedmonteſe, ſix hundred men from the Low Countries, and five hundred markſmen from the Tyrol. In the liſts which were publiſhed, by authority, were inſerted the names of all the regiments and generals which were to be employed; and even if this formidable hoſt ſhould not be found actually ſo numerous as upon paper, yet the one half of them, in conjunction with France and Ruſſia, was amply ſufficient to give occupation to the King on every ſide.

On the other hand, the King did not neglect a moment to prepare himſelf for the encounter. This he was enabled to do, by his admirable ſkill in government. Nothing is more remarkable in the hiſtory of this extraordinary war, than the rapidity with which armies were replaced. In the annals of the world no ſuch examples are to be found. Six great battles, and the deſtructive ce-

* Theſe are ſchiſmatics of the Greek religion, of whom there are many thouſands in the Emperor's dominions; and who differ with violence from their Eſtabliſhed Church, chiefly with reſpect to the mode of adminiſtering an oath.

TRANSLATOR.

lerity

levity of the rapid movements which the King made in order to present a front to his enemies upon every side, had reduced his army to a third of its original number; and yet, by the beginning of April, it was again completely recruited, and provided with every necessary article. A multitude of prisoners of war, allured by the high fame which the Prussian soldiers had acquired in the preceding campaign, voluntarily engaged in the service, and the numbers still wanting were soon replaced by the admirable regulation which exists in Prussia, that allots to each regiment a certain district for the raising of recruits, where each child knows that as soon as he has strength he is destined for a soldier, and where each mother has a pride in having reared brave soldiers for the service of the state. These, at the opening of the campaign, had not all joined their colours, but were assembled in different quarters, where they were instructed in the use of arms, and by degrees were sent off to the army.

Besides completing the four free battalions already raised, four more were added. When it is considered that these were mostly composed of prisoners of war and deserters, it would have appeared that they were not much to be depended upon; but experience has shewn, that whether from their hopes of booty, or whatever cause, the army received very useful service from them.

The

The British Ministry now adopted the most effectual means for the vigorous prosecution of the war, and were powerfully supported by the patriotism of the nation. The necessary sums were granted with the greatest readiness for the equipment of a numerous fleet, and for the maintaining of the army in Germany. The latter, by the activity of Duke Ferdinand, was not only completed in a short time, but was increased in number by a considerable body of light troops. The artillery, the pontoon train, and bakery, were all in the best condition; the magazines were filled, a number of carriages for the transportation of provisions were in readiness, and the army was so thoroughly provided with every implement of war, that they were ready at the very first command to recommence their operations.

But notwithstanding these circumstances, the King of Prussia was certainly in a more serious situation than at the opening of the former campaign, when he had only the Austrian army opposed to him. His numerous enemies had now advanced, were in possession of several of his provinces, and ready to attack him in the center of his dominions. It was likewise probable, that they had derived instruction from experience, and that the leisure they had enjoyed during the winter had been so employed in concert with each other, that they would now pour down their whole force like a torrent, to overwhelm the Prussian state.

The

The views of the Kings of Prussia and England with respect to Germany, were not directed towards conquest; but, at the same time, they by no means resolved to adopt a system of war which should be merely defensive. Every moment was the rather to be marked by some measure of activity, in order to fall with united force upon any unguarded part, before it could receive support, and thus subtract from the general scale its future strength in the course of the campaign. Extraordinary efforts alone could be competent to such an object, and promised most success when soonest undertaken. It therefore was resolved to attack the French in the middle of the winter, and to drive them from their conquests.

So great an enterprise, undertaken with an army weaker by one half than that of their enemy, originated in the character of the great leaders. They saw the nature and condition of the French army, and knew that their Generals conceived an attack to be impossible, at a time when rest and re-establishment appeared so necessary for the allied armies. So quickly to discern the advantage, to design and execute an operation of such magnitude, required uncommon talents. True military genius, fertile in the invention of such measures as often seemed in contradiction to established principles; a creative power to force superiority; knowledge to distinguish in untrodden paths the possible from the improbable, and to discriminate those points of time when daring shall be prudence; activity to employ the favourable moment, and to seize

seize hold of the prodigious influence which the extraordinary has upon the minds of men: these were the qualities necessary for such an undertaking.

Richelieu had dispersed his troops through all the King's conquered provinces in Westphalia, and through the electorates of Hanover and Hesse. The Weser and Aller covered his left flank, and the populous cities of Zell, Brunswick, Wolfenbüttele, Hanover, and Hildesheim, formed the middle of his quarters. His right extended beyond Cassel and Fulda to the Mayne. Thinking that his left was not altogether free from danger, he resolved to possess himself of Bremen, which hitherto had always been looked upon as a free imperial city: with this view he detached the Duke of Broglie, who on the 15th of January, partly by stratagem and partly by force, made himself master of that city. On the other side the few Prussians troops which remained in Halberstadt gave him some disturbance. He committed the task of driving them from thence to the Marquis of Voyer, who had distinguished himself above all the French Generals by his inhumanity. General Junken with his weak garrison retired before him to Magdeburg. Voyer exacted a payment of two hundred thousand rix dollars, and after six days possession left the town, with such memorials of his cruelty as leave the greatest stain upon his character.

After these measures, and when he thought himself sufficiently enriched, the Marshal asked permission

mission to resign, which he obtained, and thus anticipated the commands of his Court, which had resolved to remove him on account of the numerous complaints of his misconduct, and to replace him by the Count de Clermont, a Prince of the blood. On the 8th of February he left Hanover, and came to Paris laden with his disgraceful plunder, not the fruit of victories, but the product of inhuman avarice. There, as if to shew how little he regarded the opinion of his country, he built a splendid mansion under the eyes of the whole capital, which the wits of Paris satirically named *The Hanover Pavilion*. This Parisian vengeance was the only one that he sustained; and when the people flattered themselves that he was about to suffer the whole displeasure of the Court, he arrived with all his smiles and grimace, and soon after obtained the government of Guienne*.

Fortune

* It is more than probable that Richelieu's conduct in Hanover was in consequence of the express orders of the Court of Versailles; at least it is very certain that afterwards, in a letter from the Duc de Choiseul to the Marechal Duc de Broglie, dated Paris, 28th of August 1761, he says twice in the same letter, "I repeat to you, Monf. le Marechal, that the King's orders, which you will punctually obey, are, first to secure your communication with Gottingen; and secondly, that you do all the mischief you possibly can to the Electorate of Hanover." The courier, bearing this letter, and several others in the *paquet de la cour*, was intercepted near Hanau, in September 1761, on his way to the Duc de Broglie's army. Authentic

Fortune was as favourable to the Marshal on his quitting the command, as she had been on his assuming

thentic copies of the *intercepted letters* are in the Translator's possession. The words of the letter alluded to, are as follows :
 " Votre communication assurée, il vous reste deux objets à remplir ; l'un de veiller à la conservation de la Hesse par votre gauche (that is, to prevent the allies from taking Hesse) l'autre par votre droite, *de faire autant de mal qu'il vous sera possible à l'Electorat d'Hanovre.*" And again, " En consequence, je vous repète Monf. le Marechal, à present l'ordre du Roi, auquel vous voudrez bien vous soumettre, est
 " 1^{mo} d'assurer la communication avec Göttingen ; 2^{do} de faire par votre droite *à l'Electorat d'Hanovre le plus de mal qu'il vous sera possible.*"

Some farther Extracts from this *paquet* may not be improperly inserted here :

" A Monsieur,

" Monsieur le Marechal Duc de Broglie, Prince du S. Emp. Chevalier des ordres du Roi ; commandant son armée sur le Haut Rhin.—N. B. Cette lettre etait sans signature, et en doubles couverts à differents cachets, apparemment de la Tante de Messieurs de Broglie.

" A Paris ce 21 Aout 1761.

" Ce n'est que pour vous donner des marques que je suis en vie que je vous écris par ce Courier, n'ayant rien de nouveau à vous mander. Monsieur de Choiseul a soupé chez M. de Stanley, et a dit que M. de Soubise venoit d'envoyer un courier, pour marquer que le Prince Ferdinand etoit tombé en apoplexie. Le Roi l'a dit aussi à Choisi ; pour moi j'aime en general tout le genre humain, et en particulier les grands hommes, dont certainement M. le Prince Ferdinand est du nombre, et quoiqu'il soit notre ennemi je lui souhaite une très bonne santé et toutes sortes de prospérité personnelle. Je n'en dis autant de son armée, que je souhaite mes chers neveux que vous fussiez
 " bien

assuming it. At that time he reaped upon the field whereon he had not sown, those fruits, to which

“ bien si vous en trouvez l'occasion. Il n'a encore rien paru
 “ du Roi au sujet des affaires du Parlement. On s'attend a
 “ Paris a une bataille, pour moi j'ignore les ordres de la cour,
 “ mais ce que je fais parfaitement bien, c'est que s'il y en a une,
 “ vous y ferez bien l'un et l'autre votre devoir, ne vous exposez
 “ pourtant pas trop; des Generaux doivent se menager, et
 “ j'aime trop mes neveux pour ne les pas exhorter a la pru-
 “ dence, qui est inseparable d'avec le vrai courage. Adieu,
 “ mes chers neveux. Je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur.”

“ To Monsieur,

“ Monsieur the Marshal Duke of Broglio, Prince
 “ of the Empire, Knight of the different Orders, Commander
 “ of his Majesty's army on the Upper Rhine, &c. &c.—
 “ N.B. This letter was without signature, enclosed in two
 “ covers, with each a seal, and appears to be from the Aunt
 “ of Messrs. de Broglio.

“ Paris, August 21, 1761.

“ I write to you by this courier, merely to give you a proof
 “ of my being alive, having nothing new to communicate.
 “ M. Choiseul supped at M. Stanley's, and said there, that
 “ M. Soubise had just sent a courier with intelligence, that
 “ Prince Ferdinand has had an apoplexy. The King himself
 “ has said the same at Choisi. For my part, I love in general
 “ the whole human race, and particularly great men, among
 “ whom we surely may include Prince Ferdinand; and though
 “ he be our enemy, I wish him very good health, and every
 “ sort of personal prosperity. I do not say as much with re-
 “ gard to his army; but wish, my dear nephews, you may
 “ give them a sound drubbing the first opportunity. Nothing
 “ has yet appeared from the King upon the subject of the Par-
 “ liament. At Paris they expect to hear of a battle. I am
 “ ignorant

which his predecessor, from his victories as well as his gentle disposition and forbearance, had surely

" ignorant of the orders of the Court, but I know most perfectly that, whenever there shall be one, both of you will perform your duty well; but do not expose your persons too much. General officers ought to be careful of themselves; and I love my nephews too well not to exhort them to prudence, which is inseparable from true courage. Adieu, my dear nephews; I embrace you with all my heart."

" A Monsieur,

" Monsieur le Comte de Broglie, Marechal General de logis de l'armée, Haut Rhin.—N. B. Cette lettre étoit écrite de la propre main du Duc de Choiseul, mais sans signature. Le cachet étoit celui du Duc de Choiseul.

" A Versailles ce 27 Aout 1761.

" Oh pour cette fois Monsieur le Comte l'on ne peut pas sans l'injustice la plus criante accuser Monsieur de Soubise, de ce qui arrive a votre armée, et de la seconde partie de la campagne; peu importe que les Generaux tachent de sauver leurs fautes, ou sur les individus, ou sur la Cour, ce qu'il y a de certain c'est, que nous faisons la plus vilaine campagne qui ait été fait de la guerre dans toutes les armées, meme celles des Russes, et que Monsieur le Prince Ferdinand, en nous couvrant de ridicule en la face de l'Europe, se couvre de gloire. Il faut convenir qu'il en fait plus que nos Generaux, et reunis et separément, ce qui est fort affligeant pour les affaires du Roi, surtout dans les circonstances presentes; le pire de tout, c'est qu'il n'y a plus rien de raisonnable ni meme de possible a faire que de rester sur la defensive. Je vous souhaite autant de patience qu'il m'en faut, mais je ne crois pas qu'il m'arrive de faire un nouveau plan d'offensive vis à vis du Prince Ferdinand, ni une seconde fois la depense que cette année a occasionnée au Roi. Si vous pouvez vous consoler par les nouvelles, il court un

" bulletin

surely a better right. Now he left to his successor an army neglected and enervated by the greatest

“bulletin très bon de votre armée, qui dit que vous faites les
 “plus belles choses du monde. Si cela étoit, le public verroit
 “que la montagne accouchera d’une souris, et il vaudroit
 “mieux ne lui pas faire croire qu’elle est en couche. Adieu,
 “mon cher Comte, c’est toujours avec la même liberté, et le
 “même attachement que je vous mande très naturellement
 “ce que je pense.”

“To Monsieur,
 “Monsieur the Count Bröglio, Quarter-Master Ge-
 “neral of the army on the Upper Rhine.—N. B. This letter
 “was written with the Duke de Choiseul’s own hand, but
 “without signature. The seal was that of the Duke de
 “Choiseul.”

“Versailles, August 27, 1761.”

“Well—for this once at least, Monsieur le Comte, nobody
 “can accuse M. de Soubise, without the greatest injustice of
 “what has happened to your army, and of losing the campaign
 “a second time. It is of little consequence whether Generals
 “endeavour to excuse their own faults, by imputing them to
 “individuals or to the Court; but there is one thing certain,
 “that we have made the most villanous campaign which has
 “yet been made by any army during the war, that of the
 “Russians not excepted; and that Prince Ferdinand, while he
 “covers us with ridicule in the face of all Europe, has at the
 “same time covered himself with glory. It must be acknow-
 “ledged, that he knows more of the matter than all our Ge-
 “nerals collectively or individually, which is very dismal for
 “the King’s affairs, especially in the present circumstances.
 “The worst of all is, that there is nothing left for us to do,
 “either reasonable or possible, but to remain on the defensive.
 “I wish you as much patience as I stand in need of myself;
 “but I do not think that I shall again draw up a new plan of
 “offensive measures while Prince Ferdinand is opposed to us,

“nor

greatest excesses, and, from want of regulation in the hospitals, in the most miserable condition †.

By

“ nor that an expence will be again incurred similar to what
 “ this year has brought upon the King. If news can console
 “ you, there is in circulation a very good paper, relative to
 “ your army, which says, that they are doing great things
 “ indeed. Were they doing any thing, the public would see
 “ that the mountain would bring forth a mouse, and it is
 “ therefore much better not to make them believe that it is in
 “ labour. Adieu, my dear Count: It is always with the same
 “ freedom and attachment that I express to you my thoughts
 “ without reserve.”

† The Court of France, says the King of Prussia, (*Oeuvres Posthumes*, vol. iii. p. 222.), rewarded their Generals in a manner somewhat singular. Marshal D'Etrées, for gaining a battle, was recalled, and Soubise, soon after his defeat at Rosbach, was made a Marshal of France.

Having frequently quoted the King of Prussia's works in the notes, we cannot refrain from calling the attention of the reader to a dialogue in the sixth volume. Prince Lichtenstein is introduced, on his arrival in the other world, to Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough. He informs them, that every thing is changed for the better now in Europe. “ What,” says Eugene, “ I suppose the Imperial house, whose power I confirmed and extended, has made immense progress since my time.” — “ Not exactly so; for, since your death, we have been beaten by the Turks, the Prussians, and the French, and have lost a mere trifle of half a dozen provinces; but we keep up one hundred and sixty thousand men, which you never could have payed in your time. We never take the field without four hundred pieces of artillery, and you never had thirty cannon in your whole army *. As to you, my Lord Marl-

* Eugene and Marlborough had upwards of one hundred pieces of cannon in the battle of Malplaquet.

TRANSLATOR.

By these means, he laid the foundation of the dismal misfortunes which persecuted the French during

“borough, men who hardly know the meaning of a company,
 “or a squadron, decide that you were no soldier; that you
 “owed your reputation to Lord Cadogan, and that you were
 “rather a Politician than a General. What, (says Eugene,) will neither Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, or
 “Malplaquet, serve as a buckler to shield the name of the
 “great Marlborough? It is true, (replies Lichtenstein,) that
 “Queen Anne without Marlborough, and Charles the Sixth
 “without Eugene, would have made but a sorry figure; but
 “there are now a set of men, called Philosophers, who know
 “nothing of the military art, and think to render it contemptible, by abusing it upon all occasions. They in like
 “manner abuse every art and science, but that of Geometry,
 “Socrates, Gassendi, Aristotle, and Bayle, they say were
 “blockheads. There never was any wisdom, (say these
 “blackguards,) but what we have discovered. We will
 “change all governments. France must become a Republic,
 “whose Legislators need only to be Geometricians, and who
 “say, that they mean to establish a perpetual peace, and to
 “preserve it without an army.” Astonishing, that in three
 years, since the death of the great Frederick, but how long
 after he wrote these words we know not, France has actually
 become a Republic! What penetration to prognosticate this
 event! But how far the rest of the intentions of the Geometricians have succeeded, who have cut up France into parallelograms of eighty-three departments, how far they have produced the universal peace, every one can decide without difficulty. England has been forced into every war she has engaged in, since our Revolution, by the intrigues of this ambitious people; but their republic has out-done all their former out-doings. “The restless meddling disposition of that country, which has been so long the scourge of mankind under
 “the despotism of its Crown, has now shewn itself no less
 “disposed

during the whole course of this war, opposed to an enemy whose spirits under their new commander

“ disposed to blast the happiness of man under the still more
 “ wild and unlimited despotism of the people.” It is their
 nature to sicken at the welfare of all other countries. “ Ah !”
 says one of their great men, on hearing of Lord Cornwallis’s
 glorious termination of the war in India, (which their intrigues
 had lighted up, not foreseeing that their own affairs were im-
 mediately to be in the total confusion in which they have in-
 volved them,) “ *Ah ! que la prospérité de ce pays ci d’Angle-*
terre est affreuse !” This he had the impudence to say in
 England. Thank God their hopes are now frustrated, that
 their efforts would prove as successful in this country as they
 did in America. Notwithstanding our total forbearance and
 neutrality, the President of their National Convention has
 actually pronounced in his place, that he hopes and believes he
 soon shall see in England, “ A National Convention, a Form
 “ of Government, and a degree of Liberty, similar to that in
 “ France.” What a prostitution of the sacred word of li-
 berty ! What a perversion of every principle of reason, justice,
 and common sense ! There needs nothing to prove the state of
 dreadful anarchy to which they have brought their country.
 The speeches of their own Orators in their Convention draw
 the dreadful picture in its natural colours. A Monsieur St.
 Juste, in the French newspaper the *Moniteur* of December 1,
 1792, in a long speech has the following expressions, the truth
 of which not one speaker contradicted : “ So many evils de-
 “ rive their source from a complication of deeply rooted dis-
 “ orders. Man become once more in a savage state, acknow-
 “ ledges no controul ; the most horrible crimes are committed
 “ under the pretence of justice ; there is no employment
 “ for the industrious, but that of enlisting to be soldiers ;
 “ famine and epidemical disorders are rapidly gaining do-
 “ minion, &c. &c.”

* Part of Mr. Grant’s speech in the House of Commons.

mander rose in proportion as those of the French soldiers were depressed. Marshal D'Etrées had shewn him the road to conquest. He paved the way for his successor's ruin.

The Count de Clermont, &c. * * * * *

Compare this description with the present state of this happy country, with the affluence and comfortable provision enjoyed by all degrees of men under our Government. We cannot draw the conclusion in better words than those of the Earl of Hardwicke in the House of Lords on the 13th of December 1792, THAT IN PUBLIC LIFE, AND FROM NATION TO NATION, AS WELL AS FROM MAN TO MAN, AN OPEN, AN HONORABLE, AND A GENEROUS CONDUCT, IS, IN EVERY SENSE OF THE TERM, AN INFINITELY BETTER POLICY, THAN ANY WHICH CRAFT AND SUBTLETY HAVE EVER DICTATED.

**MILITARY
MISCELLANY.**

PART II.

CONTAINING

A Treatise on Winter Posts.

Translated from the GERMAN of

C. F. LINDENAU,

Captain in the Prussian Service.

P R E F A C E.

THE Editor has already mentioned at the end of the introduction, that the following Treatise has met with much approbation in Germany. The few examples which the Author has adduced in illustration, are chiefly from events which happened in the short war of 1778, and a few more are now added in the notes.

Many have spoken of the inactivity of the great armies during the summer of that year, and it has been asserted, that they felt such mutual awe, as to evince “ That an equal distribution of force, “ talents, military skill, discipline, and courage, “ may produce the same effects which usually proceed from weakness, want of spirit, defect in “ ability, and inexperience in war*.”

But yet it cannot be denied, that the King of Prussia restrained and kept in awe the whole Austrian force; that he chose the theatre of war at a distance from his own dominions, and subsisted on the territories of his enemy; that Prince Henry penetrated into Bohemia from Saxony, deceiving

* Annual Register, 1778.

Marshal Laudon by one of the most extraordinary marches upon record, in which he took or destroyed four of the enemy's regiments, and their great magazine at Leutmeritz; that the Prussian arms conquered the dutchies of Troppau and Jægerndorf, in Austrian Silesia; and above all, that the object for which the great Frederick engaged in his last war, was fully and completely gained.

During the winter of 1778, Silesia was the scene of constant indefatigable enterprize; affording in the warfare of posts extraordinary examples of effort and of talent. The harvest of military knowledge was gathered upon that occasion by a skilful hand; and it is hoped will not prove unacceptable in the form in which it now appears.

O F

WINTER POSTS.

IN treating on a science of so much importance as the choice of winter posts, it may be proper to take a general view of the subject, before we proceed to the discussion of the various parts of which it is composed.

When the setting in of severe winter weather makes it probable that the end of the campaign is approaching, the cordon or chain of posts is chosen, and is occupied by the troops appointed for that service, the army moves into quarters of cantonment, and remains ready to assemble in order of battle at the shortest notice, until reports of the separation of the enemy's forces are confirmed by the most indubitable intelligence. When nothing material is any longer to be apprehended from the enemy's movements, the troops retire behind the cordon into commodious winter quarters

ters for their reinstatement from the labours of the past campaign.

In the choice of the posts which are to compose this cordon, we must be careful not to lose sight of the three following considerations, first, the preservation and protection of the provinces, whether of our native country, or of the conquests which have been made; next, the possession of such passes and positions as may be of importance in the opening of the next campaign; and finally, the security of the troops in winter-quarters, and the maintaining their communication free.

As the whole burthen of the war during the winter must fall upon the troops composing the cordon, they must, as much as ever the nature of the ground will permit, be secured by every possible advantage, whether of rivers, mountains, defiles, or woods, &c. against every attempt which the enemy may be expected to make.

It being then one of the most important effects of a good winter position, that by means of a few troops the greatest part of the army may remain unharassed in their quarters, we must endeavour to chuse such ground as shall be best adapted for this end, where a front of no great extent, and easily to be defended from its strength, shall cover a considerable extent of country against irruptions of the enemy.

Such advantageous positions are to be found by means of considerable defiles, or mountains; if by defiles, the posts will adjoin to them: there must be

be likewise interjacent posts, and the end proposed will be obtained with the least possible number of troops if we advance or retire to the narrowest point between such defilés. Should these stretch away from thence in a different direction, they will afford the necessary interior space for the troops in quarters, as also the means of defence for those of the cordon.

If the post be formed by mountains, material advantages are to be derived from circumstances somewhat similar; we may find an extent of declivity, impracticable for artillery or columns of men. Part of the cordon will be drawn towards the places where such ridges run the nearest to each other, and where of consequence the avenues of the enemy's approach will be the narrowest.

Few troops will also in this case be necessary for the cordon, and the troops in quarters will enjoy considerable security from an extent of such steep and impassable mountains, stretching along their front between them and the enemy.

A combination of these two circumstances of mountains and defilés may occur, to which the same observations are applicable; and this measure of chusing our posts amidst such fastnesses of difficult access, (which is also the grand principle of defensive war, as the best means of counteracting a numerous enemy with a small number of troops,) must never be omitted, where it is practicable, in the choice of winter posts, from the first formation

of the grand outline of the whole to the more minute consideration of all the lesser posts.

This principle being duly attended to, the following rules must farther be diligently observed:

1st, To distinguish in the general outline, what quarters and posts must, from their nature, be considered as forming a part of the cordon, and what are otherwise.

2d, To contrive the posts so as that the troops in them may afford a mutual assistance to each other, and may form a ready junction against the enemy's attempts.

3d, That the advance posts may be guarded against a coup de main, and either be enabled to defend themselves until support arrives, or to withdraw to that support.

4th, That the troops for the support of such posts be vigilant, so as to arrive in due time for the relief of those employed in the defence.

5th, That the patrols employed to watch the movements of the enemy, may fulfil that object by having a perfect knowledge of the ground they are to pass over, as well as of the enemy's position.

6th, That the alarm posts and places of arms for the out-guards, the place of general parade, and the spot for rallying upon, shall be fixed and determined, so that the first may afford the best defence to the quarters or posts; that the second may admit of the speediest formation; and that,
by

by means of the last, the rejunction of any number of troops, who may have been obliged to give way, may be effected with the aid of certain signals.

7thly and lastly, That when these necessary precautions have been taken, the intent of them may be explained to every one.

The necessity of every precaution will be acknowledged, when we consider what very pernicious consequences may attend neglects or faults committed in our choice of winter posts, or in our conduct in them. The faults committed during a campaign, whether in encampments, in manœuvres, or even in a day of battle, may very often escape unnoticed, either from their being of a momentary nature, from the obstacles which prevent the enemy from seeing them, or from their want of quick discernment, or, if in battle, from the smoke and confusion which prevails: but, during the long duration of a winter-quarter, there is abundant leisure and ample opportunity for forming the most critical remarks upon our choice of winter posts; and such faults as we commit on this occasion, will seldom remain long unpunished. We, therefore, consider it as expedient to treat this subject at some length, and to divide our general view of the whole into two sections: the first on the choice of posts in a level country; the second on the choice of them in that which is mountainous.

ON THE CHOICE OF POSTS IN A LEVEL
COUNTRY.

The nature of a country may not always be such as to admit the drawing of our chain of winter posts among mountains. There may chance to be few or none in the province which is the theatre of war, or they may not be in the line through which our posts must run, or the enemy may have already taken possession of them, and may have posted themselves so strongly that it is no longer advisable to attempt the driving them from thence.

In such circumstances, when we are circumscribed as to our choice, we must take post upon the plain, and then can only avail ourselves of such aid, as water, wood, or defilés, afford. Should even these be wanting, we must have recourse to fortification for our security. Even in this case, it may be proper sometimes to contract the line of the cordon, and even to abandon certain parts of a country not of very considerable importance, for the more advantageous possession of the rest.

When the posts are bordering on considerable defilés, they may be considered as well protected against the enemy's designs, if proper vigilance be observed, and care be taken to obtain tolerably good intelligence. The enemy are in this case exposed to double difficulties and dangers: first, in their attack, as they must pass the defilés before

fore they can come upon the posts established at the most suspicious places; and as a certain length of time is requisite before this can be accomplished, our troops can draw together and frustrate the attempt. Secondly in their retreat, in which the loss they have reason to expect is greater than the advantage they could propose to themselves if they had been successful. This consideration will probably cause the enemy to refrain from enterprises of magnitude against our posts in such a situation, and unless he be encouraged, by our neglect of necessary precautions, he probably will be content with the partial efforts of a few skirmishing parties. These precautions in this instance may be stated in the following manner:

After carefully reconnoitring the defilés, and discovering every possible pass across them, all bridges or paths must be destroyed which cannot be commanded by our posts, that the enemy may not avail himself of them: all causeways must be broken up, and all fords must be spoiled. In time of frost, great care must be taken to break the ice, or by means of boats moving up and down at least to keep a part in the center unfrozen. In the year 1658, the Danes employed this precaution in the island of Fuenen against the Swedes on Jutland, who suffered great loss in consequence, notwithstanding that they had a number of boards to cross the cuts in the ice. Whole divisions of their troops were drowned, and they were thrown into such disorder, that in all probability, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, their

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enterprise

enterprise would have failed had the Danes availed themselves of the circumstance as they might have done. In the seven years war, the Swedes having been obliged to evacuate Stralsund, and to retire into the island of Rugen, employed the above-mentioned precaution with success against the Prussian army during the frost of the winter of 1758. It certainly cost them considerable expence and labour, for they kept open and free from ice, during the month of January, a canal above twenty miles in length along the coast of the island.

Alarm poles or fanalas must be fixed upon the most commanding eminences, by means of which, and of signal guns, the whole of the troops belonging to the post may receive information of the enemy's motions, and that the regiments after assembling singly may, as shall be pointed out by the preconcerted signals, either hasten to any point which may be in immediate danger, or repair to the general alarm posts.

But when the quarters and posts which we are obliged to take up on the plain, are either protected by defilés, by places of strength, by woods, or abbatis, and have nothing to rely upon but their out-posts, while the enemy are in possession of the mountains, it becomes very necessary in so serious a situation, that we remove to as great a distance from such mountains as the situation and circumstances of the war will admit. It will be expedient to keep at least ten miles from them, that our opponent may, after every attempt, have a long stretch

stretch of plain to retire over before he can regain his woods and fastnesses. The apprehension of our coming up with him and beating him, or cutting him off, may possibly deter him from any undertaking against us in this situation, if he knows that we are alert; or it may cause him to confine his attempts to some coup de main of very sudden execution during the night, so as to allow sufficient time to regain his mountains before day.

From such a choice of posts at a distance from the mountains occupied by the enemy, there will arise still further advantages. We can send out our patrols much further in front, and probably to the very foot of their mountains. Our chain of advanced posts may from this circumstance be at such a distance from the quarters of the troops as to give them ample time to stand to their arms in case of alarm, at the same time that we have more space in which to chuse such posts as may be enabled to make the best resistance.

A well-appointed body of cavalry, bearing a certain proportion in point of numbers to those of the enemy, placed in our second line, prepared for a speedy support of the infantry, and furnished with mounted artillery * capable of attending all the movements,

* Mounted artillery are much employed both in the Prussian and Austrian services. They are chiefly three pounders, drawn by four horses, upon each of which an artillery man is mounted, and they can move at full gallop. Frederick the Great was well persuaded of their utility, and in the campaign of

movements, is a second and very necessary auxiliary for the defence of such open posts. By a proper disposition of this cavalry, we may be almost secure against any serious effort; since the enemy, as well in the proposed attack as in the subsequent retreat, will have much to apprehend from ten or fifteen squadrons of good cavalry upon the plain. As an example in proof, witness the quarters of our right wing at Jägerndorf, where, by means of such a disposition, the enemy durst not make a single attempt of any consequence.

In this situation the extent we are to occupy will depend somewhat upon that of the enemy's posts and quarters; and the time requisite for their assembling, as well as that for our own troops, must enter into consideration; but, in spite of every thing, we must here be liable in all probability to the following disadvantages:

In the mountainous intersected ground, of which we here suppose the enemy to be in possession when they assemble under cover of their advanced posts, as it is impossible for our patrols to penetrate, the only intelligence we can obtain of their preparatory movements must be by means of spies

1778, when forage had become very scarce, he one day ordered his mounted artillery to come and take the forage from his own horses, and those of his suite. We learn that a species of light gun, invented by Professor Anderson of Glasgow, has lately been in great esteem among the French. This gun and its carriage are each of them fixed upon the back of a horse, and can be conveyed very quickly over ground on which wheels could not conveniently move.

TRANSLATOR.

OR

or deserters: and as they will most probably be very careful to guard all their roads, particularly upon such occasions, such spies and deserters must necessarily make a considerable circuit round the mountains, and will be very apt to reach us too late. This reflection should increase the vigilance of the advanced posts and patrols.

These advanced posts must have the command of every road and avenue by which columns or artillery can come, and as the enemy must necessarily commence their attack with them if they are sufficiently advanced, as has been said, and are made so strong as to resist, the army will not only have time to assemble, but to reinforce the weakest points according to previous disposition. As to the patrols, if they go out the necessary distance, and behave with activity and intelligence, it will be impossible for the enemy to conceal their movements over so great a space.

If the relative posts be well chosen, and fortified completely well, (as every winter-post ought to be,) each quarter should be able to defend itself from two to three hours. The enemy's march to an attack of this nature will probably be in the night, and in columns with artillery; the roads at this time of the year are seldom good; their motions cannot be so quick as ours, as we assemble in small numbers, and are not delayed by artillery, which ought all to be posted at the proper places, or can proceed to them with an escort.

From these various means of advanced posts, of signals, of patrols, of the resistance made by the

troops at the quarter of attack, and of the various works of strength, and above all, from the difficulties attending the enemy's approach, it is in no wise speaking beyond bounds to say, that from six to seven hours information will be obtained by the army, if no great faults be committed, and no extraordinary negligence prevails.

By this rule we may venture to allow our quarters to have an extent of from ten to twelve hours march without danger: for in such circumstances, upon a level country, the head-quarter or place of assembly being commonly in the center, to which each wing will incline, the junction will be effected in six or seven hours, supposing an hour to be allowed for the signals to have their effect, and for the turning out of the troops, which is certainly more time than ought to be taken upon such an occasion. The army will then have abundant time to give the enemy a good reception, whether he advances with his whole force and threatens a general attack, or only with a part against a main quarter. If the latter be the case, the troops will hasten to its assistance, and as soon as a respectable force is got together, will move on against the enemy, who probably, in a partial attack, will not wait so long as to allow time for the junction of a very considerable body.

Should any circumstance require our having posts at a still greater extent, so as not to admit the observance of the foregoing principles, and that it is absolutely necessary to include such distant post in our cordon, yet is a farther extension of our quarters

quarters to be avoided; and it will be much more advisable to establish a separate post there, and to preserve a communication with it, by appointing a certain number of troops of the nearest post to hasten to their assistance in case of attack. The main body will thus be kept more together, which will render the position far stronger than it would be were the quarters extended so far.

With respect to the particular disposition of the troops in cases of this nature, we have already observed that in a level country there are seldom posts or passes of importance, for the maintaining of which a greater number of men shall be required at particular places; and our chief attention will be most necessary to the flanks of such a position. Now, although we may in some degree protect our flanks in this case by a town or village, still it must be remembered, that to succour a flank requires double the time that the center does; therefore more troops ought to be posted at such flanks than in the other quarters, and above all the cavalry must be at hand for their support. The headquarters in the center ought also to be made particularly strong with infantry; and nothing keeps an enemy more in awe than the knowledge that the commander in chief has a respectable body close at hand, when he has talents to put them speedily in motion to advantage.

Every one of these separate considerations which we have here mentioned in the general view of the subject, shall have a separate discussion in the course of this work.

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The bakery, the magazines, and military chest, when there is no fortified post at hand, should be placed in some spacious position near the center, with a body of troops particularly allotted for their defence.

Well disciplined troops, when threatened with a general attack in such open and unprotected quarters as we have been describing, must not wait to be attacked, but must instantly proceed against the enemy and drive him back.

In posts covered by rivers and defilés, those places in the vicinity of fords or islands ought to be occupied the most strongly; or where there may be a creek or re-entering bend in the opposite banks, which may conceal or facilitate the enemy's passage. Besides the precaution of works, constant patrols of light troops, particularly in the night, should be kept along the defilés or rivers; and we are to be most particularly careful that we pay great attention to those places where an attempt is supposed to be least practicable.

The intention of posts, established on the banks of rivers or defilés, being to guard and defend the passage, and to prevent as much as possible the skirmishing parties of the enemy from attempting to harass our quarters, the only place of alarm appointed for the assembling of the troops in this case must be that which is menaced by the enemy. It is not very probable that they will attempt any thing when we are so protected, unless a very hard frost should have facilitated the enterprise. In this latter event the appointing of a
general

general place of rendezvous, or rather of rallying, should never be neglected; and it should avowedly be pointed out as for that purpose, in case the enemy, contrary to all expectation, whether by surprise, by treachery, or by the stratagem of false attacks, should find means to pass over in so great force that the troops shall neither have it in their power to draw together nor to beat him back. The whole in this case must hasten to the point chosen for rallying, before the enemy has penetrated into any one quarter. If in a time of hard frost, the troops must be brought much nearer together, as the circumstances become very different from what they were when their quarters were extended along the river or defilés.

When the cordon is protected on the flanks by fortresses, the chief strength of troops should be in the center, as well as the place of general assembly. Should we also have such places of strength in our front, then indeed our position even on the most level country is well secured; but still we must be jealous of our flanks, and of all circuitous roads, to which the attention of our patrols should be constantly and more particularly directed.

OF POSTS IN A MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY.

The great advantages in the general system of defensive war, which may be derived from a position in a mountainous country, are also to be experienced in every particular post. The avenues

nues of approach are few, and difficult situations never can be wanting where a few men can render it almost impossible for an enemy to advance with artillery, which are particularly requisite in such a country.

Our advanced posts in such situations can be easily reinforced, or can retire without danger, should circumstances render it necessary. Our main posts can be placed much sooner in a posture of defence, since nature has already spared us the greater part of the labour. It is seldom possible to attack them on every side; we are much better enabled to maintain our ground than on the plain, and with much fewer numbers.

Another great advantage arising from such a situation is, that our cavalry will not be harassed; as an hundred hussars supported by as many yægers, or other light infantry, can effectually perform the service of patrol better than a thousand horse upon the plain.

As the choice and distribution of the quarters for the troops which are to form the cordon in a mountainous country ought to be regulated by the nature of the ground, by the number of roads leading towards the enemy, and by the strength and extent of the various posts necessary to guard their approaches, our permanent dispositions cannot be formed until we have obtained minute and accurate information upon all these particulars. We shall therefore consider by what method we ought to proceed to obtain this information on our arrival in a mountainous region, with which we are unacquainted,

acquainted, and by what means we may commit the fewest faults in forming our general disposition.

On our arrival, and until we have perfectly reconnoitred the country, the regiments which happen to be nearest to the most important passes, must remain under arms during the night; and must send out constant patrols to watch the motions of the enemy. As to the most important passes, they can be discovered by the eye upon the march, or by charts of the country, or by information of the inhabitants. We may often find people of intelligence among shepherds, foresters, or peasants; and upon their information we may proceed with a strong escort, chiefly of infantry, to examine such ground, as it may seem proper from their conversation that our flanks ought to extend to, and where they can be best protected. The steepest and most impassable places of the mountain are to be preferred for this purpose, or a deep gully; and, if necessary, we may add to the strength of the post by felling trees, or throwing up a few works. No trouble or expence must be spared upon this occasion: we must discover every road, and every path, by which either columns of men with artillery, or a few light troops, can come; we must learn at what times and in what sort of weather certain places are impassable, and when they cease to be so; and we may by a variety of means block up such places, with rocks, with trees, or hidden stakes, &c. At certain places it may be proper to construct redoubts or block-houses; and patrols from

from them will constantly observe whether the enemy have endeavoured to remove the obstacles. Having determined and secured the flanks of the cordon by these means, our next attention must be directed to the ground in front, to the roads leading towards the enemy, and the defilés or ravines lying between; and as defilés in a mountainous country have often the disadvantage of being overlooked and commanded by the opposite heights, our main posts must be chosen at such places where this can be most avoided, and where their small detachments in front, for the purpose of intelligence, can rally under their protection.

It often happens that different ranges of mountains shall terminate in one defilé, where several roads meet at a point. A strong post judiciously placed at such a point, may enable a few men to stop the progress of a great number.

In the choice of the main posts, we should prefer gentle heights to a high mountain, if we possibly can avoid the latter; yet the summits should be occupied by small posts, to which the troops appointed for succour may repair. The next care will be to chuse for the advanced posts such situations as may best enable them to prevent the enemy from penetrating to the main posts, without their giving the alarm, and where they themselves are the least liable to be surrounded and cut off. Between the advanced posts, a chain of yægers or light infantry must extend in such a manner that no enemy may pass between to skirmish, much less

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to surprise our troops, without the alarm being given, and every endeavour being made, if any should pass, to cut off their retreat.

Having by these various means acquired a perfect knowledge of the mountainous country in which we mean to establish our cordon, and having completely regulated every thing by chusing the best posts, made strong by every defensive preparation, so that the troops we post in them may be sufficient to maintain them; then it is that the different regiments will have their particular quarters allotted to them, and will proceed to occupy them. Not a moment's delay must then be made in proceeding to work with every man upon the necessary fortifications before the weather becomes intensely severe, and hard frost shall render the ground impenetrable.

The disposition of the troops in their quarters will be regulated by the newly-acquired knowledge of the country. In those points where there are fewest roads leading to the enemy, or where they are commanded by posts of small extent, there the fewest troops will be placed; and, on the contrary, greater bodies of men must be kept at the quarter where most is to be apprehended.

When such mountainous posts have flat ground near them upon which cavalry can act, and in case of an attack can contribute to the defence of a flank, some squadrons should be posted at hand in the nearest quarters to have a constant eye to such plain ground, and to support the infantry.

Head-

Head-quarters should be chosen near the main post of greatest importance, and the troops in the second line must have a considerable body at hand to advance in case of an attack, without a moment's delay, to the support of the head-quarter.

For in a mountainous country succours cannot advance so quickly, nor so generally, as on the plain; where almost all posts, (and, with a few exceptions, all quarters,) can be succoured from both lines and from either flank at once. But in a mountainous country, succours can be effected only at particular places, by troops expressly appointed for that purpose; and the most advanced main posts, in a mountainous position, being stationed as we have described, to maintain passes of importance, their drawing back would be dangerous, lest the enemy should gain the pass and break through our cordon.

The places of assembly must be at the points most vulnerable; but the ground for rallying upon must be behind the quarters, and in a place where such troops as may have the misfortune to be broken, may most securely and most quickly resume their order, and prevent the farther progress of the enemy.

We must be very careful, in a mountainous position, in gaining information with respect to the streams and water falls, which are sometimes apt to swell in a very extraordinary degree in a short time. As such a circumstance might destroy the
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communication, so as to cut off entirely one quarter from another, and expose it to the whole force of the enemy, our foresight cannot be too much employed either in providing certain measures to be taken on such an event, or to form the general disposition, so as that it may not be affected by it.

PREPARATORY MEASURES.

When the army is to separate, and the various corps are to march to their respective districts, they will observe upon their route the same precautions as they have been accustomed to during the campaign; moving in column with advance-guards and flanking parties. At night the guards and patrols will not abate their customary vigilance, and the ground will be occupied with care.

When the troops approach their districts, no time must be lost in sending parties some hours before to reconnoitre, and to drive off the enemy's light troops, or to obtain intelligence. These will endeavour to bring back a few country folks or townsmen from the place of destination, from whom intelligence may be obtained in a general way, respecting the accommodation which the town, villages, or hamlets, can afford; what provisions, corn, hay, and oats, they contain; what woods there are adjacent; what bridges or fords are near; what is the nature of the ground, and how

how the roads proceed. It will be proper to go with some of them as guides, and to examine narrowly every particular, without relying upon any charts or upon any description whatsoever.

We naturally may expect that the commander in chief will ride along the line with his suite; and it will be of the greatest importance that we should have the fullest information to communicate relative to our intended post. Circumstances may be such as to render it improper to be occupied: it may be too near a forest, or its communications may be too much interrupted: there may be another quarter of lesser extent, and to which we may give the preference, or which we may find it indispensably necessary to occupy.

When all these arrangements have been fixed, and the situations for our posts have been approved of by authority, the infantry will take up the quarters nearest the enemy, and the cavalry will be stationed on their rear to support*. The reasons of removing the cavalry in quarters from their

* In the short war of 1778, the Austrians suffered considerably from their following a different system from that which is here recommended. Baron Holzendorff, in his account of that campaign, informs us, that General Kirkhaym, having occupied a strong post near Hof in Silesia, had established an advanced post, of cavalry only, on the heights of Teschen. Lieutenant Colonel Gräling, a Prussian officer, at the head of a strong detachment of cavalry and a few infantry, surprised the post, notwithstanding that the two regiments which occupied

their usual post upon the flanks, are perhaps generally known, but the method and order of our subject require that we shall mention them.

Infantry are better calculated for defence than cavalry: they can be much sooner under arms; they are much fitter for occupying entrenchments, nor must we forget, that in case of misfortune, it is much easier to supply the loss of infantry than of cavalry. They can advance to support more quickly than infantry, and it is better they should have some space: it is their business to attack; and they come more boldly on when they have had time to be fairly set in motion. In posts among mountains the cavalry may often be stationed quite at a distance, in the rear, except a very few for patrols.

pied it had their horses constantly saddled during the whole night. They lost between four and five hundred men. This officer had also distinguished himself a few days before on a reconnoitring party, and the King now advanced him to the rank of Colonel, with the order of merit, promoted several of the officers under him, and rewarded the whole detachment. It appears from the same Author, that the Prussians fell into the same error some weeks afterwards. A bad post in front of their right flank, near Jägerndorf, was occupied only by the regiment of Thun (dragoons). The Austrians attacked them on a dark and stormy night. Their advanced posts were quickly driven in, yet the Austrians were repulsed. The commandant had given orders that, in case of a night attack, one half of his men should form and act as infantry, and though they were attacked both in flank and rear, yet they maintained their post. The officer, whose name is not mentioned, and several of his subalterns, received the order of merit, and the regiment was rewarded.

TRANSLATOR.

The heavy artillery will commonly be stationed near head quarters in the winter, and only the light guns will be detached. The irregular troops will be distributed according to the nature of each quarter.

The officer commanding at each post will take the earliest precautions respecting the provisions and forage, that he may subsist as long as possible without touching the supplies received by convoy. He will also chuse the most secure situation for his bakery and hospital.

ON RECONNOITRING.

The first and most necessary step we can take after forming an idea of our general outline, is for the commanding General to gain a knowledge, while it is yet practicable, of the ground in front, and of the nature of the posts which the enemy will probably occupy.

When this cannot be effected with a small party, a strong detachment with artillery must proceed as far as possible, must drive in the enemy's guards and advanced posts, which as yet we do not suppose to have taken post in strength, and must take a thorough view of all we wish to be acquainted with. If we can be completely successful in such an attempt, we certainly shall gain a great advantage, and such as may be of the utmost importance in the course of the winter.

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In this first reconnoitring, the commanding General will be attended not only by such Adjutants as he wishes more particularly to employ, but by officers, from every corps of cavalry and light troops, who are intelligent in the business of patrolling and in the duty of a partizan, who will upon this occasion make themselves perfect masters of all roads, paths, defiles, hollow ways, &c. &c. From hence a double advantage will ensue: First, that the General will always have people about him, whom he can detach upon emergency, who will perfectly comprehend and explain his meaning; and secondly, that the patrols and parties sent out against the enemy, will not only be enabled to bring back accurate intelligence, but will seldom suffer loss, and on the contrary will be enabled to gain considerable advantages over the enemy. All our preparations, either for attack or defence, will feel most beneficial result from this precaution, and the following advantages in particular will be obtained in our future reconnoitring.

By exactly knowing the circumstances of the enemy's posts, we shall be able to judge at what places they can soonest assemble most troops for the defence of particular posts, or for their undertakings against us, and by observing the faults they may have committed in their manner of occupying the ground, we may form enterprises against them which will prove successful. The directions which we give our spies can likewise be more clear.

In the second reconnoitring, as we must approach nearer to the enemy, and may have to drive in several of his advanced posts, and to pass the ground they were upon, other measures and precautions may be necessary for our own security in reconnoitring and to attain the object in view; the following in particular:

1st, Our escort must be so much superior in force to any of the enemy's advanced posts we may chance to fall in with, as that we may drive them instantly back, and that our reconnoitring may be fully ended before the enemy shall have drawn together a force sufficient to oblige us to a precipitate retreat, much less to have the chance of cutting off the detachment.

2d, The true intent of this reconnoitring must be concealed from the enemy, since it is in fact an expedition which has a particular object in view; and we must find means to draw his attention from those places which we actually mean to visit.

The first of these propositions may be contrary to the opinion of many officers who would prefer the reconnoitring with a few attendants, not more in number than a common patrol, with the view of the less engaging the attention of the enemy. We do not mean to deny, that in places of free access, where there are no thick forests and few advanced posts, we may sometimes accomplish the end of reconnoitring with a small number of men, particularly by means of bye-ways, where we may contrive to come upon a quarter or main post.

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Yet even such an attempt as this, especially in a mountainous country, is scarcely to be tried, excepting against some remote quarter, or upon one of the flanks. But when we mean to reconnoitre in such a manner as will trace the way to some attempt of consequence, we must not be precipitate, but must examine as narrowly as we can, consequently more time is requisite than for a mere patrol; to say nothing of the danger which so small a party must run of being cut off when they advance so near as is necessary.

But should we attain so very material a piece of intelligence, as that the enemy has neglected to guard a bye-way leading to any post; we should let slip a very favourable opportunity were we to point out to him his error, by either a patrol or party, instead of conducting a body of troops that way at a proper time to cut him off. We should therefore ride away the instant we perceive it, and when we pay our visit in form, we should take care that his advanced posts shall be amused so as to draw his attention from our true design.

The possibility of surprising small posts and advance guards may certainly be discovered by a patrol of a few men, and even in the night. But when we would put the information of deserters or spies, with respect to a quarter or main post, to the test, and would discover whether it be true or not, then it becomes absolutely necessary that we shall have a strong escort, which will not only have the effect of attaining our object, but also that of

concealing from the enemy what that object is, as will be apparent from what follows :

The enemy's light troops in front of the ground you wish to examine, if they are much too weak to contend with you, will draw back immediately to their next post or quarter, by which you gain both time and space to accomplish your object. They will spread the alarm, and will be more attentive to the means of their own retreat than to consider you as a reconnoitring party; but if you have a small party, no sooner do you appear than your intentions are apparent, and a swarm of skirmishing parties are round you in a moment.

In a word, by reconnoitring with a party sufficiently strong to cause an alarm, you frequently will gain the advantage of drawing the enemy to their posts, and you not only will be able to judge completely well as to the posts themselves, but will see the disposition and numbers of their troops.

To conceal our views the more effectually from the enemy, we should at the same time have several parties or detachments of like strength employed in reconnoitring other quarters as particularly as that against which we have a design, which will strengthen the supposition that we mean nothing but to drive in the advanced posts. In each of these parties there may be persons whose dress shall mark distinction, and who shall appear surrounded with a suite of attendants.

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As this species of reconnoitring will not be requisite after we have obtained a knowledge of the enemy's posts, except in a small degree when any change is made by them at any particular place of their cordon, we need not be apprehensive that this service will lean too hard upon the troops.

Although no particular time of the day is generally appointed for reconnoitring, which often takes place as circumstances require; yet in a mountainous country, where we cannot be seen at so great a distance as to oblige us to be at the spot by break of day, the forenoon is probably the best, as being the clearest part of the day in the winter season, when the fogs which gather on the hills are dispersed, and the approach of night will favour our retreat in case of being obliged to it; nor will the enemy's advanced posts be so alert at that time as early in the morning.

To reconnoitre effectually the posts of Austrian troops, is an attempt attended with peculiar difficulty. They commonly chuse a rugged country, and have their advanced posts considerably in their front. Add to this the prodigious number of their light troops, habituated to live among woods and mountains, which render it almost impossible to come near any main post without first driving them away.

As we seldom can see near so far in a mountainous country, as from some rising ground upon a plain, we are also very apt to pass posts concealed by woods or heights, especially when we do
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not possess a competent knowledge of the art of defensive war among mountains, so as to be able to judge at what places the enemy ought of course to have a post. We may thus not only lose advantages, but be exposed to disaster. To gain the highest eminence will recompence the utmost exertions we can make, and may discover much with which otherwise we could not be acquainted.

If time and circumstance will permit, it is certainly very advisable to take a quick sketch in drawing, of such things as ought to be remembered, from the extensive view alluded to, rather than to trust the memory with so many objects as may occur in a large sketch of country.

Should we observe a ravine or hollow way running up through the enemy's posts, or a path or ford through a defilé not properly blocked up or guarded, a few chosen people must be detached from the escort to examine the matter more narrowly, but dressed like countrymen, such as are allowed to pass; and if in our first reconnoitring we cannot comprise all the enemy's posts, which may often extend five and twenty or thirty miles, the whole may be concluded in a second or third day.

When we approach a post which we wish particularly to reconnoitre, and have driven in the light troops, we must detach on either flank, and several hundred paces in front, from twenty to thirty light troops, under cover of the heights or woods, to give us notice of whatsoever approaches, to interrupt our employment while the remainder

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of the escort may remain concealed at some distance in the rear.

After these preparations, which must be quickly done, we may proceed to examine the enemy's position within from five to six hundred paces if we can; but not nearer, that we may not be too much exposed to the fire of musquetry; never remaining long at one spot, and least of all at that where we may have observed a weak point.

OF ADVANCED POSTS.

If we are desirous that our troops shall enjoy rest and security in their winter-quarters, we will establish a chain of advanced posts in our front, regulated to the best of our judgment by the peculiarities of the ground, among which the following may be found deserving of attention:

At such roads and paths as lead from any of our main posts or quarters towards the enemy, we must establish fixed and fortified posts of infantry, to serve as a support to other posts of a moveable nature, and to make sufficient resistance to give the troops in their rear timely alarm. Such entrenched advanced posts will have orders according to the nature of circumstances and of the ground, either to maintain their post until support arrives, or to abandon it after having given the alarm.

Between such entrenched advanced posts we will draw a chain or communication of troops; if upon the
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the plain, chiefly of cavalry; if among mountains, of light infantry; to watch the intermediate space, so as that no part of the enemy's force may pass through unobserved.

In front of such fortified advanced posts, small guards will be sent out by night for the purpose of patrolling diligently till break of day, to discover whatever is approaching. This most necessary precaution will never be omitted, when we consider that we have much to apprehend during the long winter nights, and how much more necessary it is to have early intelligence in our winter posts and quarters than in camp, where all can turn out in order of battle in an instant.

It is much more difficult upon the plain than among mountains to find situations for our advanced posts, from whence we can have a command over the approaches. As we rely much upon our chain of cavalry upon the plain, we must seek to give them every possible assistance. We will, in this view, carefully examine all buildings within two miles in front, whether villages, gentlemen's courts or castles, churches, church-yards, or farm-yards, &c. &c.; we will pitch upon such as are built most strongly, and from whence we can have most command over the contiguous roads, and will occupy them according to their dimensions, and the service we expect from them, with picquets of from sixty to eighty or a hundred infantry. These we will furnish with every possible means of defence, such as a good ditch or stake traps, with loop holes in the walls, and

and every internal and external preparation. Such posts will have little to apprehend either by day or night, if the troops in them are vigilant. By the time that one of them could be forced, our line would have such time to send out both cavalry and infantry, as to cause the enemy to repent of their success.

Where there are no such buildings, but that there happen to be defilés or dams in our front, causing narrow avenues of approach, at such places there must be strong block-houses, or other fortifications, to guard the passes.

Such of our advanced posts as have orders to draw back, and not to expect support, will of course have no artillery, but our fortified advanced posts will generally have some light cannon, as well to guard certain passes as to spread the alarm quickly. These will afford great aid to the cavalry, who will patrol with much greater confidence when they have such support to retire to. The grand guards of cavalry, if placed behind a hollow way, or some such protection, may rely somewhat the more upon their videttes and patrols, so as to be under some shelter from the weather, but ready to mount in an instant.

It is not to be denied, that our advanced posts upon the plain may sometimes be passed by without being attacked, though scarcely without their spreading the alarm if they be vigilant. But we are sure of gaining at least thus much by means of them, that several columns cannot penetrate at once ;

once; and in time of snow, where they must keep the beaten road, this cannot happen.

In posting our guards of cavalry, we must not forget that they are differently circumstanced from such guards during a campaign, which are then much more numerous, and are placed nearer to one another, so as to afford a mutual support and to flank each other; and accordingly we cannot hazard the pushing them so far in front, nor will we ever post them so as, that in case of retreat, they have a defilé to pass. Should there be a wood in their front, we will break up the roads upon the skirt of it, we will not place the guard too near the wood, and should it be clear of under-wood, we will fell down a row or two of the trees, that no enemy may suddenly sally forth upon them, for fear of which, it will be also proper to have videttes in the wood, or at the far skirt of it, if not too deep.

In the small nightly guards of discovery, it may be proper to include a mounted yæger or two. Their position should be somewhat changed every evening, nor should they be sent out at any time till dark, which will make them less liable to be cut off, or passed by an enemy.

In a mountainous country, such buildings as we have mentioned will seldom be of so much use to us as the ground itself, for buildings among mountains often lie very low, and in such vallies as have roads going off in different directions. These roads are most probably overlooked from the adjacent

jaçant heights, from whence any post we could establish in a church or castle, &c. would be completely commanded, and the utmost we would do, would be to have a picquet in them while we had our posts upon the heights, and could derive considerable advantage from the woods which are generally found among mountains.

The distance at which we place our advanced posts among mountains in our front, will depend much upon the practicability of cutting them off, upon the nature of the ground, and whether they can be surrounded or not. Where a strong defilé or ravine runs parallel to our front, we will place our main post close to it, both for strength of position and to guard approaches, unless some superior advantage appears; but should such defilé or ravine run perpendicular into our ground, we will place our advanced posts upon it, or in it; so as that no enemy can pass up, to come upon the main post unperceived.

When an alarm is given at a distant post, our chain of advanced posts will redouble their vigilance, and will immediately patrolle with the greatest care in their own front, stopping and listening if the enemy are removing any of the abbatis, which, as there generally is abundance of wood in a mountainous country, we will take care to lay along the front of our chain of advanced posts independent of that round each particular work.

We must observe, that in our choice of our advanced posts in front of our winter quarters,

we must often deviate from the principles upon which we would chuse them in the field.

It is one of the first principles in fortification to place our works as that they may not be commanded; but in winter posts, particularly among mountains, this may suffer some exception. There may be situations, particularly in the choice of our fixed advanced posts, in which we must depart from it, and in which we will prefer certain advantages with the inconvenience of inferior ground, rather than abandon those advantages for the sake of other ground, merely because it is not commanded.

An advanced post so placed, as that the enemy must attack and cannonade it before they can attempt to penetrate to the main post or quarter, fulfils the end proposed, and must still be considered as good, even although it should be commanded from an opposite height by the enemy's artillery, if not absolutely within musquet or grape-shot. When we do find it necessary to chuse advanced posts of this latter nature, there are many considerations to diminish, if not totally remove, our apprehensions of being exposed to this danger.

Among mountains there are by no means carriage roads to every height; such are seldom so good as that artillery can pass along them: on the contrary, they are generally narrow paths through the woods; but if it should be otherwise, and that there is a good road to a commanding height opposite

posite to us, such a road commonly winds in a serpentine direction up the height, consequently can be enfiladed from our side, and the labour of dragging up a gun will be heard in the night; besides we may have had opportunity of breaking up and spoiling the road, and, if the height be covered with wood, it must be felled down before a battery can be established. All these preparations require much time, and cannot pass without discovery. Such ample retaliation will take place on our part, as will deter the enemy from similar undertakings in future.

Should we find it necessary to have a fixed advanced post at some pass between two adjacent heights, so steep and rocky, that no artillery can be drawn up them by any means, or such as have no flat part on their summit, instead of a common fortification we will have a strong block-house below, lest some of the enemy's light troops should climb up and fire upon our people.

There is a custom which prevails both in the field, and during our winter-quarters, of always posting videttes and sentries upon heights, as if they could from thence at all times best observe the motions of the enemy. In summer, during a campaign, when the days are long and the nights generally clear, this custom is certainly very proper, and at all times during the day when the weather is clear; but during the long nights, it may be of the most pernicious consequences, particularly among mountains, where the enemy can often pass up deep gullies and ravines without
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being seen or heard, during the high winds which often prevail.

Our videttes and sentries ought therefore to be placed by night in such a manner as that an enemy advancing cannot avoid falling in with them, or passing near them.

We marched on the 10th of January 1779, from Gros Jägerndorf, at six in the morning, (the weather being intensely cold,) in one column of above five thousand men, with cavalry and artillery, to form a junction with the Duke of Brunswick, whose object was to drive the enemy from a post they had taken among the mountains at Ulbersdorf, which menaced our right. We marched through the village of Komise without being perceived, although the enemy had a chain of videttes. We had passed them above three miles, and when it was clear day, we heard the noise of the Duke's attack, which was perfectly successful; but the post we passed was certainly exposed to the danger of surprise from the method of posting the videttes, had we not had another object.

A second remark of almost similar import with the foregoing is this, that we should seek to place our out-guards in front of a main post or quarter, in such a manner checkerwise during the night, that even if one of them be cut off, there may still be some vidette, or some other post for the enemy to touch upon before they can come upon the main post. We know that notwithstanding the best disposition, and the most strenuous orders to
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be vigilant, stratagem has been known to prevail, and that it is possible through length of time that a fatal security of mind may lull our attention. A commander will do well not to place his sole reliance on a single post.

We shall conclude this article with some observations upon abbatis. Good abbatis are a most admirable defence. In an enemy's country, for the preservation of which we are not anxious, we will extend our abbatis in every direction, but in our own provinces, where of course we will do as little damage as possible, and where our posts are by no means so much exposed, we must be contented with connecting the advanced posts with abbatis. The night posts will be secured as much as possible by local advantages, but all roads and all avenues must be secured by abbatis across them.

Among mountains there generally is such a profusion of wood, that we may fortify every post with abbatis extending to declivities, so as to render it impossible for the enemy to get round the post. In such an extent, it is true, that we cannot have guards all along them, but must rely upon patrols. Should the enemy succeed in getting through at any part, (which, if they be well laid, is more difficult than may be supposed by those who have never tried the experiment, even where there is no resistance, particularly in the night,) the alarm cannot fail to be given if our troops be at all vigilant. The enemy cannot get through

but in the greatest disorder; their confusion will be completed by the fire from our works which connect the abbatis, and which ought to enfilade them. As to cavalry, it is impossible for them to penetrate through an abbatis, which, if properly fastened in the ground with pickets, cannot be removed but from the inside with considerable trouble, and requiring much time. Trees which are felled late in the year, cannot, when laid in that manner, be set on fire. We have tried many experiments to that effect for days together, and without success: nor should we forget the use of this excellent species of fortification, in preventing the desertion of our own troops.

• Another species of abbatis, which the French employed at Ticonderago, cost the lives of many of the British troops. The branches were employed in the same manner as the Author describes, but the trunks were laid upon each other, and afforded a solid rampart. A ditch ought always to be dug along the abbatis, as well to obtain earth to throw upon the roots of the branches, as to lower the bodies of the defendants; and certainly if time will admit to throw up a breastwork behind, and to push a few salient angles, our defence would be still further improved.

TRANSLATOR.

ON THE CHOICE AND DEFENCE OF MAIN POSTS AND QUARTERS.

IN our general system for a winter position, much will depend upon the circumstance of whether we are in our own country or that of the enemy.

If we are in our own country, and that the enemy attacks us in one of our towns, should he be repulsed, he will endeavour to set the town on fire, and during the consternation caused by a shower of bomb-shells, of carcasses, of red-hot balls, and other combustible weapons, and the confusion which will ensue in the attempts to extinguish the conflagration, he will try to penetrate and get possession of the place.

Upon such an occasion we are exposed to the danger not only of losing the town, but also the troops in garrison; for notwithstanding the best precautions, and the most determined bravery, it will sometimes be found impracticable to resist the general assault of a numerous enemy in a town completely in flames, particularly if every part of the circumference be assailable, as is the case with many towns. The truth of this assertion will appear from two instances of a very recent date.

In the short war of 1779, the towns of Neustadt and Jägerndorf in Silesia were both burnt to the ground in a very few hours in broad day, although they were built of materials which were by no means of the most combustible nature, and that every precaution had been taken against such an event*. Neustadt was set on fire by the Austrians, on being repulsed by three battalions in the garrison. The flames raged to such a degree, that the walls could not be mounted, nor could the place have been maintained; but the enemy thought proper to abandon their attempt at the very moment when they might have gained their object. Jägerndorf was burnt by accident, and though there was nothing to prevent the efforts of the inhabitants, which were exerted to the utmost to extinguish the flames, they consumed the whole

* We learn from Baron Holzendorff's account, that the Austrian force, under General Wallis, upon this occasion consisted of fifteen battalions of grenadiers, two of croats, four hundred chasseurs of Tyrol, two regiments and two squadrons of dragoons, and one squadron of hussars. That the artillery, on the expedition, consisted of twelve pieces of twelve pounders, six of six pounders, several howitzers, and a number of guns of the mounted artillery. Colonel Winterfeldt commanded two regiments of infantry (that of the Prince of Prussia and that of Price, or as the Germans spell it Preuss) within the place, which he evacuated when the enemy set fire to it by a shower of red hot balls. How it happened that the Austrians did not completely invest the place we are not informed; but it is added by the Baron, that they did not take a single prisoner. Colonel Winterfeldt having taken up a commanding post, was speedily reinforced.

TRANSLATOR.

TOWN

town except about forty houses in a very few hours. The heat was so intense, that the troops were obliged to abandon the town, and had there been an attack at the same time, it is very evident that they might have been cut off.

There is yet another consideration to deter us from undertaking to defend one of our own towns as a part of our chain of winter posts. The Austrians have a prodigious number of light troops, which are by far the best calculated for such irregular enterprises; and should the least delay be made in burning down our suburbs, they take possession and conceal themselves in large bodies in them, from whence they sally out at every convenient opportunity.

Upon such an occasion much more is to be apprehended, particularly from light troops, in a town, than if we were defending a post strong by nature and art in the open field; for we must remember that the courage of such troops is commonly heightened by the promise usual upon such an occasion, that the town shall become their prize, and be given up to them to plunder. This is a very powerful incentive, causing them to exert themselves in a very different manner from what they do when they attack field works lined with brave troops, where much loss is to be apprehended, and no booty is to be expected.

Prussian troops, very different from these we have been describing, are accustomed to the close

order of formation, which is by no means so well calculated for the defence of a town or entrenched village, where our numbers must necessarily be much divided; and what constitutes their great superiority upon other occasions, and would do so in field-works, would prove to their disadvantage in a town.

From these considerations, an officer in the Prussian service will not attempt the defence of one of our own towns as part of the chain of our winter position, if that town is so constructed as that the houses are too near the ramparts, or that it can be generally set on fire at once, or that it cannot be completely occupied by the troops, so as that there shall be no part left defenceless by which the superior numbers of the enemy can penetrate. It will be much better in that case to rely on well constructed works, placed advantageously in the neighbourhood of the quarter, especially when we farther reflect how many towns there are which are commanded from adjacent heights, and are ill calculated for a good defence. Should it be objected, that we should thus give up our town to the enemy to levy contributions in it, we answer that such towns as come within our chain of winter posts, are commonly upon the frontiers, such as probably have been visited by both armies more than once during the campaign, and to which both sides frequently think they have a claim. Should it be otherwise, we must deter the enemy from such practices by reprisals.

It

It being then our object in constructing works contiguous to our quarters, that they are to enable the troops to maintain the ground till support shall arrive from other quarters, they must be such works as the troops will confide in, and of a good substantial profile; they must also follow the bent of the ground, if not too extensive; but, above all, we must endeavour to include a space in the neighbourhood of the quarter of such a nature, as that it cannot be attacked on one flank or in the rear. Nothing causes so much trepidation and confusion in troops upon the defensive, as their hearing the fire-arms and shouts of the enemy before them and behind, and on every side, particularly in the night. When part of our space is out of reach, we may be enabled to repulse the enemy by means of a reserve there, even if they should have penetrated; and we may spare the more men for this purpose, when we are not obliged to man our whole circumference. Finally, such a space may also be of the greatest service, as the powder waggons and the wounded may be there in some security.

It is certain that the last mentioned advantage can more easily be attained in a mountainous region than upon the plain; yet even upon the plain, to which we chiefly confine our consideration in this instance, there may often be found means to produce this effect, by rivers, lakes, large fish-ponds or dams, or marshes intersected with ditches, all of which must have the ice carefully broken

broken and removed in frosty weather; or by means of deep ravines or woods, or extensive broad abbatis, which at least will keep off the enemy for a considerable time, and enable us to make a better defence, in expectation of the arrival of support. Should there be a castle or convent of strong masonry in the neighbourhood, our works may extend to it, or near to it; first having rendered it defensible by every precaution, as the enemy's attack, should they make one, will probably begin with such a building.

But should the nature of the ground be such as to refuse us all such protection, or points d'appui, to our works, we must endeavour to remedy such defect as follows:

On the highest ground adjacent to the quarter, we must construct two redoubts, *a a* figure 1. or 2, plate 1, of size sufficient to contain the garrison, somewhat above one hundred paces distant from each other, but connected by a communication *b b*. These redoubts must be surrounded by a palisade, and with stake traps, in those places where they are least flanked, and must have a good block house in each for the daily guards. The lines of communication must also have a ditch in each front, and will contain an interior space of fourteen or fifteen paces.

The faces *c c* are defences both to the redoubts and to the lines of communication. The interior space of each redoubt must be so much below the rampart, as that waggons may be covered by it, and

and that the wounded men who will be put into the waggons may not be exposed to shot, so that a double banquette will be necessary. Within eight or ten paces of the termination of the line of communication at each redoubt, there will be the epaulments *d d* thrown across, with a barrier in their center. The intention of these epaulments is, that, should the enemy gain one redoubt, the troops in it having retreated through the barrier into the other, the epaulment may afford a defence on that side; and should the line of communication only be penetrated, a body of the enemy in that space would be raked to pieces with our grape and canister shot.

Should the enemy be so fortunate as to carry one of these redoubts, which will not be easily effected if they are built with that solidity which we have recommended, and if the people within them do their duty, still the loss of one redoubt and of half the garrison will not be so severe as the loss of the whole, which must be the consequence of the enemy's penetrating into a town. But the only means by which they can carry one of the redoubts, will be by effecting a breach with their artillery, which requires so much time, that troops could arrive to their assistance from the other quarters.

We would distribute our troops in these redoubts as follows: Let us suppose our garrison to consist of two battalions. At the end of a campaign, we may reckon them at five hundred men each, and together a thousand men, with six pieces
of

of cannon. Of these we would have four hundred men in each redoubt, whereof fifty to be considered as a reserve, and to be placed behind the epaulement. One hundred and fifty men to man the lines of communication, and the remaining fifty to be deducted as left with the baggage. Sometimes on leaving our quarter, it may be proper that a certain number of men shall be appointed to remain behind as a check upon the foremost troop of plunderers, from whom the inhabitants have by much the most reason to fear. These men will quit the place when the enemy's infantry are at hand, and will withdraw into the work.

Where there is but one battalion, our two redoubts will be constructed for two hundred men each, and the line of communication will be shorter. Those of N° 2, will have the advantage of less circumference. We would place a gun on each salient angle, which will protect those two points, upon which an enemy would otherwise prefer to form his attacks. The faces and flanks will have a direct fire of musquetry for their defence, being that which the soldier will practise; whereas the oblique fire is unnatural to him, nor can you long compel him to it.

It is also very material that we shall endeavour to the utmost to place such a main post as we have been describing at a sufficient distance from other heights which are superior. In level countries, or such as are of a mixed nature, where hills do not rise on hills, we are not exposed to this danger,

nor to that of extending our works too far from the quarter for the purpose of including an eminence the more.

In our posts among mountains, where the great object of defending approaches will frequently not permit our paying so implicit an attention to the ground on which we place our works, and where hills of various heights adjoin to one another, we can only endeavour as much as possible to avoid being commanded, without always being able to have so desirable a situation. Sometimes we may be obliged to raise high walls of earth to protect us in a post, rather than abandon it for another, where the end and meaning of the post cannot be so fully accomplished.

Among mountains, we must attend particularly in our main posts to another consideration on the subject of the command of ground. We are often obliged to place our works a considerable way down the side of a hill, to give them the full command of the approaches, and of course the summit in their rear completely overlooks them. Now it is not sufficient that we have our alarm post, or place of arms, upon that summit; but as it may very easily happen, that the enemy's light troops, under favour of the woods, or of the night, or broken ground, may steal past our works and gain the eminence, so as to fire into them before the troops can gain the top, we must build a block-house there, or other strong guard-house, elevated upon poles. In this we will post ten or twelve yagers to fire on every enemy they see approaching.

ing. These people get into their guard-house by means of a ladder, and draw it after them. The Austrians use this sort of guard-houses under the name of palankas along their cordon, on the Turkish borders, and also in the county of Glatz at Ruckertz, surrounding them with broad abbatis, and having from eight to sixteen men in each.

Besides the above-mentioned precautions in the construction of such works, we must be particularly attentive not to make them too extensive, a fault which may be attended with the most mischievous consequences; we certainly, but too frequently, have seen the soldiery scattered through a great space of fortification, such as three times their numbers would scarce have been sufficient to defend, and all because we cannot be satisfied without including every little rising ground within our works.

But while we are apt to condemn the undertaking to maintain towns as part of a chain of winter posts, yet as time and circumstances may render such a measure necessary, with a view to acquit ourselves with honor, we would take care first to be well informed as to the nature of the ground adjacent to such town; next, as to the nature of the town itself; and lastly, whether the number of troops we can spare for that service be sufficient.

And first, with respect to the nature of the adjacent ground, it is certain that a free and open country must be the best for our purpose, or at least so much so, as that we may not be commanded

manded from any heights too near our walls, nor that there shall be much brushwood or interlocked ground, from whence the enemy might be favoured in their approaches to an escalade or surprise; it must also be a great advantage if the adjacent ground be such as to admit of a free communication with the contiguous posts and quarters, and the more roads fit for columns and artillery the better.

As to the nature of the town, it must be of importance that it shall be surrounded with a good strong wall, such as cannot be thrown down by a few cannon-shot, nor such as to be exposed to escalade, against which a ditch is certainly the best defence, particularly if it has water in it, when we never will neglect to break and remove the ice in time of frost. If we are in possession of the above-mentioned advantages, what remains to complete our posture of defence may be easily effected as follows :

The places easiest of access must be strengthened by stake traps * and palisades, and our artillery will be posted at such points as can best flank our circumference, along which our places of arms will be carefully chosen, and they will be

* The Translator is well aware that this expression is not in use in the English language, but why should we use the French word *trous de loup*? The Germans call them Wolf Graeben. They were invented by Cæsar at Alexia, where there were three rows of them, and each hole had a sharp stake at the bottom. They are in Cæsar's Commentaries called *Stimuli*.

connected by a chain of constant patrols during the night. If the ditch be dry, we will take care to deepen it, and to place palisades in it, particularly at the weakest points of the wall, opposite to which we will plant chevaux de frize during the night, and remove them in the day, that the enemy may not destroy them with their artillery, and wound the troops behind them with their splinters. We will also endeavour to protect such places by a crossing fire from different directions, and will reinforce the daily guard there by means of picquets at night, consisting of chosen men. We will also have abundance of long pikes there, which, in an attempt to escalade, will be of great service in pushing down the ladders, and the assailants*.

Such houses of the town, as are nearest to the weakest and most exposed places above-mentioned, will have their upper-story on the side next the wall taken down, so far as to allow a breast-work, and the walls of the under-story will have loop-

* Upon such an occasion, certain fire-works would be found of great use, as well such as are of a destructive nature, as those which blaze for a length of time, which last direct the efforts of the defendants by their light. Water and snow were employed at the siege of Colberg in 1761, during the hard frost, and rendered the walls so slippery, that the Russians in their assault could gain no footing, and were consequently repulsed. The defence of Colberg, in Pomerania, by Major Heiden and his small garrison, and that of Mangalore, in the East-Indies, by Colonel Campbell and the second battalion of the Royal Highlanders, now the 73d regiment, we conceive are as noble examples as any to be found in history. TRANSLATOR.

holes

holes made in them, by which means we shall derive the double advantage, of having an increased and plunging fire to guard our pallisades and chevaux de frize, and in the event of a breach, and the enemy attempting to storm, the under-story would be found an excellent retrenchment.

Should the place have much to apprehend from a coup de main, we will block up all the gates, but two on the side of our communication. These are necessary, even should we be reduced to extremity, because, in case of fire, we cannot trust to one gate, as the houses close to it may be in flames. These two gates must be carefully guarded and protected by works, with a draw-bridge extending from the gate to the work across the ditch. The gates leading towards the enemy, must not only carefully be nailed and bolted up, but must have mounds of earth thrown up against them; and should they have towers on each side, as often happens, they should be so contrived as to contain a few men, and have such openings as will admit their firing with effect upon an enemy endeavouring to penetrate.

The places where the garrison are to assemble in case of an alarm, will be carefully appointed, and ready communications made from thence to every other part, that they may hasten speedily, and at least two men in depth, to the places most in danger. The strength of the nightly picquets, whether they are to join the guards or only to be in readiness, will depend upon the nearness

of the enemy, and upon the danger we have to apprehend; but on a night when we have much reason to expect an attack, the whole garrison must be kept in the houses nearest to their alarm-posts, without throwing off their cloaths.

We will take care to level all the houses in the suburbs, at any part of our circumference, which are too near to our walls, or of such a height as that the enemy could fire into the town from them, or incommode us from thence upon any occasion. As to occupying the suburbs ourselves with any part of our garrison, it is not to be done if we can avoid it, as it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to preserve the communication; and when that is broken through by the enemy, we have much to apprehend for the troops so posted in the suburbs. Should it be observed, that they could retreat into the town by one of the gates, it may be objected that in the night it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and that it must be uncertain which of them we are firing upon, while we have troops in the suburbs.

But should it be found impracticable to have advanced posts for the purpose of giving the alarm in the district in front of our quarter, it will be proper to have small night-guards in the suburbs to patrol till day. If barricades be made across the streets, and these night-guards are vigilant, it will be impossible to surprise them; nor will they have any thing to fear, as the enemy will not make an attempt, in which
they

they may sustain great loss, and can only derive the trifling advantage of perhaps driving back, or cutting off, fifteen or twenty infantry, defending themselves from behind houses and fences. If, on the contrary, we can, with tolerable safety, establish advanced posts for alarm beyond the suburbs, upon the roads and avenues, (which we ought if possible to do, as tending greatly to our security,) we must then have picquets from the garrison, posted at night in the suburbs for their support in the houses nearest to them which are strongest, and to which the former may retire.

Should we have a body of cavalry in such a winter-quarter, and that they can only be accommodated in the suburbs with stables, we will chuse that part which is least exposed; and should the suburbs be very extensive, we will set off a part by means of barricades, and will place a picquet of infantry in it at night.

Should there be a strong castle or convent in the town, it must be placed in the best possible state of defence, to serve the garrison in case of need, as their last place of retreat. By means of this, should the enemy even have succeeded in making himself master of the town, we may either seek to make a good capitulation by threatening to set fire to the town, or defend ourselves till support shall arrive; it will also serve as a place of security, in which to place our baggage.

In addition to the above-mentioned precautions, there is yet another of very great importance, be-

fides those which we shall mention under the head of precautions against surprise. Of all other enterprises which the enemy will be apt to form against one of their own towns in our possession, we have most to apprehend that of a general escalade. On this account, the garrison must positively be of such numbers that no part of the walls shall remain without defence, and there must be bodies of from thirty to forty men each along the wall, ready to repair instantly to any place of danger.

There is yet another measure to delay a general attack, but which is only to be used in case of extremity, when the enemy in very great force, and from their movements, leave no room to doubt that they are proceeding to a serious attempt against us; namely, that of setting the suburbs on fire, which will gain time for the arrival of support; but for this purpose the trains must be completely laid through all the houses, so as that the whole suburbs may be in flames at once, and that the enemy will find it impossible to extinguish them.

From what has been said, it seems obvious that great care and labour must be exerted before we can expect to make a good defence in a town chosen as one of our winter-posts, and we would certainly be still much more averse to chuse a village for this purpose; but yet experience hath shewn that this is not a general opinion, and there are rules laid down for the fortifying and defending of villages. The cause of such a measure being adopted, (which we apprehend would very rarely happen

happen were due deliberation previously employed) seems to be, that there are to be found examples in the event of a campaign or battle, of great advantage having been derived from the possession of an entrenched village, either in front or flank, and by means of which an enemy has been repulsed, even after they had gained great superiority. Such cases are certainly not very numerous, and history, both ancient and modern, will afford more to the contrary; but even granting it to be so, it is very different with respect to winter-posts, and the defence of a village, composing one of the chain.

The villages in front of a camp are protected in the rear during an attack, and generally upon both sides; but an entrenched village, in a chain of winter posts, has no such advantage. The former can be continually supported, and we can easily spare such houses as are too near the works, and which ought to be pulled down, as we can pitch our tents; but in the latter it is totally different. We cannot harass our troops by moving them frequently to a distance during the winter-months, or having them exposed, unless we are so very superior in number, that our having a great many sick is not of so very material importance. Removing the houses is a work of great labour and time, and rather than take that measure, we will be apt to place the works in front of them, so as often to cause too great extension. Finally, the confidence and courage of troops defending a village which is supported by an army, will be raised to the utmost; but in a solitary winter-post,

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a length

a length of time must elapse before it is possible that support can arrive. Thus much may serve to shew the dissimilarity of the two cases.

In proof and illustration of what we have advanced, we shall suppose a village to be defended as one of our winter-posts, upon one of the best possible situations. It shall be upon an elevated plain, with a perfect command of the ground on all sides, Plate I. Fig. 3.* It shall be in the usual stile of villages, and about eight

* It may be proper to add, to what the Author has said, the following dimensions of six different Profiles. We take them from the *New French Encyclopedie*, in which the articles on fortification are written by M. CORMONTAGNE, an engineer of great reputation.

First Profile.

	Feet.	Inches.
Breadth of the ditch at top, -	18	0
Breadth of ditto at the bottom, -	6	0
Its depth, - - - - -	7	6
Cubic excavation of six feet, -	15	0
The work of one man in -	7	days.

Second Profile.

	Feet.	Inches.
Breadth of the ditch at top, -	16	0
Breadth of ditto at the bottom, -	5	4
Its depth, - - - - -	7	0
Cubic excavation of six feet, -	12	5
The work of one man in -	6	days.

Third

eight hundred paces in length, which is the least that we can have for a village in which we would place

Third Profile.

	Feet.	Inches.
Breadth of the ditch at top, -	14	0
Breadth of ditto at the bottom, -	4	8
Its depth, - - - - -	6	6
Cubic excavation of six feet, -	10	0
The work of one man in -	5	days.

Fourth Profile.

	Feet.	Inches.
Breadth of the ditch at top, -	12	0
Breadth of ditto at the bottom, -	4	0
Its depth, - - - - -	6	0
Cubic excavation of six feet, -	8	2
The work of one man in -	4	days.

Fifth Profile.

	Feet.	Inches.
Breadth of the ditch at top, -	10	0
Breadth of ditto at the bottom, -	3	4
Its depth, - - - - -	6	6
Cubic excavation of six feet, -	5	7
The work of one man in -	2½	days.

Sixth Profile.

	Feet.	Inches.
Breadth of the ditch at top, -	8	0
Breadth of ditto at the bottom, -	2	0
Its depth, - - - - -	5	0
Cubic excavation of six feet, -	4	6
The work of one man in -	2	days.

place a garrison for the whole winter, supposing it to consist of two streets running parallel to each other, with the houses pretty near; we shall suppose the garrison to consist of two battalions of a thousand men taken both together, having four cannon and two howitzers.

The works surrounding the village, although narrowed as much as possible, may yet be reckoned to extend two thousand paces, and they will be manned according to the following disposition; In the four main works, A, B, C, D, during an attack, a captain with a hundred men will be posted in each; and in the three first, on the side towards the enemy, there will be two cannon in each. In the four smaller works, 1, 2, 3, 4, binding the communications or curtains, there will be an officer with fifty men in each. A staff-officer and a hundred men will remain as a reserve, posted in the church-yard or court of a gentleman's house at E, in the center of the village, ready to move to any point in danger, where the enemy's attack may seem to have taken effect.

The

This estimate is taken on the supposition of a moderate degree of labour, and of the ground being tolerably free from stones. We may add, that experience has shewn that works which are expected to resist cannon, should have at least twelve feet in thickness of well rammed earth, or eighteen feet of loose earth. The Marquis de Feuquieres, in his excellent Memoirs, recommends a row of fascines in the heart of the lines, as well as on each side. There ought to be a man for every two feet and a half of circumference, according to Vauban, to have the works completely manned.

TRANSLATOR.

The building at C will be put into the best state of defence. For these different and certainly not superfluous purposes, we have already appropriated seven hundred men; and the remaining three hundred must be employed for the defence of the eight curtains, behind each of which there will be seven or eight and thirty men posted.

By these means, in a village so situated, we shall obtain a connected defence of flanking fire, without dispersing our troops through too much space. It may be observed, that we might easily obtain a greater body of flanking fire, by giving a larger proportion to the faces, but it must be remembered that we cannot set off the curtains nearer to the village, on account of the houses, consequently we should much increase our circumference, and where we have not a sufficient number of artillery and of men to post in such faces or flanks, we lose rather than gain by increasing their dimension. There may be villages of a different description, but they are rare in Germany. Such, for example, where the houses are more in a cluster, which may be surrounded by works approaching nearer to the figure of a square or circle; but whatever advantage may arise from thence, it is certainly more desirable that the houses should be separate, being much the less liable to be set on fire, which might frustrate the best measure for defence.

The question whether we should rely upon detached works, or defend ourselves from our quarter, in a mountainous country, will much seldomer admit of difficulty, than on the plain. Among the
many

many causes why we cannot chuse the latter measure among mountains, particularly for the separate posts nearest to the enemy, it is not the least important that we are obliged to fix our posts upon such ground as may command the avenues of approach. A town or village among mountains is commonly in a low situation, the houses are often close to woods, and if we are to employ any such as a quarter, it must be with the special precaution, of guarding to the utmost against surprise, of being ready at an instant to man our field-works, from which we will be cautious not to be at too great a distance; but as to the defence of such a town or village, it is not to be attempted, and our sole reliance must be on our judicious choice of posts. In order to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to the first article, in which we have spoken upon that head.

Having pitched upon ground for forming a post as one of the cordon, our next care will be so to dispose of the troops necessary for the defence of it, as that they shall, if possible, be lodged behind such ground, that they may be protected in their quarters. Plate II. and its reference, will explain this subject more particularly.

Although we have observed, that it is very important in such a situation to have the troops close at hand, so as that they may be able to gain their post before the enemy has beaten the advanced posts and overpowered the guards stationed in the works, yet must we also be cautious not to crowd too many men together in the quarters, lest we introduce

introduce fatal distempers among them. Should there be a village a little in front, and that we are in want of habitations, we may perhaps station a certain number of men in it, and relieve them every three or four days; but it were better, were we to build huts or barracks near to our works.

The post of Dittersbach in Lower Silesia, not far from Schmiedeberg, is very similar to what we have been describing, and we shall communicate a drawing of it to our reader, by way of farther illustration, see Plate IV. It is a post with which our enemy is perfectly acquainted, and not only is the place, but all the works for its defence, completely overlooked by heights on the right hand, without any possible remedy.

The roads from Bohemia through Schatzlar, Freyheit, and Albendorf, to Schmiedeberg, Hirschberg, and the contiguous country, all meet at this place, where for some distance they form but one road, through a sort of pass, commanded by a height called Passberg. Behind that height and another called Bergfreyen, which form the true position of importance, there is no village, or any other quarter, for the troops which furnish the daily guards necessary to occupy the posts. Upper Schmiedeberg, indeed, is not very far from the last, but is a very long and straggling village, and Lower Schmiedeberg, which is much better built, is full three miles from Passberg. In the event of an attack, troops from this village could not possibly arrive in time for support, unless the posts were

so

so strongly manned as to enable them to make a long resistance. This would require a greater body of men than could be furnished by one garrison, as several hundred would at least be requisite.

Now in our disposition for the defence of this post, were we to occupy the villages of Dittersbach and Haselbach, behind these heights, and almost close to them, we could not be one moment in a state of security, because the enemy, by means of a vigorous and spirited attack, could there be in the heart of our quarter, before the garrison had time to gain their position upon the heights, and consequently would cut them off. The fixed advanced posts which could be placed in front of these quarters, would not be sufficient for their protection, as they could not be placed at a proper distance to give the alarm in due time, nor could they make an opposition of sufficient length. Moreover, as the different roads branch off again towards the enemy, the troops necessary for guarding them, added to those of the main posts, could not be fewer in number than three battalions.

Upon the whole, the best measure for maintaining this important post during the season of winter-quarters, would probably be, to form a mixed command of about three hundred men with two pieces of cannon, and thirty hussars from other quarters in the neighbourhood, for whose speedy support Schmiedeberg might be occupied with one

or

or two battalions, extending as far as St. Anne's church, where a strong guard should be kept. The command, which must be relieved every three or four days, should be disposed of as follows: Fifty men to be posted in a substantial redoubt upon the Passberg heights. In each of the two works on the Bergfreyen heights, likewise fifty men and a cannon; one hundred men to occupy the abbatis during the night, which must be formed from the left flank to the summit of the Bergfreyen; besides which obstacle, we would have upon the height a block-house, with a guard in it of the sort we have described.

The remaining fifty infantry, and the thirty hussars, will form the patrols by day and night; the infantry in the woods and roads in front on the Bohemian side, (which must be barricaded,) the hussars on the plains near Pitzelsdorf, New Weisbach, and Mitchelsdorf. These troops will occupy the houses behind Passberg and Bergfreyen, and in case of an attack will draw back to the main post.

Another post similar to that of Dittersbach, in the circumstance that no quarter could be occupied behind it and in its neighbourhood, was that of Nesselgrund, in the county of Glatz, belonging to the Austrians, but there chiefly arising from there being a forest above six miles broad close to it.

We now proceed to the description of such winter-posts as border on defiles and ravines, extending

ing towards the enemy. The roads through the mountains generally lie among such openings, and it may be of the greatest importance that we establish such posts and quarters near them, as may prevent the enemy's columns from penetrating and forming any enterprize of importance. This end will be best accomplished, if the ravine be in front of our place of arms and main-post, and if we place them where it is narrow, so that our grape and canister-shot and musquetry may reach across. These should also be closed in by impassable heights, in such a manner as that the enemy, in the circuit they will be obliged to take in forming an attempt upon any of them, cannot pass without coming near to some other post in the cordon. Should a forest be added to such advantages, from which we can be supplied with abbatis and palisades to form barriers of communication between our works, our situation would then be one of the strongest to be met with among mountains; and yet there are several precautions and measures for defence to be observed in this case, different from those we have already described.

Having chosen the spot for our works, where the double advantages unite, of all the roads running into one, where the ravine is narrow, and the nature of the heights such as we can wish, it will then be proper to throw up an entrenchment, with a ditch before it, across the ravine, see Plate III, and to build a block-house behind it for the guard. The distance in front of our quarter, at which this
entrench-

entrenchment should be placed, may possibly be greater than that of some advanced posts in different circumstances, in which they are more liable to be forced, surrounded, or cut off.

On the right and left of this entrenchment upon the elevated ground, we will construct a good palisaded work on each side to flank the entrenchment. These, with the connecting abbatis, will form our advanced posts in this case.

A few hundred yards in front of the entrenchment, we will establish an alarm-post behind some felled trees or chevaux de frize, or some such obstacle, containing an under-officer and a few yægers, also some hussars. From both sides of this alarm-post, we will form a second abbatis running parallel with the first, but from thence a thousand to twelve hundred yards in extent, behind which the night-posts will be divided, and must patrol till day-break. Should there be any approaches on either hand, by which we apprehend that the enemy might easily pass and come upon the rear of our advanced posts, we will there establish block-houses, with small guards in them.

With respect to the main post, as it must be established on the strongest ground from whence we can most completely command the ravine or défilé, we would not divide the troops, but would keep them as much as possible together on one side. But upon the side opposite to the place of arms, and if possible under the command of it
and

and lower, we would erect a good redoubt, not only for the protection of the quarter, but to guard the ravine.

From what we have said, and from Plate III. we hope that we have been sufficiently clear in the expression of our thoughts upon this part of our subject.

In our choice of posts among such ravines and gullies extending towards the enemy, we may sometimes find situations in which it is proper that we should cut off and abandon a part of the quarters. Two causes may operate to this effect; either where the end nearest the enemy is built disorderly, so as that a post upon an eminence could not protect it, or if it is too decidedly commanded by some heights which it is not advisable should be included in our post.

The hollow way in which the village lies, which we have been obliged to occupy for want of a better quarter in which our troops could more readily assemble for the defence of their post, shall at the large court of a gentleman's house become broad, and three roads shall extend from thence. The ground to the right and left of the straggling houses shall be open, and afford no connected defence, so as to be incapable of a chain of alarm and advanced posts; the hollow way and all the rest of the village from the gentleman's court shall be commanded from the opposite heights, where it shall be unadvisable for us to establish a post.

This




Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.






Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.





Scale bar with markings for distance.






Plate 3.^d Military Movement Page 336

This part of the ravine and of the quarter we therefore would abandon, and draw our boundary where the ravine is narrow, and where the roads begin to branch off at the gentleman's castle. This, if it is of good masonry, we would form into a fixed advanced post with cannon, as the enemy may probably undertake something against it by reason of its being open and accessible. On both sides of the court we will construct a redoubt, as in Plate III. and lay an abbatis and palisading extending to the castle, and from thence stretching from each flank along the bottom of the height back to the main post. The advanced posts will be divided along this abbatis, reinforced at night by a picquet, which must supply the place of nightly alarm-posts, which, from the narrowness of the space, we cannot in this instance place to better advantage. The choice of the main post will, as much as the nature of the ground will permit, be regulated in the same manner as in Plate III.

The strength of the guards, and the number of works as laid down in these different plans of winter-posts, (which it is to be understood are for those posts and quarters of the cordon lying nearest to the enemy,) we conceive to be no more than is indispensably necessary for security. And in such a situation, it is unquestionably much better to establish good and sufficient posts where it is practicable and necessary, and to man them strongly even with one third of their garrisons, so to secure the rest of the army in tranquillity in their quarters,

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than to have fewer posts and guards, and have the army constantly under arms without producing security.

Having thus considered the subject of the choice and defence of main posts relative to winter-quarters, there yet remains some observations to be made respecting the baggage in posts and quarters, where we have most to apprehend an enemy's attack.

In the first place, it is evident that in such a case our baggage ought to be reduced as much as possible, by sending every thing away which we can possibly spare; for example, our tents at this time are useless, as well as many other articles, and may be attended to the place appointed for their reception, in some town more remote, by a small guard and a careful under-officer from each regiment. The provision waggons, which bring bread for three or six days, as soon as ever they are unladen will return to the bakery, and only one or two at most should remain for such men as may suddenly fall sick, and who must constantly be sent away the very first opportunity. No greater quantity of provisions should be kept than necessary, and not more than a fortnight's pay for the soldiery.

Having as much as possible got rid of every impediment, if we are in a place much threatened by an enemy, we must still be careful to have every thing which remains packed and loaded at night, and horses to be ready at a moment; or in certain cases, it may be proper to send all away in the evening,

evening*. By means of these precautions, we shall render it needless for the enemy to form an enterprise

* We learn from Captain Archenholtz, that when the Russian army, consisting of seventy thousand men, commanded by Marshal Butterlin, had at length effected a junction with the Austrian force of sixty thousand, under General Laudon, on the 12th of August 1761, near Strigau in Silesia, the King of Prussia resolved, for the first time, to avoid a battle, and to adopt the system of defence. The only works which he hitherto had employed in his camps, were a few redoubts for his camp guards, and batteries for his heavy cannon; but he now strongly entrenched his camp, with a degree of skill which portrayed his genius, and with a quickness of which there is no example. The precious moments were diligently employed. His immense works were begun and finished in three days and three nights; and when his enemies had brought their deliberations to a conclusion, the Prussian camp had disappeared, giving place to a chain of redoubts, and twenty-four great batteries, connected with a line of entrenchment, having in front a broad ditch, a line of fraise-work or palisades, and three rows of stake-traps six feet in depth.

In this situation were the Prussian soldiers kept in constant readiness to sustain an assault, reposing only, during the day, when the movements in the enemy's camp could be plainly discerned; but regularly every evening all the tents were struck, every article of baggage, not excepting that of the King himself, was sent away under the cannon of Schweidnitz, and the troops sat down behind the entrenchments, with their arms in their hands, till sun-rise. So formidable did the Prussians appear in this camp at Buntzelwitz, that the combined armies were deterred from hazarding the event of an attack, and from their numbers soon experienced much inconvenience and great want. Nor did the King place his reliance on the operation of time alone. He detached General

terprise against us, and yet more against our baggage; but as it yet may happen that the latter may be the particular object of some partisan, we will omit nothing which may tend to its security.

Therefore, should there be in the neighbourhood of our quarter, a castle or a church, or any other strong building, especially if it be under the protection of our place of arms, the baggage, which we have retained, may be sent thither in the event of the enemy coming unexpectedly so near

Platen with seven thousand men, who came upon their rear by a circuitous march, and cut off a convoy of five thousand waggons coming to their camp, having attacked and dispersed, or taken prisoners, the escort, consisting of four thousand men. The Russians had now been twenty days before the Prussian army. They retired upon this event, leaving a corps of twenty thousand men, with General Laudon, under the command of Czernichef.

The retreat of the Russians caused extraordinary joy, and much loud shouting, in the Prussian camp, where the troops had suffered considerably from the sultry season, from having subsisted on bread and water only, and from want of rest; and though the army of Laudon was still much stronger than that of the King, all defensive measures were immediately laid aside. The tents were no longer struck, the baggage was no longer sent away, the garrison guns were sent back into Schweidnitz, the mines near the batteries were emptied of their gunpowder, almost all the entrenchments were thrown down, the communication was re-established with the open country, and the Prussian camp was soon supplied with abundance.

TRANSLATOR.

near that we cannot fend it quite away; but with this view, such building must have undergone some preparation, so as to afford the means of defence to an escort taking refuge in it. Should there be no such building, we must be very active in having our baggage set in motion at the very first menace of an attack in such a post as we have been describing, and driven off towards our next garrison in the rear. If our post is upon the plain, where we generally will have cavalry in the second line, a detachment of them will have orders at the first alarm to repair to some place appointed to take the baggage under their protection, and escort them from thence.

But among mountains, where the enemy's cavalry cannot so easily move, and but rarely can form a circuit round a post, so as to overtake and fall upon the baggage, there will be little or no difficulty in escorting it to a place of security*.

* At Gibraltar, the troops soon learnt to consider the enemy's artillery with great indifference; and, perhaps, it would be impossible to set fire to a town with ordnance, whether guns or mortars, if a soldier or inhabitant, inured to the sound of cannon-ball and shells, had charge of every six houses, and that there were vessels ready filled with water in each house, with a few good fire engines in the town. The explosion of a shell, unless it falls among very combustible materials, seldom communicates fire which may not be extinguished at first with great ease; but when all the inhabitants leave their houses and lock their doors, the flames will certainly soon spread.

OF FALSE ATTACKS.

Enterprises against winter-posts are commonly conducted in several divisions of attack, as the most probable mode to be successful; when the enemy know how to employ such means with a few troops as will keep us on the defensive, will cause us to bring numbers from various quarters to a particular point, and keep them there in check, while they make their effort on the side which has been weakened and deprived of its support.

Few

It were to be wished, that the Author had insisted more fully upon the subject of *butting* near the field works, which he proposes for his winter-posts, where there are not quarters for the accommodation of the troops. Small huts, little larger than soldiers tents, are soon constructed, and may be made of various materials; of stones, of hurdles made of branches of trees, covered with sod, and thatched either with straw, reeds, or grass. Each company may likewise have a kitchen made in the following manner: A circle is traced upon the ground, and a trench dug of such circumference as that the men can sit round in a single rank; niches are made in the opposite side of the trench for their fires and kettles. A certain number of trees are split into poles, which are set up with their lower end three paces from the outer-side of the trench, and their upper ends sloping in so as to support each other. A wall of earth and sod thrown up in the out-side upon these poles, four feet high all round, forms a complete shelter from the weather. The Hessians in America, and at length our own troops, made great use of such kitchens.

TRANSLATOR.

Few attacks can be undertaken with so much prospect of success as those against winter-posts, chiefly because of the extension which they are often permitted to have. This renders it quite impossible for the General to see with his own eyes. He must rely on reports and on signals, which may cause him to detach troops from the very place where he ought to keep them, while his enemy, in the many miles which winter-posts often reach, may have choice of such ground as can effectually conceal the nature of his attacks.

It being very evident, that in a winter position, it is of the very greatest importance to be able to distinguish the true attack from those which are but feints, we shall endeavour to point out such considerations as may enable us to form this desirable distinction.

In a general view, much must depend on the nature of the country, on the disposition of our troops, and the position of the enemy; and we may observe, when several attacks are made, that if one of these be upon a flank post, and another be made at the same time towards the center, it is most highly probable that the first is the true attack, for the following reasons:

As it requires double the time to succour a flank to that requisite for the center, and such succours can arrive at a flank only from one hand, consequently the attacking body may expect fewer troops to oppose them there: a very important consideration in all such attempts. Besides the advantage which

which the center possesses in this respect, there commonly is a large body posted there. A judicious enemy will scarce attempt any thing at the center, except a sudden surprise, rapidly conducted against a post that is weak or negligent, and a real attack there will probably be over in a moment; but if the firing there lasts for any time, there is every reason to suppose it is a feint, to prevent our sending assistance to the flank. The absence of the General from the flank, is another reason for supposing it to be the true point of attack.

If the alarm be on both the flanks of the cordon, and at different times, we may then conclude almost to a certainty, particularly in a mountainous region, that the first is a feint. This observation is more particularly applicable to the posts of the cordon. But suppose the enemy attacks both flanks at one and the same time, that flank which is the weakest, as to posts and troops, is most probably the real point of attack. An intelligent enemy, indeed, will not attack both flanks at once, because nothing will be gained by such a measure. The troops in the center will naturally march to the weakest point when they hear the firing on both flanks at one and the same time.

These are the considerations of the first class, founded on the general view of the country and our own disposition. Those of the second class may be drawn from the circumstances in front of the posts and quarters that are menaced, from the position
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of the enemy, and from their preparatory movements.

For every false attack, particularly before day, or which shall continue for some time after day to facilitate the true attack, the enemy will prefer such quarters as have ground in their front, which is intersected with woods and hills, to conceal their numbers. Their delay there will evidently mark that it is no real attack, but a feint. If they take post, and do not keep moving onwards to close with our infantry, before their support can arrive; if they draw their artillery over such ground, as it is easiest for them to move upon and to retire by, rather than to the points where they could do the most service, and if they keep up a great fire from them all, this denotes a false attack.

If the enemy advances against one of our quarters, which can be attacked on more than one side, and where some places are weaker than the rest, and sends no troops towards those places to cut off the post, or to intercept the succours, (two grand objects of attack upon a winter-post,) we may conclude that he means nothing decisive, and is not in strength at that place, but employs his force at the place of real attack upon some other quarter. It would be madness in him, in this situation, to send a detachment from his small body, which would delay his retreat, and would get between two fires, between that of the post, and that of the succours.

As

As soon as the real design of the enemy becomes apparent, not an instant must be lost in stopping the march of all troops who have been detached towards the points of false attack, and in causing them to move quickly towards that which is in danger. This will be soonest effected, by means of signal guns and well-mounted adjutants.

It certainly may be observed with truth, that the foregoing symptoms of the second class, are more applicable to the day than night, where we must have recourse to those of the first class, and particularly observe, (if we would form a just opinion,) whether a great and continued noise be made from the enemy's artillery and light troops at particular places; for in such night expeditions, if they are in earnest, all is conducted in silence, nor will an enemy wish to rouse his opponents from their slumbers, but will endeavour to come upon them by surprise, before they are upon their guard. If he deems the field-works, against which his attempt is directed, so bad, that they can be thrown down with a few cannon-balls, and the troops within them be deprived of their defences, (a very improbable supposition;) to effect this, he would be much more likely to employ the fire of his artillery during the day. This long continued noise by night, is merely an alarm, or a false attack.

ON SIGNALS.

Signals are invented for the purpose of regulating the movement of troops, in cases of alarm. The following precautions will render them more intelligible, and less liable to confusion :

In every quarter, or main-post, there must be three places chosen, in which a certain number of cannon should be kept for the purpose of alarm, and also two alarm-poles or fanalas *, in case one should not have the effect. These should, if possible, be upon some eminence, so as to be seen at a distance.

At the first quarter, where the alarm happens, these fanalas will be set on fire, and the garrisons of the other posts, to right and left, will spread the alarm, by means of their alarm guns, which will set those troops in march who are appointed for support, or will cause the whole to hasten to the place of general rendezvous. Lest the sound should be interrupted, the alarm must also be spread by the fanalas.

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* Fanalas are long poles covered with straw, tied upon them from top to bottom ; and if kept dry, will make a blaze for a minute or two. These are such as the Translator has seen ; but there may possibly be others of a more permanent nature, by means of lights, hoisted as colours are upon a flag-staff.

The commander of each post will detach, as speedily as possible, a mounted officer towards the troops advancing to support, with such observations as he has been able to make as to the real point of attack, that they may regulate their movement accordingly. The intelligence, at which post the alarm began, must be spread from post to post.

As we must place our chief dependence upon the signals made by the great guns, such measures must be taken as that there may not be the least delay, but that a sufficient number of artillery-men may be constantly near the guns to observe and repeat the signals.

It is very evident, that if these signals of alarm were made upon every trifling occasion, not only would the troops be harassed without necessity or use, but the signals themselves would lose all effect in a case of real emergency. It must, therefore, be strongly inculcated at every post, that no cannon are to be fired at any skirmishing party of the enemy, but such must be driven away with musquetry. The signals must be made only when you learn from the reports of your patrols and advanced posts, or any other very probable, or rather certain, intelligence, that the enemy are advancing in force, and with artillery. If we are thus sparing of the fire of our artillery, as we ought to be, it must be by the enemy only that we can be alarmed without just grounds; and it will become an invariable rule, that when our own artillery fires, the troops are to hasten to the place
of

of general rendezvous, if upon the plains; and if among mountains, that such as are appointed for support, shall immediately advance to the posts.

We have observed under the head of false attacks, that the enemy may sometimes advance with artillery, merely for the purpose of alarm; when this is discovered to be their design, by the methods there pointed out, the commanding officer, at such post, will cause his fanalas to be extinguished, and rockets to be fired into the air.

Although it be improbable, yet it is possible that we may be forced to abandon a quarter to the enemy; and our subject requires that we should make mention of the signals for the troops to hasten to the spot for rallying upon.

A guard-house must be built either upon that spot, or near it upon some eminence, and an officer, with some artillery-men and two heavy cannon, must be constantly posted there, as also four alarm-poles or fanalas. These will receive their signal from head-quarters, by an incessant fire from the alarm-guns there, repeated as quickly as they can be fired, without fanalas being raised, and continued until the people, at the point of rallying, have answered with their lights and their two guns, which they will continue to fire until the rallying is completed.

As head-quarters are generally well secured from the attempts of an enemy, and as all other signals consist of a certain number of guns, fixed and determined upon, there is no possibility of mistakes in this instance of the signal for rallying; and at the same time, orders can be dispatched on all hands by people on horseback.

There is yet another method which may answer better in the day than fanalas; namely, that of smokes, for which purpose different heaps of combustibles, somewhat damp, should be ready at the different quarters*.

Signals may also be applied to advantage upon another occasion. We may gain a spy, who shall become an inhabitant upon some height in the enemy's chain of posts opposite to us. Should they form any serious design against us, the greatest secrecy will probably be observed until the moment of execution. Our spy may, upon this critical occasion, by means of a preconcerted signal, give us notice that the enemy are on their march against us. Setting fire to a shed or stable will be his best means, as the most conspicuous. The advanced posts may have orders from their main-quarter every evening, to have a particular good look-out that way, and, without all being discovered, they may be told that the enemy have a fanala there, and that they are to report immediately on seeing it set on fire.

* Any greasy substance, or any thing of woollen, thrown upon any fire, will have the same effect. TRANSLATOR.

OBSERVATION.

Polybius has a curious passage upon this subject. He first cites the invention of Æneas the tactician. Two pots of equal dimensions, and filled with a like quantity of water, were provided, and each of the parties, who were to converse at a distance, had one of them. Lights were hoisted; first to express a desire of communication, upon which preparation was made: lights were again held up, denoting that both were ready. These were lowered at the same instant, when spigots, exactly equal, were pulled out of the pots. A cork floated in each pot, into which a slip of wood was inserted, which stood upright. Upon these sticks, which were divided into equal parts, certain letters were written. As the water ran out, they sank equally, and when that letter was even with the edge of the pot, which, by preconcerted agreement, was to signify what was now meant to be expressed, lights were again hoisted to stop the bung-holes of the vessels.

Polybius proceeds to observe, that he conceives he has himself made a great improvement in this invention. He divides the alphabet into three parts, and chuses three stations. One light hoisted at the right hand station, denoted the letter A, and eight lights there denoted the letter H. The intermediate letters were denoted by lights accord-
ing

ing to their order. The letters from I to Q had the center station assigned to them, and those from R to Z had the left-hand station. He imagines, that any intimation whatsoever could be signified at a distance, within sight, by this manner, and defends his invention from the accusation of being complicated and difficult, by the observation, that all things appear so at first sight: that to a man ignorant of the invention of letters, it would be inconceivable that thoughts could be represented on paper, and that to hear a child read a passage, with all the proper stops and inflections, would to him seem nothing less than miraculous; that all our acquisitions are the result of practice and habit alone, &c. &c. The passage may be found at length in *Hampton's Polybius*, vol. iii. page 324.

When we consider the very great use made of signals in the navy, and that by them, a prodigious variety of orders can be given at a great distance, we very naturally may ask the question, Why they are not more employed on shore? and although the watery plain has the decided advantage in this respect, that there is nothing upon it to interrupt the sight, such as woods and mountains, &c. yet, on many occasions, that advantage is equally possessed on shore. Questions and answers of very material consequence might be signified by different coloured flags, differently arranged above or below each other, and hoisted on a flag-staff, or by different combinations of lights, rockets, and bomb-shells, at night. Notice could be given from a
besieged

besieged town, how many days the place could hold out; at what time, and on what side, a sortie is intended, and various other intimations, by which the conduct of succours might be regulated. It is very possible, that one day or other, trial may be made how far the late invention of air-balloons may be useful upon such occasions. But in addition to what the German Author has said, the Translator must add, that it appears to him, that even on a field of battle great advantage might be derived from signals. A flag-staff of considerable height, and so contrived as to be easily raised and depressed, could be drawn by a couple of horses. When to advance, when to retreat, and when to halt, could be expressed for the whole line by three colours; and the addition of a colour underneath might signify a particular brigade, or a wing, or the cavalry.

OF PATROLES.

Next to the proper choice and well-ordered disposition of advanced posts, nothing can contribute more to the security of our winter-posts and quarters, than the observance of just rules and measures in the sending out and conducting of patroles towards the enemy; and in the first place, it is of the greatest importance that full and particular instructions shall be given to each patrole concerning the main

and peculiar point to be attended to, and of the species of intelligence which we are the most desirous of obtaining on that quarter through which they are to proceed. An exact idea of the country, and a knowledge of the roads, must be communicated to them, if possible, as well as a description of the enemy's disposition; and the strictest charge must be inculcated of vigilance during the night.

Generally speaking, there are but two sorts of patrols sent out from winter-posts or quarters. The first are the main patrols, ordered by the Commander in Chief, for the security of the whole. These are chiefly for the purpose of observing the great movements and changes of position of the enemy; whether he is drawing bodies of troops together, whether he has received reinforcements or made detachments, and whether he has brought more troops into his advanced posts; also to ascertain whether he is repairing roads or opening communications; to learn the times of his patrols, and to observe every thing which has a tendency to any enterprise against us. Officers of capacity and intelligence must be employed on this service, if we expect to attain these main objects of information; and they should be chosen from amongst those who accompanied the reconnoitring expeditions of the Commander in Chief, in the first formation of our line of posts and quarters.

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If such officers are furnished with sufficient sums of money, and apply them judiciously in their patrols, and if they are possessed of address in their manner of speaking to the people, they will rarely fail in making friends among the inhabitants, who will not only facilitate the labours, but who, by having free access to the enemy's posts and quarters, will give information which cannot possibly be obtained by any other means.

The second species of patrols are such as are sent from each quarter for their own peculiar security. These will, at times, proceed as near to the enemy's advanced posts as can be done without exposing themselves too much; and being constantly in motion along the roads by which the enemy must approach, they cannot fail to give the alarm in due time. They will likewise in a certain degree, and as far as they proceed, fulfil the intention of the first species of patrols. The officer, commanding at the quarter, will be very careful to have one or two good spies, to give timely notice of ambuscades laid for his patrols, or of any movement of the enemy: and as it may be dangerous, if not impracticable, for them to proceed to us by the direct road upon such an emergency, some place in a different direction should be fixed upon, to which they are to repair, and then communicate their intelligence, either verbally, or by means of signals fixed and determined upon. A daily report of all such patrols ought to be sent to the Commander in Chief, at a particular time appointed,

pointed, as well as an immediate report in cases of emergency, which may possibly affect the army.

Where a patrol has to pass through very broken ground, where there are ravines and hollow ways, such as occur among mountains, where it is scarce possible to make a circuit, particularly in the winter season, such patrol must not be too strong, nor consist of more than from twelve to twenty men. More would add nothing to the strength of the party, and would only be an incumbrance. In passing through such ground, they must ride two and two wherever the road will permit, and at a considerable distance two men should be advanced; the first at five or six hundred yards in front, and the next half as far, following the first; if the ravine, or hollow way, be not very long, the party should halt till the first man has got fairly through, and when he has seen that all is clear, they should pass as quickly as they can. But as such ravines are commonly of too considerable length to admit of such a method without causing much delay, we must be content with following our advanced men with much attention.

It may be asserted, that we may upon such an occasion perceive every thing in our front from the heights; but it is not so; for generally speaking, some adjacent hill will interrupt the view, and the whole is very often overgrown with wood in such a manner, as to render flanking parties of little use beyond a small distance.

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We must also have two men at a similar distance, in the rear of our party, who by means of a pistol shot will give the alarm, should the enemy make any attempt in rear.

During the patrole, attention must be paid to all roads which strike off, and to such ravines and hollow ways as have a different direction from that of their route; and a man should be sent not only to discover if any of the enemy be concealed there, but to obtain a thorough knowledge of their course, that the patroles, in case of being at any time unexpectedly cut off or dispersed, may never be at a loss for bye-ways, by which at least a man or two may get through, and convey intelligence of the enemy's approach.

When a patrole comes to a village, which among mountains is commonly in bottoms, and that they cannot proceed by taking a circuitous march, but must pass through such village, they will then, particularly if in an enemy's country, halt before they enter, and will bring out of the adjacent houses some of the inhabitants, who must be compelled, by threats of immediate death, to give us true intelligence, if any of the enemy be lodged in any of the houses, barns, or churches, to which they must be obliged to conduct us. But as villages are often very long, and that those at one end cannot always be acquainted with what passes at the other end, the precaution must be renewed as we pass along. Should the village have been deserted by the inhabitants, we must again

advance two men in the manner already recommended, who must have a sharp look-out to the buildings as they pass; particularly the larger fort, such as we have described, in which the enemy's light troops and marksmen very frequently make their lodgment, and fire upon the patrols as they pass, or sometimes cut them off.

It may be sometimes advisable, when we are patrolling in an enemy's country, to give out that we mean to take a quite different road from that which we really intend to take; but then, we must either ourselves be well acquainted with the latter, or have some guide that we can depend upon. The inhabitants will certainly communicate this false intelligence to the enemy, by which he will be probably misled.

Should the patrol come to a town, in which the officer has it in his orders to levy contribution, or to seize and carry off some obnoxious person, or to stop for any other purpose, the environs and approaches should be reconnoitred, and videttes should be placed upon the most commanding spots. The remainder of the party must be kept together, without being permitted to dismount. It would possibly be better to cause them to halt before they enter, and execute the business with two or three men, using the utmost expedition, lest the enemy receive intelligence, and gain time to come upon you.

Should the patrol have to cross a height overgrown with wood, and of such a nature that there
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is no retreat on either side, nor by any other way than the road, they will do well to halt till a few men detached for that purpose have gained the summit, and a skilful man, well used to flanking, has advanced on foot through the thickets on each side.

A certain pernicious custom has been but too frequent with patrols commanded by under-officers, that of stopping at houses, when several of the men, or perhaps often the whole party, will dismount to drink or plunder. A post can derive no security from such patrols, which sooner or later cannot fail to be surprised, and cut off.

Should the enemy frequent such ground as our patrols ought properly to pass through, we must add a certain proportion of light infantry to accompany them to the most dangerous places, such as defilés and ravines overgrown with wood, where they will halt till the patrol returns to occupy such posts, and to accompany them back; and it may be proper that such infantry shall somewhat vary their position, which will cause the enemy to be less venturous for fear of ambuscades, and more cautious how they follow our patrols upon their return. It may happen that the enemy shall take possession of woods near us, filling them with small parties of light troops, in such a manner as to have the command of them; in which case, if we cannot fell down the forest, we must adopt such measures as will intimidate them, and cause them to be apprehensive

prehensive for their own safety; for which purpose a regular expedition must be undertaken against them. This design must be kept a profound secret until the hour of execution: else, like most undertakings which are made known some days before to the staff-officers and adjutants, it will be fruitless, and of no avail.

Several divisions of infantry must then be formed of two, three, or four hundred men each, and accompanied with a few yægers. Each of these columns, which may, perhaps, if the wood is broad, be four or five in number, will be furnished with one or two good guides, such as foresters, or shepherds, who keep their flocks in those woods; or smugglers, who have frequented them; or people who have been accustomed to fetch their wood from thence; as such people will probably have a minute knowledge of every road and foot-path. Artillery and cavalry are unnecessary, except a few with such column as moves upon a road. The columns will advance about an hour before day towards the point where our patrols have been accustomed to pass, and so as to arrive nearly by day-break at the enemy. The columns which keep upon the flanks of the wood may probably remain undiscovered in their progress; which circumstance is much to be desired, that the enemy may fall in with them in their retreat; for which end, the columns which penetrate into the center must endeavour to pursue all who escape, so as to drive them sideways. But as we must not suffer our columns
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to disperse in pursuit of the enemy, we must detach a few chosen men from them to assist the yagers, and to follow them in small bodies for their support. It is far from improbable, that a number of prisoners will be taken upon such an expedition. At all events the enemy cannot remain, and they will probably be at least so closely pursued, that they will not in future chuse to run so great a risk, and will appear much seldomer to interrupt the daily duty of our patrols.

Wherever it is practicable, particularly among mountains, and if the roads have been broken up, a patrol should return by a different road from that by which they went out, and frequently should change their hours; these and other precautions are not the less frequently to be put in practice from their being well-known.

Every patrol which is sent out either in the evening, or before break of day, towards the enemy's quarters, as soon as they have got from two to three miles in front of the advanced posts, should send back a report if they have seen nothing of the enemy. This practice will be a great means of preventing surprises, both of our advanced posts and quarters; because if no such report arrives, we have reason to suspect that the enemy have cut off the patrol, with a view to endeavour to surprise us. The advanced post will then immediately send out a few men to reconnoitre, and also will send to the quarter to give notice of their suspicions, that they may be upon their guard.

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Should the patrolle fall in with the enemy, within that distance, it is scarce possible but a few shots will be fired, which will give the alarm; or, if beyond it, the horseman who was sent back will probably hear their firing, and bring us back an account of it.

A patrolle must never forget the main object for which they are sent out. Sometimes an ill-timed fool-hardiness has been known to lead a patrolle to pursue a few men quite a different way from that which they ought to have taken; nor will the trifling advantage of taking a few prisoners at all compensate for the neglect of their orders.

But should a patrolle in a thick fog, such as is common among mountains during the autumn or the winter season, unexpectedly come so near a party of the enemy, that a conflict is unavoidable; they must, without a moment's reflection or hesitation, attack them, whether they be strong or weak; for it will not be apparent which side is strongest, and if it should happen that your enemy has most numbers, still in such ground he cannot extend so as to use that superiority. It will, therefore, in such a case, commonly happen, that which ever party comes most quickly to a determination, will prove victorious. But the officer commanding the patrolle, must be prepared for every event; and in case he has obtained part of the intelligence required, he will take care that an intelligent soldier shall follow him at a distance, who is upon no account to join in any skirmish, but return back

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to the post with the information: for what was conceived in the fog to be only a party of the enemy, may prove a column advancing against our posts, and the party may chance to be cut off.

There is yet a third species of patrol; namely, such as go, during the night, between the advanced posts, and even in front of them between the night posts; but of these we have already spoken at length under their proper article.

After having determined and ordered the regulations for the patrols from our posts, it yet remains for us to watch over the execution with unceasing assiduity. Not only the commanders along the line, but the General himself, when it is least expected, by night as well as day, will ride to the posts, and see whether the rounds and patrols proceed with that zealous diligence and punctuality which the general security requires; for in spite of the best and most pointed orders, it will almost unavoidably happen, that habits of negligence and indolence will soon creep in, if officers of rank and weight do not frequently employ a jealous eye over the uninterrupted continuance of the required duties. Not unfrequently are districts and roads most diligently patrolled and watched for some time after our arrival in our quarters; but when a length of time has elapsed without seeing or hearing any thing of the enemy, who, perhaps, may have industriously kept off to remove all suspicion, and to lull us into security; then by degrees and insensibly have our cares been less and less towards
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that quarter: the patrols have been sent out less frequently; to a lesser distance, and have proceeded less efficaciously in their work, taking less pains to bring back just and indubitable intelligence. The enemy can then consider their success as next to a certainty; nor can it be denied that all surprises, and the success of almost every undertaking against winter-quarters, are chiefly to be attributed either to the misconduct of advanced posts, or the negligence of patrols.

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SURPRISE.

Ignorance and negligence are most commonly the only causes to which we can attribute a surprise, against which too many preparations, external and internal, cannot be employed. Ignorance will appear by the improper position of our out-posts and sentinels; when the latter cannot discover the approach of the enemy, nor the former possess the means of defence; and by want of judgment in the directions given to patrols. Negligence, which is much more common, shews itself either by omitting totally to post the proper guards and to send out patrols, or by suffering them to become careless, or not keeping the troops in quarters alert and ready to assemble at the shortest notice. Having spoken fully upon these subjects, under their proper heads, it would be superfluous to use repetition,

repetition, for which reason we shall proceed to consider what yet remains to be done to guard against surprise.

If our quarter be a town, and still more if it be a village, and woods extend from us towards the enemy, we shall do well to fell down a considerable number of the trees in rows, crossing each other, so as to form the strongest abbatis. We will not be deterred by a desire of preserving the wood, as the enemy can, under cover of it, form any enterprise against us, and can advance, even in the clearest day, without discovery; or by having their numerous light troops posted in it, can keep us in a state of constant alarm.

We may often have to occupy a town in a flat and open country, with no commanding situation upon which we can fix our advanced posts of infantry, and where, from apprehension of a superior cavalry, we shall be obliged to draw in even our out-picquets and videttes, or we may not have a sufficient number for the whole circumference. In such a case, we would adopt the following measures:

About two hundred paces in front of each gate, and as nearly between them as possible, we would endeavour to pitch upon a strong building of stone, in the suburbs, as an observatory guard-house, and would clear away every interruption between it and the gates, to leave the view clear. The windows and doors of the lower story should be strongly barricaded with earth or dung, except

one entrance on the side next the town. A fort of scaffold of thick boards, musquet proof, and covered with tin as a preservative against fire, should be erected opposite a front window, so as to form a covered projection, in which loop holes will be made not only in the front and sides, but also in the floor. The only entrance into the house, on that side next the enemy, will be by a ladder, and at night, two clear lamps will be hung up to shew whoever approaches to demand admission. An officer, with two trusty serjeants and one-and-twenty chosen men, should be posted in this building. A double sentry will be placed at the center door, and one in the scaffolding. Nine men will be allotted for that purpose. The remaining twelve will be employed in patrolling in the following manner:

We have said, that a post of this construction should, in the circumstances above-mentioned, be chosen between each gate. At night-fall these will send out their patrols, which must be constantly on foot; consisting of an under officer and two men. The patrols of each post will meet half way, and then return. Should the enemy succeed in cutting off one of them, it is very improbable that both will have that misfortune. None of the inhabitants will be permitted, on any pretence, to approach the line of the patrols, which will move ten or twelve paces asunder, ready to fire, without long questioning, on whomsoever shall approach that appear suspicious.

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On their return, they will be challenged by the sentry, and will report to the officer, who will immediately send out others in both directions. The patrols should frequently stop and listen. Should the suburbs be regularly built, it may be practicable to barricade the streets so as to afford considerable protection.

In villages, such houses as we have been describing may not be found, and a small block-house must be erected for the same purpose. This we naturally would place so as to be the least exposed, and so as to guard any approach, by which the enemy would attempt to steal upon us whether up a ravine or otherwise. Upon our first arrival in the town, the commandant will carefully examine the ground and the whole circumference, and will continue frequently to go round and see if any thing be amiss. If the town be surrounded with a wall, every building or mound touching the wall must be thrown down, and the common sewers must be particularly secured with double grates *.

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* The surprise of Cremona, on the 1st of February 1702, by Prince Eugene in person, was effected by introducing a hundred men up a common sewer, by means of a traiterous ecclesiastic within the town. They forced the gate of St. Margaret, by which the Prince with one thousand men were admitted; but five thousand, who were to have entered by the gate of the Po on the other side, were kept at bay by two Irish regiments in the service of France, who at length broke down the bridge. The garrison thereby gained ample time, and Prince Eugene was obliged to retire, carrying with him the General, (Villeroi,) Lieutenant General Crenoi, and a considerable number of prisoners.

TRANSLATOR.

All the cellars and vaults must be examined, in case of any passage. The guards will constantly report whatever is amiss, and every thing extraordinary.

The internal precautions against surprise are as follows:

We must take care never to open the gates till broad day; and on Sundays, holidays, or market days, or in case of any procession or cavalcade, or any pretence which may bring a number of people together before the gates, we will do well to shut them, till we are perfectly aware who those people are. It should be a constant practice for the guards to draw up under arms at the opening and shutting of the gates; it will be very proper to have two clear lights at night on the rampart at every gate; and should there be no work, we will not fail to erect strong palisades in front of it.

The sentinels within will be carefully posted, so as that every part of the wall shall be seen. They will be constantly visited, but with the greatest diligence in dark or stormy weather. The picquets and night reserves will be placed with equal care, contiguous to the points where we have most to apprehend, and will remain till broad day, or an hour after it. The rounds will go punctually, and an officer of the staff will frequently go at times which are not stated, and in times of danger will remain with the guard for that purpose. It would be advisable for the commandant, at such a time, to have a few armed men at his quarters, that he may at any hour go rounds without having to send

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to any of the guards to acquaint them that he is coming. It will also be proper, that a careful serjeant shall be constantly on foot, during the night, along the ramparts between the gates.

Should we apprehend desertion, it will not be without use to number our guards anew at the beating of the tattoo, that men may not be posted at the same places where they stood by day, and that, where there are double sentries, the same men may not stand together. All understanding with the enemy, through inhabitants within, will thus be in a great measure frustrated; and with the same intention we will send away, to some more remote quarter, all deserters from the enemy, as soon as we have thoroughly examined them.

Every piece of ordnance must be carefully examined, and laid every evening by officers of artillery. It may be proper, in the day time, to have a trusty soldier at the top of some high tower or steeple, should there be such, commanding an extensive prospect, and also at night to observe any signals either without or within.

To these military arrangements, others relative to the civilians within the town remain to be added. If we are in an enemy's town, we will begin with disarming the inhabitants, and will demand from the chief magistrates a written description of every one that we permit to remain, and for whom he must undertake to regulate the services on the works or otherwise; keeping a watchful eye over every part of their conduct, but most particularly over such as shall ask permission to leave the town,

from time to time, upon any pretence whatever. Inhabitants who shew sufficient grounds for the request, such as affairs of the very greatest importance, will have passes granted to them by the Commanding Officer, at the recommendation of the chief magistrate, expressly specifying, whether permission has been asked and given for such inhabitant to go within the enemy's lines.

Travellers must be narrowly examined, their baggage must be rummaged, and their whole conduct, while in the town, must be watched. When they return, if towards the enemy, they must not be permitted to go back by the same road they came. Should persons come back who have had permission to travel, they must be required to produce a certificate, signed by credible witnesses, of their time of abode in every place.

Every citizen, for whom the chief magistrate, or his fellow-citizens, do not chuse to become responsible, or who may be suspected, or who cannot give a sufficient reason for wishing to stay, must be sent out of the town. No messengers are to be permitted, nor no letters going or coming, but by the common post, and even those liable at times to be opened and read.

All merchants must, under pain of the severest punishment, be obliged to bring their goods for sale to one particular place appointed. From this a double advantage will accrue. Immoderate exactions will be prevented, and all new comers, who may have a secret intelligence either with the foldiers or inhabitants, may be more narrowly observed. A sworn constable of the market, ap-

pointed by the magistrate, must be attended by an intelligent and trusty under-officer belonging to the garrison.

Every citizen must, on the severest penalty, report, a full hour before tattoo beating, if any stranger has been received in his house, particularly describing his person, and mentioning his business, and how long he means to stay. This report he will deliver to the officer of his district, and also a duplicate to the main-guard. The town should be divided into districts, with an officer to each. From these reports, a general one will be made for the commandant, and one for the chief magistrate, who must be answerable, with his head, for all treachery.

In case of alarm, the citizens must, particularly in the night, remain in their houses; they must place candles in their windows, to throw light into the streets; or, if in the day-time, they must on no account assemble in any numbers.

Should a fire break out, the inhabitants, when the alarm is sounded, must repair to the several posts previously allotted them, with the implements necessary to extinguish the flames, such as ladders, fire-hooks, buckets, engines, &c. &c. all of which the town must have constantly in readiness, and their assistance will be demanded when necessary.

There may certainly be instances produced of surprises being effected both in mountainous and level countries; and should so very unfortunate an event take place, contrary to all expectation, the commander of a post must instantly endeavour to extricate his troops as well as possible; and before

we proceed to specify the measures to be taken on such an occasion, it may be necessary to distinguish, in a few words, two different species of surprises.

A quarter may be surprised in such a manner, that the soldiers have just time to seize their arms and defend themselves singly, or in small bodies, in the streets, or from the houses, while the enemy are pouring in and occupying the places of strength, when it becomes impossible to make any farther opposition. In the event of such surprises, which we conceive to be very unlikely to happen, or rather should deem impossible, were there not too many examples of them, no remedy can be applied; the speediest determination and the boldest conduct would be in vain.

The second species of surprise is, when the enemy have cut off a patrol, or passed them unnoticed, and have overpowered the advanced posts somewhat suddenly; but when the garrison have been sufficiently alert to gain their posts, and get into a position of defence, if there has been no time to make the necessary signals of alarm, to cause the troops of other posts to advance to their relief, the situation would certainly be very critical, yet, perhaps, not altogether desperate, if without hesitation they employ the means within their power. The noise of great guns and small arms will convey the intimation of their being attacked.

The officers commanding at the next quarters on such an occasion, when there is reason to fear that a post may be overpowered before a body of infantry could arrive to their support, will hasten

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to the post of cavalry which is nearest to that which is attacked, and where, by the principles of general arrangement, a certain proportion of mounted artillery should be posted. They will quickly form two divisions of two hundred men each, more or less, with a light gun to each, and cause them to move quickly by the two nearest roads towards the post attacked: fifty of these will be more particularly attached to the gun, and all the cavalry and infantry of the post will follow as quickly as possible, either to support or to protect the advanced party, in case of their being obliged to retire. When the two divisions of cavalry come within half an hour's march, the fifty men, with the light artillery, will dismount and take post upon a commanding spot, drawing up in a rank entire: the enemy will probably suppose them to be a body of infantry, with artillery, followed by columns of troops; the guns fired from two several points, by which they know that succours can arrive, may cause them to suppose that they are near, and may at the same time greatly encourage the troops attacked. It is possible that, by these means, we may actually gain sufficient time for our columns to arrive, and beat back the enemy. Had such conduct been pursued for the relief of Neustadt, it very probably might have proved successful; for the enemy employed but a few infantry in that enterprise, in which they succeeded beyond their own most sanguine hopes*.

* It is evident from page 310 of this Miscellany, that what the Author here says, is by no means applicable to the circumstances

OF PLACES OF ARMS, OR ALARM-POSTS; AND
OF BACK-POSTS, OR RALLYING PLACES.

A judicious choice of places, for the above-mentioned purposes, is absolutely requisite for the completion of our system of defence and security in our winter-posts and quarters.

The alarm-posts for those garrisons, of which we have spoken under the head of main-posts, which in level countries determine to occupy towns, will be along the ramparts; each battalion hastening to the post which has been assigned to them, as quickly as possible, on the first alarm; but in all other quarters, we will either chuse some position near at hand of great natural strength, or will construct strong field-works, such as we have described, adapted to the numbers of our garrison.

How such alarm-posts should be chosen, whether before, behind, or on one side, of the quarter, can be best determined by the nature of the ground; it is of the most material consequence that

cumstances under which the burning of Neustadt in Silesia took place. Most probably it is Neustadt in Bohemia that is here meant; and something appears in Count SCHMETTAU's *Campagne Raisonnéé*, page 73, as if about the 30th of July 1778, a post of one hundred Prussians were cut off there. Neustadt in Silesia was also attacked in the month of September of that year, by a battalion of Austrian invalids, who exacted a contribution.

TRANSLATOR.

that they shall not be at too great a distance, but that the troops may have it in their power to repair to them from their quarters in right and proper time. If possible, it is certainly desirable that the alarm-post shall be in front, because we gain time thereby to send off our baggage when an alarm happens; and the very act of moving in front, particularly in the night-time, adds greatly to the spirits of the soldiery.

Should our situation afford us choice, the distance of the alarm-post ought to be from four to six hundred paces from the quarter: if nearer, the enemy might probably have it in their power to incommode our works from the houses, when we quit them.

With regard to a back-post, or general rallying-place, although we have a right to consider it as next to an impossibility, that whole armies can be surpris'd and beaten back, or cut off, in their winter-position, if all due precautions have been employed; yet we must acknowledge that history has furnish'd examples of such events, when probably the observation of just principles has been neglected. Among these we may reckon the great surpris'e at Duttlinghen on the 25th of November 1643, of the army of France, commanded by Marshal Rantzau, combined with the army under the Duke of Saxe Weymar, effected by the combined Imperial and Bavarian troops, under Prince Charles of Lorraine and General Mercy. It was owing to the circumstance of neglect and inatten-

tion, in not sending patrols through the mountains and woods at Mofskirch, between Duttlinghen and the enemy, which the French had deemed impassable. We may also mention the surprise, planned and executed with so much ability by Marshal Turenne, of the army of the Princes of the Empire, combined with that under Bournonville, acting against France in Alsace, when their numerous forces were parcelled out over a whole territory, extending from Strasburgh to Basle, and which, after this event and the actions at Muhlhausen and Turkheim, were driven back across the Rhine*. Other examples of a more modern date might be adduced, but which are sufficiently well-known to evince the possibility of such events.

In war, no precaution ought to be deemed superfluous; and as it may be possible that the enemy may find means to penetrate our cordon, whether from the negligence of posts or patrols, or by means of treachery, notwithstanding the best ordered dispositions on the part of the commander, we deem it essential that a general rallying-place or back-post shall be fixed upon and publicly determined. In level countries, this will probably be

* The King of Prussia, speaking of Duke Ferdinand's winter campaign of 1757-8, the history of which is given in page 254, &c. of this Miscellany, says, that the only transaction worthy of being compared to it, is this very irruption of Marshal Turenne, here adduced as an example. TRANSLATOR.

be chosen in the center of the quarters, behind the second line, where it will also serve as a protection for the magazines. Among mountains, on such an occasion, we probably would chuse to hasten to the most commanding ground, to prevent the enemy from occupying it before us.

Let us suppose that the enemy has unexpectedly advanced; that intelligence of his approach, within an hour's march in full force, has arrived at head-quarters; and that circumstances are such as that the Commander in Chief has previously determined on drawing back in case of such an event; the means by which he will most speedily make known his intentions are specified under the article of signals.

We will suppose upon such an occasion, that the whole chain of winter-quarters of our infantry shall stretch out to an extent of thirty miles, or twelve hours march, with the cavalry behind in a second line, at the distance of one hour's march. Let us consider what would be the consequence, were the attempt made to assemble the army at the head-quarters in the center. We presume that half an hour would be requisite for the troops at the several posts to get under arms. We will then suppose that each post is at the distance of an hour's march from that next to it; consequently in an hour and a half the two posts on either side will reach the center. Every hour afterwards, the troops of two other posts will arrive, and those most distant on each flank will have completed their march

march in six hours. But the enemy we supposed within one hour's march, and the troops of the different posts, hastening to the center, would consequently be beaten in detail as they came up.

If, on the contrary, all the garrisons of the different posts, upon the appointed signals being made, begin their march towards the rear to their general rallying place, they will be a full half hour before the enemy; the cavalry in the second line will have time to advance and meet them, and to cover the retreat, and facilitate the junction of the whole at the place appointed.

Should the enemy closely pursue our retreating infantry, without being intimidated with the circumstance of their having little or no knowledge of the ground behind the quarters which we have abandoned, we may, as we move, quickly occupy good posts with a few infantry, such as copses, houses, or ravines, from whence we may gall and much interrupt their progress, particularly that of their cavalry. A forlorn hope, on this occasion, may do the most essential service, by delaying the enemy at various defiles; and there are times and occasions when a few men must be sacrificed for the advantage of the whole.

During these operations of the retreat and re-junction of our troops, should a favourable opportunity appear for our cavalry to make an advantageous charge upon a column of the enemy's troops, which may well be supposed to happen, whether from their having got into disorder in plundering,

or

or from disadvantageous ground, the officer commanding the cavalry will, without hesitation, avail himself of the event; and it is evident that if one of their columns be beaten, their general care will be exerted to get the broken troops into order, the object of their enterprise may be altogether frustrated, and the disadvantage may recoil upon themselves.

As soon as the commanding General has got together a body of troops in any degree sufficiently numerous to cope with the enemy, he will advance from the rallying place to the relief of such of the garrisons as may be in danger of being cut off, to protect the junction of the retreating troops, and perhaps beat back the enemy. But should the enemy's superiority be so very great, whether from their numbers or ground, as to leave us no hope of success, our troops must fall back to the nearest fortress, and wait for reinforcements before they advance again upon the enemy, to regain the ground which they have lost.

Surprises and attacks of particular quarters and posts, are certainly much more to be apprehended than a general attack of the nature which we have been describing; they require few columns in comparison, consequently they afford less room for discovery, and against them will our vigilance be more particularly exerted.

OF DISPOSITION.

We suppose the general disposition of our troops, in their winter-quarters and cordon of posts, to have been wisely digested and arranged, and are now to consider more particularly those dispositions which ought to be made in the event of an enemy's approach; that, by their being fixed and clearly decided, neither hesitation nor misconception may give rise to delay or irresolution in moments of such critical importance. As soon then as the Commander in Chief has fully regulated the posts and quarters of the various divisions of the army, and has assigned to each of his Generals and inferior commanders their respective posts, he will proceed, in conjunction with them, to consider of the rules of conduct to be observed by each and every one of them, as well as of the whole.

There are certain invariable rules established for guards and posts; there are others which may vary according to circumstances; and it becomes necessary, that instructions shall be given for the conduct to be observed relative to each, and the whole; most of which may be comprised under the following heads:

1st, Instructions and orders for the troops in each post, in the event of an attack upon their own post.

2d, Or.

2d, Orders how they are to act in case of an attack upon contiguous posts, or of a general assembly of the army. Let us first treat of the disposition of troops posted on the plain, in the first case of an attack upon their own post.

We take it for granted, that calculations have been made respecting each post: as to the time which the enemy must take to advance up to the post from that point where they, probably speaking, must be discovered by our patrols, and also as to the time of opposition we have a right to expect our troops to make on the advanced posts and in the main posts.

These computations having been made, there remains but one rule of conduct for the troops; to get under arms with the utmost speed, and defend themselves without a thought either of surrender or retreat, considering it as infallibly certain that a sufficient body of cavalry and infantry will arrive for their support.

The very same conduct, we apprehend, ought to be observed by the troops, even in a post which is not included in our cordon; and it may happen, that we may have such a post at some distance from the rest, whether for the protection of some important avenue of approach, or for other reasons. Should we once have determined upon establishing such a winter-post, we must make it as strong as possible, and consider it as much safer and better for them to endeavour to defend themselves, even against an enemy much superior in numbers, than
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to attempt a retreat; and this for the following reasons:

In an attempt against a winter-post, the enemy will chuse to move by night; and on the plain, they will probably get round the post, or at least will pay the greatest attention to those points from whence we suppose we can retreat. Now we cannot expect more from our patrols and advanced posts, than that they shall give us timely notice of the enemy's approach, and whether they have any infantry or artillery; but we cannot suppose they will give us information respecting their numbers in the night-time; or even by day upon the plain; we may only in general suppose, that they will be more apt to magnify than to diminish.

At what point of time would we then determine to withdraw? Should it be when the enemy have approached so near, as that we can form a pretty exact opinion of his real force; we should then be exposed to much greater danger, from the cavalry of the enemy, in the retreat upon the plain, where there are seldom good posts to assist us in covering our retreat, than we should do in waiting the attack in our entrenchments. But, on the other hand, should we withdraw upon the first intelligence of the enemy's approach, without any knowledge of his strength, such alarms would answer no purpose, and would be so often repeated, that we should soon lose more by the desertion, which would be caused by harassing our troops, or at least much facilitated by such movements in the night,

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(to say nothing of the dangers of the retreat,) than we should probably do in the defence.

Let us then suppose the troops under arms and at their post. Having fired our alarm-guns, and set fire to our alarm-poles, on the enemy's first approach, we will dispatch two horsemen to the right, and two to the left, to the next posts, as soon as the enemy's intention of an attack is apparent, and an adjutant, or other officer, to the quarters of the commanding officer to hasten the support.

With respect to advanced posts, whether in redoubts, block-houses, or fortified buildings, near which the enemy must pass, their construction may be such as to occasion prodigious loss to the assailants, and their numbers may be so increased as to keep them back a considerable time, till support shall arrive, or at least a body of cavalry to cover their retreat. There may be advanced posts for the support of a grand guard of cavalry, which might be permitted to retire, when our cavalry are in safety, and on the approach of infantry; but unless they are favoured by woods or hollow ways, or villages, it were better they should remain firm in their post, which, if of a certain strength, an enemy, upon such occasion, would rather chuse to pass, than sustain the loss of time and men, which the attack of them would occasion.

We come next to consider of the disposition proper for troops upon a plain, which are to support a post in their neighbourhood, which may happen

happen to be attacked; and nothing will tend more to frustrate the enemy's designs, than a just disposition of such troops, upon such an occasion.

As soon as the alarm guns, and signals denoting an attack, are fired and repeated, every garrison in the chain of posts must get under arms. They ought to be ready to march with their artillery and baggage in half an hour, or three quarters at the most. As the baggage will, upon such occasion, be driven back within our quarters, the troops need not be delayed nor incumbered with it. The advanced posts are at the same time drawn in, and light horsemen are sent with orders to the patrols how to shape their retreat. The troops being set in motion, will proceed with as much speed as is consistent with preserving the continuity of a column, and a few cavalry will patrol on the side next the enemy, as well for security as to be a check against desertion.

The roads of communication must at all times be kept in the best state by the regiments next to them, without any particular orders for that purpose. They must be so made, as that a sub-division in front can march upon them; they must be fit for artillery to move upon, and the Commanders must be thoroughly acquainted with them; otherwise they may miss their way, and cross in upon the route of other regiments, or fail of receiving orders which may be sent.

Should

Should the troops which first arrive at the quarter or post which is attacked, be too weak in number of themselves to attempt its relief, they must take post on the most advantageous ground they can, and wait for farther reinforcements if the day has broke; but should they arrive before day, so as that the enemy cannot discern their numbers, and that the quarter attacked appears to be in danger, of which we may judge from the fire of the musquetry, and particularly if no intelligence comes from thence, something bold must be attempted at all events. We must attack the enemy's flank with our cavalry and infantry united, and must not suffer them, for a moment, to make any farther impression. But as the attack may be only a feint, to facilitate a design at some other quarter, we refer to what has been said on the subject of false attacks, for farther rules of conduct upon such an occasion.

OF THE DISPOSITION OF CAVALRY IN WINTER-
POSTS UPON THE PLAIN.

The orders for the cavalry will be almost always for their supporting other troops, for they always are or ought to be posted behind infantry. If it be possible for the enemy to come unperceived, and without resistance from other troops, upon the

winter quarter of a body of cavalry, we may almost consider that body as lost.

The disposition with respect to how many men are to be furnished, for the advanced posts and patrols, by each regiment of cavalry, how the first are to be distributed; from whence, and at what times, and in what manner, the latter are to proceed, will be fixed and regulated, and will be adhered to without alteration or deviation till further orders from the Commander in Chief. With respect to what internal guards and patrols are to be furnished, that will be as each commanding officer shall see fit.

The points first to be attended to by cavalry, with a view to the support of posts of infantry, are the roads and the nature of the ground, with which, particularly round the posts adjacent, they should be minutely acquainted, so as perfectly to know where ditches, hedges, hollow ways, and ravines, or other obstacles occur; distinguishing which are of a nature to prevent their acting altogether, from those which may only cause some impediment.

In a night attack, or before day has fully broken, as the cavalry advancing to support will arrive before a support of infantry can come, they ought instantly to fall upon the enemy, and rapidly seek to gain their flank; and if the officer commanding the cavalry knows the ground, he will not only avoid impediments, but turn them to advantage, so as to throw the enemy into disorder, and oblige them

them either to retreat, or wait till day, as it will be impossible for them to make a disposition when they cannot see our numbers, and can have no exact knowledge of the ground.

It is by no means improbable, that such conduct will prove successful, and that our cavalry will beat back the enemy; but should it prove otherwise, they must fall back to the nearest body advancing to their support, in as good order as they can. The enemy's pursuit may be somewhat diverted in the night, by detaching trumpeters to sound in different directions from the line of retreat. We may also employ this measure, at the first commencement of such a night attack, to bewilder the enemy, and cause them to suppose that our strength is greater than it is; also that different corps are advancing by different roads; but as this is a stratagem which has been much employed, we must protect each trumpeter with a party of men, against the patrols which the enemy will probably send out.

The service of the cavalry, in our posts and quarters on the plain, may be most essential; and, in such a situation, they may be considered as our arm of greatest strength against the undertakings of the enemy. It is evident that we cannot bestow too much attention in arranging every circumstance which may facilitate their speedy assembly. They must be saddled, mounted, and in motion, without a moment's loss of time, upon the very first alarm.

We proceed to considerations on the disposition of troops posted in a mountainous country.

When a post among mountains is attacked, it is of still greater importance, than upon the plain, that the troops shall maintain it to the utmost extremity; for the very worst consequences may often attend their abandoning their situation.

Posts among mountains are commonly very strong, having few avenues of approach, and frequently can only be attacked in front: it follows, that they are the more defensible, and with fewer men; but it is then highly material that we hasten to occupy our defences on the first instant of alarm, lest the enemy should suddenly overpower the guards posted in the works, and get possession of them, or even surprise the troops in their quarters. Such events are far from being improbable among mountains. We must there often unavoidably have our place of arms at some distance from our quarters, from the nature of the ground: then our sole reliance must be upon our patrols and advanced posts. Should they fail in doing their duty, the consequences are obvious.

The vast variety in the circumstances of posts among mountains, renders it very difficult to apply general rules to such situations. Each must probably have its own peculiar detail, comprising dispositions and measures quite different from those of others, particularly with respect to the conduct of their advanced posts. In no case is it more material that these should be fixed and decided, than when the quarters lie in front or on one

side of the main-post, and place of arms, without being protected thereby.

As we have given a particular description of the position at Dittersbach in Plate IV. we shall now express our ideas as to the conduct proper to be observed by the various posts belonging to it, whether advanced posts for the purpose of intelligence, or others for the covering the movement of the troops into their place of arms, or respecting the measures to be employed by those troops when there, for covering the retreat from the posts, all of which, without exception, in the case of this position, are to withdraw.

As soon as the enemy advance through Hermisdorf and Michelsdorf towards Dittersbach, (being the only way by which they can come with artillery, and in columns, as to a serious attack, supposing the precaution of strong and well-guarded abbatis on the right flank,) the moveable advanced posts and night-posts, behind the outermost abbatis, at 6, 5, and 4, as soon as the enemy's infantry come within musquet-shot, will draw back to the nearest fixed advanced posts at C, D, and E; but those at 3, 2, and 1, behind the abbatis, from the hill of Molkenberg to that of Oschenberg, will remain posted as long as they can, without apparent danger of being too much exposed on their left flank. The mixed post of observation at H near Plattendorf, will likewise remain posted till the enemy's infantry advance near, when they will draw back, under the protection of the houses, to

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the fortified advanced posts F and G, at the Dürrenberg and Laubberg heights.

The fixed advanced posts at C, D, E, F, and G, must be maintained, and must oppose all entrance into the village of Dittersbach, till the troops have quitted it, and have retired into their place of arms and main-post upon the Bergfreyen height, to which the battalion at Haselbach will likewise repair. The troops which march out of the village of Dittersbach, will leave a hundred men behind, which will line the hedges, garden-walls, and ditches, &c. &c. for the protection of the troops retiring from the advanced posts.

As soon as the troops which have quitted their quarters have got near to their place of arms, the troops will leave the posts at C, D, E, and F, and will retire through the village of Dittersbach; but those in the post at G, will remain posted to cover their retreat on the left flank, while their right will be protected by the redoubt on the heights of Pasberg. The light troops at 3, 2, and 1, will at the same time withdraw along the abbatis to Arnsberg.

When the troops that withdraw from C, D, E, F, have passed the village three or four hundred paces, they will halt, and front between Dittersbach and the main-posts, and wait for the hundred men who were left behind in the village. The troops in the post at the Laubberg will withdraw at the same time with these hundred men; the latter through the wood, the former in a body through the space between the redoubts of the place

place of arms, where the whole, under cover of the Pasberg mountain, will in a body await the enemy's attack; and should the enemy have pressed very hard, it may be necessary and proper to set fire to the village, to impede his progress, and gain as much time as possible.

In this intersected and woody ground, we should be but little exposed to suffer from the enemy's cavalry, and the troops in the posts need only be attentive to move off before their infantry get between them and the village which has been quitted.

In cases where the main-post is in front of the quarter, the fixed advanced posts may be much more easily supported from thence: their position will probably be better; they cannot be so easily cut off or attacked in rear. Should they lie so near to the place of arms, that they can be under the guns posted there, they may well be considered but as out-works, which are to be defended to the last extremity.

But should they lie farther off, and beyond cannon-shot, and that all avenues are not blocked up by which the enemy can approach the main-post from any other quarter, so as also to come in rear of such advanced posts, all attempts to support them would be dangerous; so that, when the alarm is fairly given, the troops in them ought to withdraw to the main-post or place of arms.

The advanced posts of cavalry will draw back behind the infantry on the enemy's approach, and their retreat must be covered by them. In

such quarters and posts as are taken in ravines and hollow ways, formed by mountains, there to cover main roads and avenues, the advanced posts have but little to apprehend being surprised by the enemy. Such narrow avenues, guarded by impracticable mountains, and closed with strong abbatis, will prove their security; and, if necessary, will afford them support in their retreat.

OF SPIES.

It is to the full as indispensably necessary to have good spies during our winter-posts, as during a campaign; or, perhaps, more so, as we are then generally at a greater distance from the enemy, and have not the same opportunity to observe their motions; and of all spies, those who have their residence within the cordon of the enemy's posts will be of the greatest service to us, not only by giving us notice of all the enemy's movements at the right and proper time, but by communicating many circumstances useful for us to know when we would form expeditions against the enemy.

A never-failing method for procuring spies has, from times of old, been that of money; and, if we are not too sparing, it will rarely be found to fail. Yet all are not duly qualified for this service who are willing to engage in it, and there are very few of the common people upon whose
informa-

information we could place much reliance in an important undertaking. When it is wished to obtain knowledge from foreign countries on the subject of commerce, manufactures, or politics, men somewhat versed in these matters would be chosen, that we might not receive defective or imperfect information. In like manner, should our spies in war be chosen; men who have some knowledge of military affairs, who comprehend the subjects to which their attention ought to be directed, and can bring back useful and intelligible information.

To gain spies of this description, is neither impossible nor attended with much difficulty. To the reproach of the honourable profession of arms, there have been found in all armies men whom it has been necessary to cashier from the rank of officers, on account of improper behaviour, among whom there are often deep designing heads. From their necessitous condition, and their natural propensities towards low transactions, they will readily undertake the office of a spy, if they are well paid, and they will unquestionably be the first and ablest in the trade. If such people were retained with a small pension in time of peace, by means of some resident near our frontier, upon whose fidelity and secrecy we can depend, considerable advantage might arise in time of war, when it may for some time be difficult or impossible to find such spies. It is possible we might even find such among old soldiers, or non-commissioned officers, discharged by our enemy and deprived of bread, who frequently

quently travel to the frontiers. Such would be much more serviceable than peasants, and would be permitted to go and return from the enemy's post without hindrance to beg an alms.

Should no spies be found of the above-mentioned description, we must take them from whatever class we can, chusing those who have most prudence, and are best acquainted with the country and inhabitants, or with people in the enemy's army; but above all, such as speak the same dialect, and whose manners and appearance will not betray them. Among such there must be one, if possible, resident on each main-road leading from the enemy towards us, and by which their patrols must pass. Should they be alehouse-keepers it were so much the better, or we might furnish them with money to set up such a house, which might give them an opportunity of conversing with the soldiers without suspicion.

One method by which we may keep this species of people true to their trade, attentive and devoted to us, is this; always to give them reason to hope for more than they already have received.

OF ENTERPRISES AGAINST THE ENEMY'S WINTER-
POSTS IN A MOUNTAINOUS COUNTRY.

Our first and greatest care in forming our enterprises, must be to keep our intentions secret; but our forces in winter-quarters not being assembled as they are in the field, ready for any undertaking, we must employ extraordinary measures and precautions to conceal our design.

The officer who plans, will himself conduct the expedition, and, if possible, will employ no eyes but his own in obtaining the most complete information concerning the enemy's post, their numbers, disposition, and every local circumstance. But should it be impracticable for one person to obtain all the necessary intelligence, whether from the extent of ground, or shortness of time, or whatever cause, and if communication must be held with another officer upon the subject, the most entire confidence ought to be bestowed, explaining the whole scope of the design.

A very different conduct will of course be observed with spies, whose only motion is self-interest: we may conceal our real views from them, by giving them other questions to ascertain, besides those of which we wish to be informed; nor need they know the time when we mean to put our designs in execution. If we have employed them before, we can the better judge what reliance we ought

ought to place in their intelligence; and should the accounts received at different times, and from different persons, bear a resemblance, we can the more fully confide in their truth. Deserters from the enemy, or prisoners, or travellers, may often assist us in ascertaining information, especially if we use the habit of making memorandums of what we learn, and of forming a chart which we may correct from time to time; and shortly before we set out upon our expedition, we may, in the most pointed manner, examine our spies on the matter we wish to know; afterwards taking special care to secure their persons, that they may not betray us. We may then ask, for the last time, What is the strength of the enemy in the post we mean to attack? What guards they mount? What are their weakest points? How the roads and paths branch off? &c. &c.

It being necessary for the concealing our intentions, that there shall be as little appearance as possible of unusual movement of troops, of which the enemy's spies could give them information; it may be deemed an excellent practice, during the winter-season, frequently to relieve the regiments forming the cordon of posts, by which means the duty and loss will be equally divided, and when we form an enterprise against the enemy, our movement may be supposed only for the purpose of changing quarters. It may even be proper that our troops, when they march, shall suppose this to be the case, and shall be met by an Adjutant to
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halt them on the way, or direct them to the real place of assembly, which may be at one point, or at several, according to the number of columns in which we mean to conduct our attack.

There are various instruments useful and necessary for effecting a surprise, a storm, or an escalade, such as ladders of different lengths, hurdles to throw over the enemy's stake-traps, wool-sacks and fascines to fill up ditches, &c. Every winter-quarter should at all times have a certain number of these in store, otherwise, if we do not provide them until they are wanted, we shall give rise to conjecture and conversation. Field-pieces and powder waggons, with the necessary horses, are of course to be included.

Good and sufficient guides, thoroughly acquainted with every road and path, and with all circumstances of the country near the enemy, should be always maintained at head-quarters, that we may not have to seek after such when wanted.

We may frequently appear to be making great preparations, and suffer reports to spread, that we are on the eve of an undertaking when we have no such design. When the enemy's spies have given them false intelligence several times, they will be the less attended to, and will themselves be less ready with their information: for fear of losing all credit they will stay till the last moment. To prevent such spies from escaping, when we actually have formed a design, we will not fail to draw a chain of light troops along the roads on the side
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next the enemy, but not till it is near dark, lest we give suspicion. Frequent false alarms will probably cause the enemy to be much less alert than they ought to be, and may be accomplished with a few men.

The neglects and omissions on the part of the enemy, in which we can ground the greatest hopes of success, are chiefly the following:

Should they have a quarter or post at considerable distance from support, an expedition against it is of all others the most advisable. Other causes may make it difficult for a post to receive support; the communication may be interrupted by various obstacles, while we gain time to complete our operations by making a circuit; and, perhaps, by posting a few troops in so advantageous a manner as to keep at bay the succours.

Should the enemy have a quarter or post, in which a garrison is placed that is not sufficiently numerous to occupy the natural or artificial defences; should their posts be badly chosen, or carelessly occupied; this will also give us good encouragement.

But should the whole scale of the enemy's winter-quarters be of improper extent, we may proceed by a variety of roads, and in a number of columns. We can hardly fail in success, either in defeating or in cutting off his posts.

In every such enterprise against the enemy's posts, where our design is open attack, for we mean to treat on the subject of surprise in a separate article,

article, the following considerations may be found deserving of attention :

First, it may be useful to know in what given time the post or quarter which we mean to attack can receive support ; secondly, the strength and description of the succours ; thirdly, the roads by which they can arrive ; and finally, to weigh and compare these circumstances with such as relate to our own numbers, to the time requisite for the completion of our design, and to the means in our power of causing a diversion, or of delaying or even beating back their succours. The knowledge of all these circumstances are easily obtained in winter-posts ; and if we have not such information, the success of our enterprise can be the effect of chance alone. Should we even perceive upon our march, by means of the enemy's signals, alarm-guns, &c. that in spite of our precautions, our intentions are discovered, the previous knowledge we have obtained may probably still induce us to persevere with good hopes of success, particularly if we have formed false attacks.

Such false attacks, in the same manner as mere alarms, will be conducted so as to be concealed and favoured either by darkness in the night-time, or by peculiarities of ground, whether of hills or woods. By means of the latter circumstance we may often succeed, even in the day-time, in alarming the enemy, or in causing them to draw off their strength from the true point of attack ; but if no such peculiarities occur, the night, or a few

few hours before day-break, is the proper time for our attempt. The following considerations may be properly added to what has already been said under the head of false attacks.

The post against which we form a false attack, may be of such a nature as not to rely solely upon its own defences, and may be such as to receive succours; or it may furnish succours to another post when menaced; or, finally, it may be ordered, as is the case with many of the Austrian posts, to draw back in the event of a serious attack. Should we commence the false attack on such a post before that which is real, the garrison might either advance immediately against us, or avail themselves of the alarm which we have caused to hasten to the weak point, or to effect a retreat while there yet remains an opportunity. In either case, our intentions would be completely disappointed. For these reasons it is evident, that the false attacks, in order to be of use to that which is real, should, in either of the above-mentioned cases, take place as nearly as possible at one and the same time; but then we must fairly acknowledge that (for reasons which have been given under the head of false attacks) we cannot form sanguine hopes of success. The enemy, if alarmed at every point, will naturally send his force to that which is the weakest, and against which our true attack is probably directed.

Where we wish to effect a surprise, a false attack will prove of prejudicial consequences; but in
such





such enterprises, on the contrary, concerning which we more particularly mean to treat in this article, against those main-posts or quarters of the enemy which form a part of their cordon, whose only object is their own defence, and the guarding of certain passes and avenues among mountains, when our design has been formed rather in consequence of the defects in their disposition than their want of vigilance: in enterprises against such posts, we say, the false attacks ought to be made two hours at least before that which is real, in order to give them ample time to send off their troops.

Should we here begin the false and real attacks at the same time, we should cause the enemy to march rather to the support of the latter point than the former.

But should we begin it only one hour or less before the real attack, we should do still more harm, for we should scarcely give more than sufficient time for the enemy's signals to have taken full effect, and for all the troops to have been fairly assembled, in a state of preparation, ready to march to the real point of attack; but by allowing an interval of two hours, or more, we have a good chance of deceiving the enemy, who will hear no noise of firing but at the point of false attack, and will conceive it to be the true one. Should they upon the first noise of the true attack, contrary to what is probable, march back again, still we have gained much time and probably sufficient to conclude our enterprise.

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In illustration of the foregoing principles, some examples, from events which happened in the late campaign, will not be deemed superfluous:

While we were posted at Jægerndorf, during the winter between the years 1778 and 1779, the Austrians formed two enterprises, both of which, for want of properly regulated false attacks to facilitate the real attack, proved unsuccessful. The first of these undertakings was on the 26th of November 1778, and was directed against our fixed advanced posts and works in front of Jægerndorf, at Weiskirch, and those upon the heights near the river Oppa.

They moved from their ground at twelve o'clock in the forenoon, and in order to facilitate their views, which were to dislodge us, they made their appearance at break of day, with a column on the heights, upon our right flank at Meidelberg, moving as if their intention was against Fullstein and Hotzinplotz, which places they alarmed by means of a heavy cannonade. This false attack gave us great apprehensions for a battalion posted at Hotzinplotz, especially as we could not discover of what numbers the enemy's column was composed. They equally seemed to menace two other posts at Rosswald and at Leobschutz, and the more so from their having very favourable ground either for attack or retreat. Had they appeared in this quarter but a few hours before, there was every reason to suppose that we should have detached troops from Jægerndorf, which, we have said, was the

the true point of attack; and had we done so, a distance of two long German miles would have been marched, and we should have had the same distance to return when the real attack at Weiskirch took place.

But instead of confining their disposition to the measures which we have related, and which would have been so well calculated to produce the end which they desired, had they properly timed the attacks; they chose, at the same time, to make another false attack not far from Jægerndorf, on the other side of the Oppa from the skirt of the woods, and after they had continued a cannonade there for about an hour, they commenced their real attack. The effect was, that neither of the false attacks caused us to detach a single soldier. On the contrary, they only served to give us full time to get under arms, and the consequence was, which may easily be supposed, that the enemy were driven back to their mountains with considerable loss.

Their second undertaking was that against Neustadt. This they endeavoured likewise to facilitate, and to draw all support from thence by means of a false attack; but the steps they took were to the full as faulty in this instance as in that which we have related, and were attended with similar consequences: by making their false attack at the same time with the true one, they found that our troops had stood fast at their posts, and they made a precipitate retreat before a few of our soldiers,

not being able to distinguish their numbers, and yet they themselves had from fourteen to fifteen thousand men.

Our enterprise against Zuckmantel, from the district of Jägerndorf, might probably have been facilitated, and have been attended with more success, had similar considerations been employed. All of the three posts of which we have now made mention, Weiskirch, Neustadt, and Zuckmantel, are of that description which should on no account be abandoned, but ought to be defended to the utmost. These examples, we hope, will serve as an excuse for our stating at so much length the necessity of timing properly our false attacks. We now return from the digression.

The hour having arrived at which we have determined that our enterprise shall take place; the appointed regiments having assembled; the routes of march and the dispositions having been given; and every precaution tending to the happy issue of our design having been carefully employed; the troops which are to form the false attacks will begin their march so as to arrive two hours at the least, at their place of destination, sooner than the rest.

These detachments will be formed chiefly of light troops, with a few hundred hussars, supported by two or three battalions of infantry: the former

former will take the advanced guard and flanking parties, and in order to draw the enemy's attention more completely to those points where we are desirous to excite the false alarm, they will be provided with artillery. Should the roads not be so very bad, as to render it difficult to bring off the guns when we retire, they should even have some heavy twelve-pounders, from which they will fire briskly when they approach the enemy; and behind the advanced-guard there should be some waggons filled with scaling ladders, and other instruments for storming, to give the appearance of serious intention.

Should there be several roads leading to the enemy, nearly in the same direction with that on which any of our detachments moving to a false attack is marching, they will send out upon them as many strong patrols of infantry and hussars as their numbers will permit; these will appear to be the advanced-guards of columns advancing, and must boldly attack and drive back immediately whatever parties the enemy send out to reconnoitre, which probably may be easily effected, as such conduct will convey the supposition that they are well supported. If we are in an enemy's country, the inhabitants will not fail to fly and give intelligence, and will always greatly magnify our numbers.

As soon as the detachment approaches the enemy's posts of observation and advanced posts, several small divisions of light troops must be sent

out, as well to begin a firing to cause alarm, as to drive off patrols: but they must not, upon this occasion, attempt to surround and cut off a post. Detachments of this nature, sent to a considerable distance, must not seek to bring on a serious contest, but must give the enemy's posts ample opportunity to send for succours.

During this onset of the light troops, the detachment will at first keep moving at the distance of about two thousand paces, and beyond the fire of the enemy's artillery, employing upon this occasion such measures as we shall point out under the head of alarms, in order to make their numbers appear greater than they really are.

From this first position, should the enemy's post be a town, a summons to surrender must be sent, accompanied with menaces, and a representation of the impossibility of their receiving succour on account of the great superiority of our force. To give this a greater air of probability, and to impress more strongly on the minds of the enemy that we intend immediately to begin a serious attack, we will at the same time proceed with a strong escort to reconnoitre their post. The artillery, and the waggons containing the instruments for storming, will be drawn to those points which we deem the weakest, within one thousand or one thousand two hundred paces distant, attended by a battalion, and some cavalry and light troops, while the rest of the detachment form to the right and left of them, two men in depth, under cover of the woods

woods and hills, posting small divisions at every opening to make a shew. By these means, not only will the flanks of the battalion posted with the artillery be protected, but the enemy will imagine that we are proceeding to surround, and fall upon them on every side. A continued fire from the guns must be kept up, and the light troops will penetrate where they find there is least to apprehend from artillery, to within a few hundred paces, driving in any of the enemy that may be posted among the bushes or in houses, and endeavouring to bring on a loud noise of musquetry, which will strongly impress upon the minds of the troops advancing to support, the necessity of using the utmost diligence.

During these operations, endeavour must be made to discover from a height, and still more by means of patrols, from what quarter, and in what numbers, the enemy's succours are advancing; and as soon as some of them are perceived, the object may in a great measure be considered as accomplished, from its being probable that more of them are upon the march. Hereupon the artillery will first be sent off, escorted by a battalion and the greater part of the hussars: the rest of the infantry will follow, and the light troops will form the rear-guard and flanking parties. Should there be any narrow foot-paths, by which the enemy might get on before to interrupt the retreat, some light troops must be sent in proper time to guard the pass: they must also be ordered to throw

down the bridges, and remain for some time to guard the fords, and afterwards join the rear-guard. Should there be defilés to pass, the precaution ought to have been taken in advancing to leave divisions of troops, to guard such avenues, to protect the bridges, and secure our retreat. Upon this occasion little is to be apprehended, for as soon as the enemy hear the noise of the real attack upon their other posts, we shall be no longer incommoded by them, as they will hasten back to repair their loss of time, though probably without effect;

If in front of one of the enemy's towns, quarters, or main-posts, against which we are desirous of forming a false attack, there shall be a fixed advanced post of such a nature as to prevent our penetrating; similar measures to those which have been mentioned must be employed; but with this addition, that it may be proper to make a vigorous and real attack upon it, not only with the artillery and light troops, but with the infantry if necessary.

When the troops appointed have marched off to the false attack, the regiments which are to compose the real enterprise, will be drawn up in as many columns as there are roads among the mountains leading to the point of attack. The artillery will move on the best of those roads, and, as we have already said, the whole will proceed

in such a manner, as to arrive and form about two hours after the commencement of the first attack.

Two hundred Jægers, or should we have none, a like number of men chosen from the battalions, who are used to climbing up and down the sides of mountains, and a few hussars or dragoons, should form the head of the advanced guard. The chosen men should, if possible, be marksmen, and that they may not be impeded in the woods or mountains, they should have no pouches, but should carry their ammunition in the same manner as the Jægers do. Some of them should have light poles, about the height of a man, with iron hooks, not only to pull themselves up precipices, by laying hold of branches, but in case of meeting with trees laid across the roads, to use them in removing such impediments.

A division of cavalry will follow close to the light troops; then two six-pounders and some waggons, with instruments for storming any of the enemy's advanced works, which may be in the route. A few squadrons of cavalry, and a battalion of chosen infantry, will be added to complete the advanced guard.

These will be followed by the battalions composing the rest of the column, with the artillery, and such instruments for storming as may be necessary; then by the cavalry; and lastly, by a rear-guard of some hundred infantry, closing the column of march.

The

The troops will march in as close order as possible, and will observe the most perfect silence. Should the advanced guard fall in with small posts, or patrols of the enemy's light troops, which give way, twenty or thirty men of the van-guard, who are swift of foot, and some hussars, must immediately make a dash at them, and if they cannot overtake them, they will at least oblige them to quit the road, and make good their retreat by some less direct road, which will require more time before they can give the alarm: but all the columns must use their utmost endeavours to cut off, by means of various small patrols, all intelligence proceeding from one post to another, or to head-quarters, and also to intercept such succours as may, notwithstanding our false attacks, be hastening to the post against which our enterprise is directed.

Should a column on its march fall in with entrenched advanced posts of such a nature, that they can pass them out of reach of their fire, they must not attack, but leave them, that no unnecessary delay nor alarm may be caused; but we will leave twenty or thirty men to cut off or pursue any persons who may be sent from thence to give the alarm, which, if they have no artillery in the post, may possibly not be effected by the small arms, either on account of the distance or contrary wind, or from the frequent repetition of musquetry at other times.

But

But should an advanced post present itself in our line of march, that we cannot pass until we make ourselves masters of it, or a post by the taking of which we may be enabled to get round the enemy's flank and rear, we must proceed to the attack without hesitation. On the supposition, that intelligence has been obtained in former reconnoitring of its strength, of the circumstances of its position, and of the time which may probably be requisite, dispositions will have been assigned to the van-guard for the attack. If the post be of such a nature, that a few rounds from our artillery can accomplish the gaining of it, this is certainly the best and shortest means, and will be attended with no loss of our people; but should this prove unsuccessful, the following more efficacious means must be used.

Such a post among mountains may probably be contiguous to some rugged height covered with woods, and in a low lying situation, with defilés near to it. The two hundred light troops of the van-guard will march off to the right and left of the work in two divisions, and will endeavour to find a place upon its flanks, where they can climb up to the heights, or where, by means of fascines, ladders, and other instruments, they may be enabled to pass over the defilés, or broken ground. As soon as a few have passed, they will endeavour to get near the rear of the work, and from thence begin a fire upon it to cause as much confusion and consternation as possible.

When

When it appears from the noise that the light troops have penetrated, the battalion of the advanced guard, which hitherto will have amused the enemy in front by detaching a few men, will now march forwards to the attack, supported by the artillery, and will proceed to storm should the troops have remained in the work; but most probably they will have retired, from the dread of being cut off, as soon as they found that they were attacked on both sides and in the rear.

When the columns have driven in the outguards, and have all penetrated to their places of destination, near the enemy's main-post or quarter, they will immediately open their artillery upon the weakest points of the fortification. Parties will at the same time ride round the circumference, as near as they can, in search of hollow ways running up towards the place, by which, during the other attacks, a body may perhaps penetrate to the flanks unobserved; and should there be any height from whence we can fire upon the enemy, either with the artillery or small arms, the opportunity must not be neglected. Above all, we will endeavour to discover what may have escaped our notice in former reconnoitring, when the advanced posts prevented our near approach; namely, some path by which we can detach troops to get round the enemy's rear. Whenever this is practicable, we will send out strong divisions to take post upon the most advantageous ground, as near as possible to the roads by which the first body of troops moving

ing to support may probably advance. Such detachments will send out a few light cavalry and infantry, from one thousand to one thousand five hundred paces in front, under an intelligent officer, to patrol diligently and report the enemy's approach, but without alarming them. This officer, as soon as he has sent the intelligence, will endeavour with a few men to gain the flank of the enemy's march, and discover the depth of their column; to ascertain their strength, which may be inconsiderable, but which they will endeavour to make appear greater than it really is. The body which comes first, will most probably halt till others shall arrive, nor will we cease to persevere in our design, till we have good reason to be convinced that a superior force is actually at hand.

During the reconnoitring and the movement of the troops, if the post is a town, we will not fail to send a summons to surrender; and as it is most probable that this will not be complied with, we will not on that account interrupt our operations even for a moment. While our detachments are taking post, and our artillery is employed either to make a breach, or to set fire to the town, we will form our disposition of attack; and as nothing causes greater consternation in troops defending a place than their being surrounded, our different attacks will avail themselves of that circumstance. The light troops, supported by a battalion, will at the same time in divisions, with open files, form false attacks

attacks upon several of the strongest points, in order to keep the enemy there in check. Should the woods not have been felled down, their manœuvres will derive great assistance from them; and these troops should be furnished with scaling ladders, which they may employ, and they may actually penetrate, if the enemy are inattentive.

The true attacks will be led on by volunteers, to whom it may be proper to promise certain rewards, and even to allure them with the hopes of plundering the town; but they must be commanded, that when they have got within any of the out-works, either by escalade, or by a breach which our cannon may have made, that they are not to halt with a view of making a prize of any of the enemy's cannon, but that they shall be paid for them. On the contrary, they must closely pursue, and endeavour to enter the main-works together with the fugitives. The attacks must be aided by the fire of all our artillery upon the walls or breast-works, and upon the men behind them, till our troops have penetrated, and have made prisoners of the garrison.

The first step to be taken immediately after the successful termination of our attack, is to get our people into order; and without loss of time to send off the prisoners and artillery we have taken, and the heaviest of our own guns, by the road which is best and farthest distant from the enemy, under the protection of a strong escort. We then will draw in our detachments, and march back in as many columns

lunas as possible, observing the same precautions as we have enumerated in the first part of this article for the false attacks. When we have reached our own quarters, it will be advisable to encrease, if possible, the diligence of our patrols that night, as the enemy, having assembled their troops on account of the alarm we have caused, may probably endeavour to revenge the loss they have sustained.

OF ALARMS.

We endeavour to alarm an enemy, not only for the purpose of favouring a real attack at some distant point, or to gain time and opportunity to reconnoitre, as we have observed in treating on those parts of our subject; but also, with the intention that, by means of a few men, we may incommode and harass numbers of their troops, causing them frequently to assemble under arms.

In a level country, the latter intention of alarm is best to be effected in the night-time, by the causing a greater degree of confusion and terror, and bringing together a greater number of their regiments than we can in the day-time, when they can ascertain our numbers. Desertion from the enemy is then facilitated, our own numbers are concealed, nor can their enterprises be directed against us, with immediate decision or certainty in the darkness of the night.

The

The posts where we should prefer to make this species of alarm, are such as have woody or intersected ground in their front, where infantry can take post for our support; and such will always be found in a chain of winter-posts.

Our march will be regulated so as to arrive at the enemy at least two hours before day; one hour to be employed in giving alarm, and the other in effecting our retreat before our opponent will venture to pursue, or can be certain what road we take. Should the ground favourable to a retreat, such as a wood, mountain, a defilé, be at the distance of more than an hour's march from the post we have alarmed, our enterprise would be undertaken so much sooner, that we might be certain of regaining such wood, mountain, or defilé, in our retreat, before day.

Were we to require many men for an expedition of this nature, it is evident that we should gain nothing, because we should harass our own troops; yet we must employ a sufficient number to drive in the enemy's posts of observation and advanced posts, such as have no fixed station, nor any entrenchments. Artillery must always be employed in such an undertaking, to spread the alarm more generally and to a greater distance.

In a mountainous country, we may often find it practicable with a few men to cause a considerable alarm even in the day-time, particularly at those points where there is much wood covering the hills, which often happens among mountains; or the hills

hills themselves may often conceal our numbers, and afford protection to our retreat. We should then march with infantry only, or but with a very few cavalry; but it would still be requisite to employ more men than in the night. Our object is to set a considerable number of the enemy's troops in motion; and we must shew numbers sufficient to give grounds of serious apprehension to the post before which we appear, and cause them to make their signals for support. From one to two battalions of infantry will, therefore, be necessary, according as the enemy's post is strong or weak, together with some light troops or yægers, and two cannon, also from eighty to one hundred hussars; more of which latter mounted troops would only cause impediments in this species of ground.

Let us suppose that we have the command of a battalion of infantry, with two cannon, three hundred yægers, and one hundred hussars for the purpose of alarming a post of the enemy, occupied with a thousand men, cavalry and infantry, and also with a view to alarm and set in motion the troops in the adjacent posts.

Thirty yægers and six hussars should march in front; they should be followed by an advanced guard of one hundred yægers and sixty hussars; then by the battalion with the cannon; and lastly, by the rear-guard, consisting of the remaining hussars and thirty yægers. The remaining hundred and forty yægers will move on the flanks as patrols, on both sides of our line of march, par-

ticularly when it is near day, to prevent any of the enemy from approaching our column, and counting their numbers, and to cause them to suppose, from the strength of the flanking party, that that of the main body must be very considerable.

As soon as the advanced guard comes near the enemy's post of observation, the *yagers* forming the side patrols will advance and join them; and by moving rapidly on in several divisions, and by frequent discharges of musquetry, they will drive in the enemy's parties to their advanced post, or should there be none, to their main-post or quarter. The troops which follow, have then to be attentive to their flanks, and seek to protect them as they move by woods or hollow ways, or with their own cavalry, which they must not expose too much to the enemy's artillery.

When the ground in front of the enemy's quarter has been thus cleared, small patrols must be sent out along the roads by which any of the enemy may approach, to give us timely notice of such an event; the battalion will move up to the advanced-guard, which will soon re-assemble again into one body, and will take post on ground where they may appear stronger than they really are; if, in woody ground, they will not come quite clear of the wood next the enemy, but will remain a certain number of paces within it according as the wood is thick or open, that the enemy may see the front, but not the depth of our troops. Where there are breaks in the wood, our men will be

be drawn up three deep; but in the thick parts they will be two deep, or in a rank entire, and with intervals between the files, equal to those between battalions. The men drawn up in this manner must sometimes be kept in motion; and by filing off and counter-marching, a few men may be considered by the enemy as being very numerous, and they will have the appearance of fresh troops continuing to pass; nor will it be possible to ascertain at a distance, whether it is actually so or not. The same effect may be produced by the same means among heights and vallies, even where there is no wood. The stratagem so often employed of causing several trumpeters and drummers to sound different marches, would, upon this occasion, be injudicious, and would too evidently betray our intentions, since it is very evident that, in a real attack, we would employ no such measures of alarm.

An attempt which the Austrians made on the 26th of November 1778, to alarm our posts at Jägerndorf, was considerably frustrated by their having employed these very means of trumpeters, &c. The whole number of their troops employed on this occasion, and which extended over a considerable space, was no more than one battalion and some light troops; nor did they advance beyond the woods. But to return from this digression.

From the position which our battalion has taken, two hundred men will march with the cannon towards the enemy's main-posts, or towards their entrenched advanced posts, if they have any, taking

care to move by ground of such a nature as may afford them the best defence, that they may not be forced to a serious engagement. The light troops and yagers of the advanced guard will advance upon the flanks through the broken ground, but the hussars will take post behind our flanks. The remainder of the battalion will remain posted to cover the retreat. The troops detached in front will keep up a constant fire from their cannon and small arms, and they will soon perceive what effect is produced, whether the enemy, after making their signals of alarm, draw back towards their reinforcements, and afford us means of making prisoners, or whether he stands fast and is determined to wait for our nearer approach. Should the first not appear to be the case, we must immediately think of retiring, from its being more than probable that all are in motion to support the post.

Our cannon will first be sent off with the two hundred men who advanced with them, which, together with the cavalry, will form the advanced guard; the rest of the battalion will follow; one hundred of the light troops will form a rear-guard; and two hundred the flanking parties on both sides. Upon this occasion, where the enemy have been brought together in full force, it is most particularly necessary, for our retreat, that we hasten to occupy all the roads and paths, lest the enemy's numerous light troops may take the advantage, and gain them before us.

When

When our retreat lies through thick woods, and especially where the heights are not sufficiently bold to cover and protect our column, if we do not employ the most judicious and well-timed precautions, we may be much incommoded by the enemy's light troops.

We had to make a retrograde march of the nature we have been describing, during our winter-quarters at Jægerndorf, after having alarmed the enemy's posts in our front. We employed two battalions of infantry, four hundred cavalry, and four pieces of artillery, upon that occasion, and succeeded in our intentions; but our retreat was attended with some difficulty, for the following reasons: We did not set out upon the enterprise till near break of day. The enemy plainly saw our whole force; could judge of our intentions; and could take their measures accordingly, for they had an advanced post upon a height at Bransdorf, not more than a quarter of an hour's march from our post at Jægerndorf. This post of the enemy, and that of Seifersdorf, ought to have been previously alarmed by a false attack, and should have been kept in check till our retreat, which lay through a forest of seven miles in length, and about the same in breadth.

The consequence was, that we were attacked on all sides, on our flanks and in our rear, by a swarm of marksmen and croats. As our cavalry could be of no service in such ground, and had already considerably impeded our march, (for there was

but one road,) they were sent off to the quarter as quickly as they could move. These light troops of the enemy, according to their custom, ran about here and there, and every where, placing themselves behind trees; and notwithstanding our flanking parties, they hovered round, and continued firing into our column for more than five miles, till we came near to the skirt of the forest not far from Jägerndorf. Although it be very certain that the efforts of light troops can make but little impression upon regular infantry*, yet we actually did lose men upon this occasion; and had we delayed sending off our cavalry, they very probably would have suffered considerably, and would have still farther retarded our march.

It is, therefore, very plain, that in an undertaking of this nature, we must regulate our measures not only by the circumstances of the ground, but also with due regard to the position of the enemy; and if, in spite of our endeavours, they find means to attack us in woods, the following precaution may be found useful:

The flanking parties sent out for the protection of the battalion, by continuing three deep, scarcely extend along one quarter of the front, nor can they derive any advantage from remaining of that depth. They

* Had the Author ever seen the British light infantry, he probably would have changed his opinion. See the account of their mode of fighting in the third part of this Miscellany.

They ought to move in a rank entire, and at the distance from their battalion of from one hundred and fifty to three hundred paces, according to the degree of thickness of the wood. Could the flanking parties be composed of yægers, armed with rifles, which would carry a ball as far as those of the enemy, it were so much the more advantageous; but by being in a rank entire, their fire can protect the whole line of march, and each man can cover his body with a tree when he fires, and can support his arms upon it, so as to take a better aim: on the contrary, when the flanking party remains in a body, not only are they themselves exposed, but the column receives little or no protection from them.

Sometimes it may be useful to place ambuscades of twenty or thirty men in deep hollow ways, or strong thickets, to remain two or three hundred paces or more after the column has passed, to chastise the enemy if they are troublesome; but these must be taken from the head of the column, and must be posted before the rear-guard has passed, that the enemy may not perceive the stratagem till they have suffered from it. One piece of artillery should be kept in the rear, and a few shot may be fired from it when the enemy presses too near. The other may be found necessary in front, and may be drawn to some commanding spot; but the chief object is to continue retreating. Should we have much artillery, baggage, or cavalry, upon such an occasion, they should all move upon the road;

but the infantry, after forming an advanced and rear-guard, should quit the road, and march on each side of it, by which they will keep off the enemy; the whole will advance more speedily, and less confusion will ensue, than if the cavalry, infantry, and baggage, were mixed together.

With respect to the distance at which the flanking parties ought to move parallel with their battalion, it is impossible, exactly, to lay down a rule for them in mountains, or thick woods. Should the heights be at the distance of even four or five hundred paces from the road, the patrols ought to move along the summit of them; for should the enemy come there, they might fire from thence into our column, and might do considerable mischief to the patrols.

Should there be a defilé running nearly parallel to our march, and even at a greater distance, the flanking parties should move close to it, and at any part, which branches off towards the enemy, they should constantly leave an under-officer and a few men there to watch; and these should be relieved by every battalion till the whole has passed: but lest they might take a wrong direction in thick woods, a few platoons of musquetry should be discharged from time to time, and officers should ride from the column towards the flanking parties, to put them in the right line.

but the infantry, after forming an advanced guard, should quit the road, and march on each side of it, so that the enemy will keep off the whole will advance more speedily and

OF SURPRISES.
We now proceed to the consideration of measures proper to effect a surprise of the enemy's posts.

There is no enterprise whatsoever in which secrecy, foresight, and quickness of execution, are so absolutely requisite as in an undertaking to effect a surprise, so as that the enemy may not have time to get under arms or occupy their posts. With this view, our preparations and our march must be so regulated, that our opponent shall not have the smallest intimation either of our point of destination, or even of our having set our troops in motion; that the alarm may not be spread from any post of their cordon to that which we mean to surprise. The precautions to be employed before moving having been sufficiently detailed in the foregoing article, we shall proceed to those which are necessary for the concealment of our march, till the moment that we come upon the enemy, to the measures calculated to ensure a fortunate issue to the undertaking, and to such considerations as are more peculiarly appropriated to this part of our subject.

We will first naturally consider whether the post which we mean to surprise has any out-posts or night-guards; in what manner the disposition of these has been made, and whether any of the three following

following circumstances exist:—Whether their outposts are so badly chosen that we can pass them, and come upon the main-post without discovery; whether they are so negligent in their duty, that we can cut them off without alarm; and whether they are so near to the main-post or quarter that we can fall upon both nearly at the same time, before their troops have sufficient opportunity to assemble under arms. In either of these cases a surprise may be effected in spite of advanced posts; but should the enemy have no advanced posts, an attempt to surprise their main-post or quarter can hardly fail to prove successful.

Our next consideration will be respecting the enemy's patrols, what roads they take, at what hours they move; whether we can avoid and pass them by, or whether we can cut them off. If none of these objects can be effected, we cannot entertain much hope; but should there be no patrols sent out by the enemy, we may in this case likewise expect the best success.

Finally, every bye-way, foot-path, or possible approach, should, without exception, be known to us, by which either our own march directly to the enemy, or round their rear in a circuitous direction, may be effected; or by which any person whatsoever, whether country people or deserters, may give us the slip, and give the enemy intelligence. With a view to prevent this, we will send small parties along every such path to stop every person, or to pursue them so as to oblige them to take

take some less direct road, such as may wind so much, that our party may gain sufficient time before any such person could get the start of them.

There being many circumstances, concerning which we cannot obtain accurate information, by means of reconnoitring, or even the best efforts of our own patrols, we must not betray the smallest anxiety upon these points to our troops, but push boldly forward, and obtain the necessary information as we move. But an undertaking of this nature ought previously to be well digested. We will probably have taken care to employ intelligent and trusty spies, by whose observations, and by means of what we learn from deserters or prisoners, and, above all, from travellers, we may obtain a complete knowledge of almost every necessary point of information with regard to the external and internal regulations of the enemy; the height of their walls or works; the depth of their ditch; whether they are alert in getting under arms, and moving to their alarm posts; whether their guards and sentinels are active during the night, and in stormy weather; if their patrols and rounds go regularly; and whether there may not be some point of the circumference neglected.

Should our enterprise be to surprise a town occupied by the enemy, we would previously endeavour to be well informed on the following points: In what manner their gates are covered and guarded; at what time and with what precautions they are opened; if they are ever opened in the night-time upon any occasion or pretence, whether for
carriages,

carriages, couriers, or otherwise; if the wall at any part of the circumference may have fallen into decay, and what is its height, that our ladders may be regulated accordingly; if it be surrounded by a ditch, wet or dry; what is its breadth and depth; whether in severe frost the ice be carefully broken and removed, or, if dry, whether it be palisaded; whether there be any part of the wall which is not flanked, or any point which cannot be seen by any of the sentinels.

Should our design be against field-works, intelligence will be requisite concerning the ramparts, ditches, abbatis, and palisades, and what degree of confidence the enemy place in the natural defences; whether there may not be approaches which they have deemed impassable, but which in reality are not so. Should there be but one of that description, such an omission or misconception will often be sufficient to enable us to effect a surprise.

The success of a design of this nature must depend greatly upon our employing as little time as possible in its execution. We also will march in as few columns as possible, that we may not, by the multiplication of our parties, give many chances of alarm; and for the same reason, false attacks will not be often employed on such an occasion; nor is it then our business to cause alarm; and yet there may be one exception upon this head. There may be a post very near to that which we wish to surprise, particularly destined for its support, which might find means to interrupt us before our design

is

is completed, unless we can contrive to employ and keep them in check.

In this case, however, whatever party we may dispatch, will, upon no account, begin their alarm, until they receive a signal from the real attack, even if they should come to their ground before it. They will also take the greatest care not to advance too far, that they may not be discovered, nor must they fire a single shot. Should they, on the contrary, be later in coming to their ground, the difference of a quarter or half an hour after they have heard the noise of the real attack, should not deter them from proceeding; for it may be possible that the enemy in that time can have done little more than get under arms, and that the false attack may be of service in preventing their moving; at least it is evident that it can then do no harm to the real attack by moving on, because when it once begins it will proceed at all hazards.

Upon this occasion, when our march will commonly be made in the night-time through woods, or among mountains, the troops at the head of the columns should be composed of infantry alone, and of men most carefully picked out, upon whom we can place the utmost dependence. Were a horseman to desert, it is evident that he could much sooner alarm the enemy than a foot soldier, especially as the latter would be pursued into the woods, where most probably he would go astray. Were other horsemen to pursue the mounted deserter, an alarm

alarm might be caused, particularly if there are any houses near which we have to pass.

Having assembled the troops with which we are to endeavour to effect a surprise, the commander of the expedition having previously received ample instructions, and having made his dispositions, will carefully inspect every man, and see particularly that their arms have on their hammer-caps, that no firelock may go off by accident. The columns will then proceed in the most perfect silence in the closest order, without any interval between them and their advanced guards, and with no flanking parties except a few men, close to the battalions to prevent desertion. They will set out as soon as it is dark, or later, according to the distance which each column has to march, which should be carefully attended to if there be more than one column, that they may arrive at their destination at nearly the same time.

Two or three hundred chosen infantry or yagers should compose the heads of the columns, attended by trusty guides, and those spies upon whose intelligence we have relied in forming the expedition. These will be followed by the waggons with instruments for storming, with a light gun for making signals, and perhaps a couple of heavy cannon, if we have any hopes of forcing open a badly secured gate, or making a breach in a ruinous part of a wall by means of a few shots. Then follow the infantry, after them the cavalry, which we may find useful in suddenly surrounding the post, or in patrolling

patrolling during the attack, or afterwards in the pursuit. The march will be closed by a small guard of infantry close to the cavalry, and the whole will proceed in as little space, and with as much speed, as the road will possibly permit.

Several hundred yards in front of the advanced guard on each side of the road, we will cause ten or twelve men, under two trusty under-officers, to move singly and very quietly with their arms slung behind them, and with swords in their hands. They will particularly avoid making the smallest noise in moving through long villages, where they will slip away among the houses, that those who meet them in the darkness may not imagine them to be soldiers but inhabitants. They will suffer every one to pass them that they meet, and to go towards the column without seeming to take the smallest notice of them; but will on the contrary block up the way to every one going towards the enemy.

Should a column come near a village through which they must unavoidably pass, they will do it in the greatest silence, first sending on twenty or thirty men with some good guides well acquainted with the village. These men will move through the gardens, or behind them, or how they best can, and divide themselves among the different paths which lead towards the enemy, that no one may pass that way. They will remain posted there, not only until the column has passed, but for some time longer, to give them sufficiently the start of any person who may afterwards move from the villages to alarm the enemy.

When

When the columns have arrived near to their destination, they will halt in some retired place on one side of the road, through which it is improbable that the enemy's patrols will pass. The troops forming the advanced guards will then be employed as posts of observation, and to surround our column close at hand, from whence no person will be permitted to stir. In the mean time, an officer of experience with two men without firelocks will advance, together with the spy, as far as they possibly can, without being discovered; to observe if there be any unusual stir among the enemy, and whether any change has taken place in their guards or posts, particularly in those circumstances which gave rise to our expedition. Should these be challenged, they will answer without hesitation, *citizens or countrymen*, according as the post may be situated near a town or village; and at the same time will keep moving on without hastening or slackening their pace, lest they may be fixed upon, and an alarm caused. If they can find means to hear the enemy's counter-sign, great advantage may be derived from it. A few trusty men will follow at a distance to observe what happens to the officer, and two men in front, and to bring back the speediest information.

During this reconnoitring, the columns will be got into order, the different divisions will be told off, and the officer commanding each will be pointedly informed of every circumstance of conduct expected from him. It may not be improper to stimulate a certain number of the private soldiers

at the head of each attack with a permission to plunder, which indeed could scarce be prevented in the night-time: but above all, we must inculcate in their minds that they will now certainly be successful; that nothing is wanting but to advance boldly; and that the enemy are incapable of now making much resistance.

The officers will at the same time be reminded, that during the attack they are upon no account to come to a stand, nor imagine that the whole affair is discovered, should a single guard or two of the enemy be found alert and make resistance: but on the contrary, that they must rush upon them, and forward the main design with impetuosity; that it is possible a garrison may have fallen into great negligence, and a very slovenly method, in the discharge of their duty, although a single guard may be vigilant: but that the moments are now precious, and, if well employed, that the enemy will either be surrounded, or will fly in the darkness of the night, before they can possibly have assembled in a body.

When the officer has returned with the two men and the spy with favourable intelligence, the different divisions will proceed in the utmost silence to the points of attack, led by proper guides; and as soon as it is probable that they have gained their posts, the commanding officer will cause the signal to be made, which has been previously fixed, whether by a cannon or a rocket.

The attacks will then proceed at every point at once. Some will even place ladders at the strongest places

places where success is not expected, that the enemy may be employed on every side, and thrown into universal consternation. The first divisions which mount over the wall or breast-works, will, as soon as they have got a few men together, pursue the enemy along the rampart to the right and left, and facilitate the entrance of the other storming parties. Should the post they have entered be a town, they will hasten to the nearest gates on either hand, against which external as well as internal attacks will be directed, where, by overpowering the guards, a speedy admission for our troops will be obtained. The troops which follow the first divisions will move directly to the main-guard, which they will overpower, taking possession also of the artillery. Other divisions will move towards the chief open spaces, whether squares or market-places, putting to death or dispersing any of the enemy who attempt to assemble in a body, until the whole garrison have thrown down their arms, and have surrendered prisoners of war.

Until the affair be completely terminated, and especially until we have made the enemy's commander prisoner, the places by which our troops have penetrated must be strongly guarded; the battalions will continue drawn up, nor will any man quit his ranks under pain of death without permission. Perhaps, when the day has broke, if the time will permit, a certain number may be allowed to quit their ranks, and others to go when they return. A reserve of troops will be kept at some little distance during the attack, and the cavalry will

will be ready to cut off all fugitives, and at the same time will send patrols to observe if the enemy's succours are approaching.

Should a surprise be undertaken, in the hopes of penetrating at any one point, whether by means of the enemy's negligence, or by internal treachery, no signal will be given from without to our own troops, but our different columns will wait near at hand, till the party which enters has had sufficient time to complete their design, whether of seizing on a gate, or any advantageous post to facilitate the entrance of our troops.

Should our enterprise at the same time extend to the design of surprising one of the enemy's entrenched posts at some little distance from the quarter, by means of sending a column round to fall upon it in the rear, while the attack takes place upon the main post, such column ought to make a signal of their having arrived by one or two rockets. At least the time should be so exactly calculated, that if possible both should arrive nearly at the same time, or that the single column may be the first to arrive, and be ready to answer the first shot with a discharge from their great guns and small arms. The propriety of a collateral undertaking of this nature will depend upon the circumstances, whether the enemy's advanced posts are in front or behind, or on one side of their quarter, and the measure will be regulated accordingly.

If in front, the main object will be directed to come upon the *quarter* first, and to cut off the troops from gaining the works; but at the same time two or three hundred men, or as many as can be spared, will be detached against the advanced works to get possession of them by coming in their rear, while they are attacked in front by a column on the first shot being heard of the attack against the quarter. If on the contrary the works and posts for the security of the quarter to which their troops are to repair be behind it, and they have but a few advanced posts in their front badly chosen, or negligent in their duty, the attack should begin with these latter works, that the troops within them may be engaged when the quarter is attacked; but of course the quarter is the chief and great object.

Upon all occasions, however, except the case we have just mentioned, when we have a certainty that we shall not be delayed by the posts in front, it is far more advisable, when we would surprise the enemy, to come upon them in the rear by a circuitous march, and suffer no attempt to be made in front until the main attack is begun. The drawing off their force from the main object of attack, is a measure more appertaining to an enterprise of open force, such as we have described in the foregoing division of this treatise. The measures and precautions to be taken when we withdraw, are the same in the case of a surprise

prise with those which we have mentioned under that article *.

* We believe that few instances could be adduced of more quick decision and bold execution than appeared on the surprise of the American General Lee, effected by Major General Harcourt, at that time a Colonel Harcourt.

The complete surprise of General Wayne's brigade, and the following year of Washington's dragoons, both accomplished by Sir Charles Grey, and in both which surprises the translator was employed, are also as perfect examples as any that can be mentioned; but we have forborn giving any illustrations from events in America, chiefly from the circumstance of their being well known.

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MILITARY
MISCELLANY.

PART III.

NARRATIVE of EVENTS

AT THE

Island of St. Lucia

MILITARY

ALMOST six months had elapsed, since it was known to the British army in America that a large detachment was to be sent to the Windward Islands, under the command of Major-General Clinton.

A war with the French was seen to be inevitable, and there could be no doubt that they coveted our valuable possessions, and would attempt to snatch them from our hands, while our rebellious colonies were employing our forces, and were assisted by their arms.

Therefore as it was not only expedient, but necessary that the army should be sent to the Windward Islands, and that it should be sent there on the 1st of January, it was necessary to retain all our arms, and to be prepared to strike revenge on the day, when we have recovered. I had with the detachment that arrived at St. Lucia, the British army, and the second division.

NARRATIVE of EVENTS
AT THE
Island of ST. LUCIE.

ALMOST six months had elapsed, since it was known to the British army in America that a large detachment was to be sent to the West India islands, under the command of Major-General Grant.

A war with the French was seen to be inevitable, and there could be no doubt that they envied our valuable possessions, and would attempt to snatch them from our hands, while our rebellious colonies were employing our force, and were assisted by their arms.

Then let us, it was said, by timely caution, frustrate their intentions, and have an army long before them on the spot; let us render it unnecessary to retake what now belongs to us, or by a vigorous attack revenge the bitter injuries we have received. These were the sentiments that universally pervaded the British army at this period. They felt

felt that the interference of France in the contest between Great Britain and her American colonies was likely to render ineffectual all her efforts to recover them, and that the object of a three years war would be at once destroyed by the perfidious and unprovoked aggression of that restless and ambitious nation. Nothing appeared to detain the expedition, when the commissioners* arrived at Philadelphia, with an order, as was generally understood at the time, for the immediate embarkation of the troops. But as in other national affairs, perhaps of greater consequence, they had been entrusted with discretionary powers, they exercised the same powers upon this occasion; and, by their authority, delayed the expedition, from the time of their arrival, early in the month of June, until the third of November one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight.

Our patience was by this time severely tried, by the accounts which had reached us. The French had transported a considerable force to the West Indies; they had already captured Dominica, and had probably proceeded to take an advantage of the defenceless state of our other islands.

The necessity of the measure became too urgent to admit of a dispute. Ten regiments were immediately named for this service †, and by draughts

* The Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, Esq. and George Johnston, Esq.

† Namely, 4th, 5th, 15th, 27th, 28th, 35th, 40th, 46th, 49th, 55th.

from other corps, were completed to five thousand men; and though the answer to the commissioners' remonstrance was expected every hour, we sailed.

Our voyage was conducted by Commodore Hotham with such care and skill, that notwithstanding a violent storm, and other difficulties in the way, our fleet was safely conducted to Barbadoes on the 10th day of December, with the loss of only one sloop, containing the horses of the field-officers of the army. It was thought that she had lost us in a fog, and for some time we knew not what was become of her. At Barbadoes we joined Admiral Barrington, who now took upon him the command by sea.

Having staid only one day at Barbadoes, on the 13th of December we came in sight of St. Lucie; by twelve at noon we got in with the shore, and in sailing along saw the French flags upon a number of mountains. We were also saluted with cannon ball from three several batteries, which, excepting one, were at too great a distance to reach our ships. We passed a deep bay, with the village of Carenage at the bottom of it on our left, and at two o'clock the Commodore's ship came to an anchor in a bay three miles farther up, surrounded by very high ground. The rest soon followed, and brought up near the shore, the water being remarkably deep.

The first division of troops were landed before five o'clock, and marched immediately. Our road
was

was remarkably steep and narrow, being cut through thickets which no man could penetrate.

Having moved about two miles in single file, the light infantry fell in with a few of the enemy, and took one prisoner. The rest fired, and ran off. He said, he was *pris, pas vaincu*—taken, not conquered; a distinction which our soldiers did not comprehend, and they imagined that the French rascal, as they called him, said, *baïsez mon cû*. He added, that there were many French upon the island to defend it, and vapoured considerably.

It was now dark, and we had drawn up on the side of a hill, where we halted for the night. Next morning, soon after break of day, we were joined by the rest of the army.

We saw the enemy on a much higher hill, and close to us. They began to fire some cannon, and sent eight or ten plunging shot near us. An hour after sun-rise we proceeded, and they fired no more till we got near the top, which took both time and breath to accomplish.

The first object which the advanced guard then saw, was a well-dressed man carrying in his hand a flag of truce, who scarcely had advanced, when a volley of musquetry came from the enemy, which wounded several of our men. This occasioned the death of the unfortunate man who bore the flag, who proved to be surgeon to the French hospital, and came out of it to capitulate for the sick. The soldier next him shot him through the head.

After

After this defence the enemy retired; and some prisoners informed us, that all the force upon the island, consisted of one hundred and eighty of the regiment of Martinico, and fifty or sixty of the inhabitants in arms. They observed that, with so small a force, they never could have thought of opposition, but that a few shots from their twenty-four pounders were necessary for the honour of France; and agreed with us in opinion, that the volley of musquetry did not contribute to the national honour, but alleged that it was fired by the inhabitants, who were ignorant of the customs of war.

It was obvious to every one of us, that the enemy might have dearly sold us this acquisition of their post. To surround a body posted here, would, for a length of time, have been impossible. It was inaccessible but by the narrow path; so rank and luxuriant was the vegetation which choaked up the woods. But their behaviour was far more polite and acceptable to the strangers. They left us their magazine untouched and entire, their barracks, their hospital, their governor's hotel, and eight pieces of small cannon.

We gained the top and these acquisitions together, and from the height we had ascended, expected to have found a widely extended prospect, with fertile vallies underneath, houses and inhabitants below their conquerors' feet. All this was magnificent in idea, and the disappointment was proportionate. A wilderness appeared on every side,

side, and the hill, on which the mighty conquerors stood, was over-topped by mountains, which interrupted the view without the least appearance of an interjacent plain. A gloomy mist was settled on their tops, which the sun, notwithstanding his powerful influence in this part of the world, could never dissipate, so that deluges of rain poured down upon us every hour. Every step we took, even on the declivity, was treading in a marsh; and this continual increase of moisture, shielded from the air, was cherished by the earth, and there gave birth to myriads of disgusting reptiles, or, by the heat of the sun, was drawn forth in noxious exhalations.

The effects of this were visible, not upon us, thank God, but upon the great number of sick belonging to the small French garrison, in number about fourscore. The utmost humanity was shewn to them during our halt here, which lasted about two hours; and we now received the following orders:

GENERAL ORDERS, *St. Lucie*, Dec. 14, 1778.

As a considerable body of troops will always be kept on this island, it is absolutely necessary to protect the inhabitants, their property, and their houses. It is expected that the commanding officers will exert themselves in keeping good order and military discipline. The General will look to them only, and it is, therefore, incumbent upon them, to take proper notice of officers command-

commanding companies, who allow their men to straggle.

The General is determined to punish, with the utmost rigour, all marauders, and will not trouble courts martial, but will order them to be executed upon the spot by the Provost. This will be the most disagreeable part of his duty, and he will sign the order for their execution with the greatest reluctance; but the unfortunate marauder will not be the only person to suffer, for no promotion will be given in the corps to which he belongs. It is recommended to the commanding officers of corps, not to bring any man to a court martial but for a capital crime, as no corporal punishment will be inflicted in consequence of the sentence of a general court martial.

BRIGADE ORDERS, Dec. 13.

Brigadier General Medows is extremely sensible of the high honour conferred upon him, by having the command of the flank corps. From the active gallantry of the light infantry, the determined bravery of the grenadiers, and the confirmed discipline of the fifth regiment, every success is to be expected; and he sincerely hopes that the lustre of their actions in the field, will not be tarnished by any irregularity in their behaviour out of it. The officers, of course, will instil this precept strongly into their men, and, at the same time, set them examples which they ought to follow. Marauding,
drunk-

drunkenness, and want of vigilance, lead not only to disgrace, but danger; on the contrary, while discipline and bravery go hand in hand, they deserve that fortune which they almost ensure. The troops are desired to remember, that clemency should ever attend upon victory; that to be brave and cruel, are almost incompatible; and the glorious character of a British soldier is, to conquer and to spare.

Acting on these principles, they can never fail in doing honour to their King, their Country, and themselves.

Before we moved, a person, having the appearance of a gentleman, came in. We understood that he was a man of consideration in the island, and that he expected the whole would capitulate the next day; but, in the mean time, we saw the French colours in three different places, and as we now were moving down the hill, the troops expected a resistance. All the inhabitants had left their houses, except a few women and the priest. The women said, that there were twenty companies to oppose us; the priest said, there was not a soul; and so, indeed, it proved, when our corps under Brigadier General Medows marched round a creek of the harbour, and took possession of a peninsula, which formed the right-hand-side of it, called the Vigie, upon which, on a high hill and on one beneath nearer to the sea, two of the flags were

were still displayed. General Grant remained with the brigades on the Morne Fortunée, for so the Governor's hill was called, and every thing seemed as it ought to be. The island we had taken, it is true, seemed totally uncultivated, and nearly in a state of nature; but, from its situation, it afforded an easy access to any of the French islands, as well as to our own: the harbour, which we now surrounded, was a valuable acquisition, since it could contain our whole fleet, and, being fortified, would protect them against every attack by sea.

We now saw nothing to prevent the fleet from entering the harbour, as they were only two miles to leeward, and between the tropics the wind always blows nearly from East to West. We expected next morning to have our ships with every fit equipment for the field, of which we were totally destitute, having been ordered to leave every thing on board but arms and accoutrements, and one day's provisions. Talking of these expectations, we chanced to cast our eyes towards the sea, on that side where the island of Martinico appeared like a black cloud at a distance, and the height upon which the flag-staff was placed afforded us a commanding view of whatever floated in the ocean, when in half an hour a fleet appeared.

What they were, the distance and the hazy sky would not permit us to discern, and various were the conjectures on the occasion. From their numbers, for we already counted twenty-four, they could

hardly have followed us from Barbadoes; and yet many were of that opinion, believing that the inhabitants, who, from the shortness of our stay, had not had time to bring down refreshments to us; and who knew that, from the length of our voyage, his Majesty's officers could have only salt provisions left, from their regard to us and the desire of gain, had followed us in sloops, containing every luxury; for we had as yet no idea of the size of their ships.

Others began to repeat the various rumours they had heard at Barbadoes, of the French West-India fleet; some having said, that it was very powerful; others, that it consisted but of two ships of war. Some wags declared, they thought it was D'Estaing, with his whole fleet of great ships of the line; that, at two morsels, he would swallow our little squadron; and asked their friends, if they had ever been at Paris; but there were many reasons why this appeared too ridiculous to be seriously supposed, and one of these was quite sufficient. Was he not blocked up in Boston harbour by the superior fleet of Byron?

Thus night came on, and we were left at liberty to repose our limbs upon our rocky hill, and to form new conjectures.

And now many foldiers, myself among the rest, were seized with a violent sickness and incessant vomiting, owing, as was afterwards believed, to the having eaten too freely of the green oranges, which grew by the side of the roads along which

we had marched, but I ascribed it at that time to the sugar-cane. Three of them had been given to me in the morning, and I then observed that they were at least twice as thick as those which grow upon Barbadoes. The sugar-cane is grateful to the taste, but I then supposed it to be improper to be eaten in that state. I have since found that I was mistaken, as the Negroes on the estates of the West-India planters, when the canes are ripe, soon acquire a degree of health, strength, and appearance, very different from their dejected habits during the rest of their sad year, when the most wretched fare and treatment prolongs their miserable existence*. The sickness ceased in a few hours, but left a languor for several days.

Violent as it had been, it could not interrupt our curiosity, which led us to the flag-staff by the dawn of day, when we were no longer at a loss to say what this fleet should be. A French newspaper had been found, giving an account of D'Estaing's arrival in the West-Indies.

And now we could discern every ship, in number twenty-four, thirteen of which were of two decks; the rest were sloops of war, or frigates: besides a multitude of sloops, which from their numbers, more than fifty, our soldiers termed the Musquito fleet. This armament we now saw crowding every sail, and moving slowly on directly for our shore.

* Written in January 1779.

Our feelings are more easily imagined than described. The total destruction of our little navy and the transports appeared inevitable. What fate would then attend the army, without the means of life in this inhospitable climate? We had the utmost confidence in British seamanship and British spirit; but now they could be of no avail; and perhaps, (nay, the event seemed certain,) in three hours we should be the passive spectators of the most vigorous exertion of our gallant sailors, of the glory they would gain in the disproportioned shock, and of their infallible captivity.

They had now advanced so near, that we could discern every man upon their crowded decks. Their largest ships had steered into a line two miles in length; their admirals had now displayed their several flags; and any of the three divisions, which their different stations marked, appeared a match sufficient for our fleet. Their fleet of sloops was guarded by the lesser ships, and kept aloof.

But a cape of land prevented us from seeing how our sailors were employed. The Admiral had seen the enemy the night before. His doubts of what or who they were, were not of long duration, nor was there time, or indeed much necessity, for much deliberation. His signals were immediately hung out, and this expeditious mode, by which the orders in our navy are expressed, was on this occasion seconded with universal ardor. The ships of war were disentangled from the transports, and formed in line across the entrance of the bay; the transports were pushed farther back, that they might be

be of no encumbrance, and to guard as much as possible against their being shattered by the shot. The ships were cleared from stem to stern. Every cabin was knocked down. Every thing which might be found to stand in the way, was removed or thrown overboard; and every measure being taken which the occasion required, or the time would permit, an officer of the 49th regiment, sent by General Grant, found it necessary to wake the Admiral, who was gone to rest in a hammock in the midst of his ship's crew.

The Admiral said to him, "Young man, I cannot write to the General at present, but tell him, that I hope he is as much at ease on shore as I am on board." But in the fleet they had already begun to remove the provisions from on board; and undismayed as Mr. Barrington appeared, it can hardly be supposed he could behold the enemy with the same indifference, now they had advanced so near.

They stood directly for the harbour's mouth, came within a quarter shot of our peninsula, and seemed to consider our handful of troops as unworthy of their notice, till a battery upon a little rock, surrounded by the sea upon the left side of the harbour, began the important day which was to decide, it seemed, at once, to whom the West Indian empire should belong.

To the insult of this single gun, which had been left there by the French, D'Estaing, whose ship sailed first, returned a reply in two broadsides, but

could not strike the little rock, and having changed his course, was followed by the rest along the shore between us and our fleet, half-way to which he hardly had attained when he began his fire. He did not long continue it unanswered. Although we could not see our ships, we heard their warm cannonade, and saw their shot, which all, excepting a few, fell short.

Nor did the French Admiral permit them long to fire at him, but after having given two broadsides, sheered off, and worked upon the wind. The same was done by every ship, forming in the whole the figure of a half moon, some coming nearer, others not so far, some staying longer, others a shorter while than their Admiral in Chief.

In this sham battle, all the damage or loss sustained scarcely deserves to be mentioned, being only three men; and yet their heavy guns sent every shot beyond our ships, without doing them any material injury.

By their retreat we now had time to breakfast and make remarks. Two days provisions had been sent us round in boats before the French came on; and though we were without the means to dress our pork, this was not the first time we had eaten it raw, or sliced and broiled upon the end of a bayonet with yams and plantains, of which we found abundance upon the post, afforded to a hungry man no despicable meal; nor did we relish it the less from the behaviour of the French.

But

But they advanced again at four o'clock, and again our spirits sunk within us. We had every reason to suppose, that the meaning of their first manœuvre was to see the disposition of our fleet; and having now obtained the utmost information they could wish, that they were returning to the attack in that determined way which must have proved decisive. They did indeed return, but it was to make the self-same caracole as they had done before, and with an effect as insignificant.

The only difference this time was, that as they sailed past our hill, their Admiral, whether he had now conceived a less idea of his own importance, or was inclined to think more favourably of us, did deign, with a prodigious elevation of his two-and-forty pounders, to send two shot across the summit of our hill, on which some twenty of our officers at that time stood, who did not fail, with a very low bow, to return the salute.

While they were thus employed, their fleet of sloops had steered their course towards the shore, and seemed inclined to come into a spacious bay which lay upon the right. Our glasses had already shewn us, that they were filled with troops; that by the most moderate computation they must hold one hundred men each, which in the whole amounted to five thousand; and on board their ships we always understood, from the time of their appearing before New-York, that their force in land troops amounted to nearly four thousand men.

After some appearance of hesitation, they passed the bay, turned round a point of land still farther to the right, and passing between an island and the land, vanished from our sight.

That evening, as we expected, they landed every man.

Here then the army saw employment for themselves. The situation of the navy, it may now be understood, remained no longer the only object of our thoughts: besides, we had already seen that they were able to defend themselves against every enemy, however superior in numbers by sea. It was our business to maintain the land.

But it was not till the morning after, that every thought of a serious attack upon our ships was totally abandoned by the enemy. The night of the 15th they continued to cruise along the coast, still hovering near, as if prepared to seize upon their prey; and their third and last disposition bore a different face from either of the two before, as if at last they were convinced of their mistake.

The whole advanced at once, to all appearance with a view of running right a-head, to carry every obstacle before them. But they again changed their mind, at least they changed their course; the mountain brought forth nothing, and all this fire did not this time produce so much as smoke.

They

They at last came to an anchor before the bay upon the right, and soon began to try experiments upon us, upon the Vigie, the very first of which, had it succeeded, must have driven us from our post. They attempted to bring ships of war to lie on both the sides of the peninsula, but at length discovered, by sounding several nights successively, that there was no depth of water in the bay. All they could do, was to send in two little armed sloops from time to time, which discharged a few broadsides from four-pound guns.

Many fruitless attempts were made to send in the Lively frigate, which had been made their prize some time before, when cruizing in the British Channel. Having failed in this, they next directed her to make her way by entering at the harbour's mouth: but this was likewise found to be impossible, as no ship can enter it without assistance from the shore to warp her in, according to the seaman's phrase. This at present she could scarcely expect; and the assistance she did receive from General Grant's side of the harbour, quickly served to help her back again.

Their next attempt was to cut off the provisions from this post, by sending ships of force to cruize before the mouth of the harbour.

All the provisions for the army had now been landed on the beach, and most of that for the navy, as they kept on board only ten days allowance for every man: but still it was to be carried on the men's shoulders to the top of Morne Fortunée, and a magazine was to be established there.

When

When the enemy came down before the wind, no boat could shew its face; but this at night they seldom cared to do, so that we never lost a single boat.

But to proceed, and not to make my journal too minute. This account, or journal, or whatever it may be called, was not begun until the 23d of December. Until this day we have remained without a tent, and wet both day and night incessantly. Being now dry, thank God, should I attempt to be jocose, it will not, perhaps, appear extraordinary to such of my friends as may hereafter be disposed to peruse it.

And now I think it is brought down to the 16th of December; and yet from that day to this, events of the most serious importance remain to be set down. The French send many of their vessels back to Martinico, and once and again with the utmost diligence returning, they land whomsoever they have brought.

The timid soldier, if now there be any such among our troops, has opportunity to add his apprehensions to the force and numbers of the enemy, of which our leaders have no means of information, and various are the projects formed among ourselves. At first, to march and to prevent their coming to the shore, and when this was now too late, another scheme succeeded to it. Shall we, it was said, permit them, now they are on shore, to cut our communication off? Or, if our post is judged of use, what are the brigades about? Let only one of them descend, and passing through the town,

town, march on, strike down the only flag we have left to the inhabitants, and occupy a ridge of hills which form at the distance of two miles a right angle with our peninsula. Such generals were there to be found among us. It is amusing to recollect even the very absurdities that are uttered upon such an occasion.

And yet it cannot be denied, that on the morning of the 16th the French came there, and took possession of these heights. A captain's picquet posted there from the brigades retired, and the white-coated gentlemen were now conspicuous in a line before a house, which stood upon a spot which had been cleared. Elsewhere the woods concealed them wholly from our view, if we except the opening in a path, through which, during two days, we saw them pass at intervals in files towards the house.

The pattern which we saw was such as served to give a high opinion of the enemy's appearance; but the whiteness of their cloaths, and lustre of their arms, were much diminished, after they had been next morning as completely drenched with rain as we were ourselves.

This morning it was no consolation to myself and other officers of the 55th flank companies to be informed, that our transport and another which belonged to the regiment, had dragged their anchors up, had driven to sea, and had been taken by the enemy. Then was not the time for us to be jocular, when every thing we had was gone, and when we never felt our wants so great. Our joy in
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the evening must be confessed, when we found that neither of the two was ours; but when we received the farther information that both were the ships of the regiment, our joy gave place to our concern for this no small misfortune of our friends and brother-officers, and the soldiers under their command. One of them was taken, the other made her escape, and next morning came safely back into the fleet.

This and the Ceres sloop of eighteen guns were the only prizes taken by the enemy, who still lay anchored where they were beyond our cannon's reach, increased in number now to eight and twenty sail. The sloops had come into the bay, and extended in a line quite to the water's edge. Many hours did not escape before fortune gave us a revenge. A sloop from Guadaloupe mistook our navy for that of the French, and running in at night became our prize, with the soldiers and officers on board of her.

What could the intentions of the enemy be now? They were in possession of the village—they had pushed their picquets close to ours; so near, that our sentries and the French could almost shake each other by the hand*, had they been so

* A grenadier of the writer's company was tried by a court-martial, and sentenced to be punished for taking a pinch of snuff from a French sentry, the orders having been to hold no communication with them. He was a very well-behaved man in general; and Major Harris pardoned him at his Captain's request, but cautioned the battalion against French civility upon this occasion.

inclined.

inclined. Byron was expected every hour. What if we should join our fleets? The time was critical. What could D'Estaing intend but an attack? for the command among the French remains the same by land as on the sea. But would he attack our post, or General Grant's, or Sir Henry Calder's, near the shipping?

A deserter came in on the evening of the 17th, while we were eager after information.

Our General was then, according to his frequent custom, going round the post, taking his observations with respect to every spot, and conversing with the different officers in that lively and engaging manner which so much distinguishes his valuable character. But now he was the General, and waving with his hand, he gave the deserter into his serjeant's charge, ordered them to follow him, and instantly retired.

We learned soon, that he was a serjeant in the regiment of Martinico; that he had deserted because he was in debt; that he believed the French to be twelve thousand strong; and that their only talk was of an attack intended on our post of thirteen hundred men, now that we were completely disunited from the army by their means.

To this report of a deserter every one gave that degree of credit he thought fit. It might be so. Our disposition was already made; the nature of the ground was such as we could wish, and most minutely had it been attended to. The troops were but a handful, it is true; but they were such

as were not much addicted to give way. Every one indulged such meditation as he chose, nor could it have been perceived from any alteration that an engagement was at hand.

The night, as usual, was extremely wet, and it continued to rain till seven in the morning, an hour and a half after the break of day. From that time we had been amused with a very unmilitary custom of the enemy, in popping off the pieces they had loaded in the night, which some of us observed were considerably more in number, and nearer to the post we had advanced, than usual.

This post was beyond the neck upon two hills, between which five companies of the light infantry were divided, commanded by Captain Henry Downing of the 55th light company. On one of these there stood an old redoubt, built when the Duke of Montague possessed the island. It was a pentagon of solid masonry, but had no parapet, and affording no cover for a defendant, was not occupied.

The General, with Major Harris, the commanding officer of our battalion of grenadiers, and Sir James Murray, who commanded the light infantry, had gone down to visit this post, and to repeat such orders as they should see necessary, when, from a grove of Manchineal, extending in a line along the beach, the enemy at once rose up, and advanced in line against these hills, equal in numbers to two of our battalions.

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We lost no time in standing to our arms; but from whom should we receive commands? The grenadiers called out, shall the light infantry be cut off? A moment more, and they will be surrounded. Let us move down the hill. Had they but seen the danger which their three commanding officers were in, they could not, men nor officers, have been kept back.

But they soon appeared, for having spoken every thing they wished, in case of an attack in force upon that post, they already were returning, when the enemy appeared.

The light infantry, said the General, will take care of themselves; but as for you, stand fast. None of the officers to whom he spoke durst offer a reply to his judgment; but the poor light infantry, were they not now hemmed in? They keep smartly up their straggling fire indeed, but now it seems to cease. The enemy have given two heavy vollies. They are moving on again in numbers four times theirs. The light infantry are gone.

But huzza! the French come to the right about and run. The light infantry, formed in a body, have charged through. The whole regiment of Martinico, which was clothed in blue, gave way, and ran along the beach. A regiment clothed in white were still advancing. A smaller party falling in with them, were killed or taken every man.

The affair stood thus, when we observed the whole French army moving on slowly in solid columns

lums to the attack. The light infantry, who had broke through, were already returning into the action; and to no purpose did the grenadiers, and the rest of their battalion, call to them to return. At last they saw the danger they were in was greater than before; and thanks to the thickness of the brush which favoured their escape.

Our cannon then began. The enemy were within musquet shot, as we discovered by the dropping of our men; and our troops began their fire with the greatest silence, and the least confusion possible.

Our hill was near the bottom covered with shrubs, from behind which a considerable body of the enemy kept up a constant fire. They had three ammusettes, from which they fired grape and leaden balls of a pound weight with great effect upon our line; but these were soon silenced by our four three-pounders. The columns never fired a shot. They for a length of time seemed to pay no attention to our cannon ball, which swept away whole ranks, but inclined their heads now to the right, now to the left, as if to see which way they could most easily ascend the hill. One column gave way twice, and was twice rallied in our sight beneath our fire. They came to a halt at last, and there they stood or fell.

Our men dropped fast. Our ammunition could not last long, for we had but thirty rounds at first. Fresh columns still continued to advance. The enemy appeared to be determined. Orders were given that we should fire no more until the
enemy

enemy came close, then to retire to the summit of the hill, to form in a line, to charge and drive them headlong back.

These orders were obeyed to admiration. The firing ceased from us, but the enemy did not advance. Our men sat down, and bore the enemy's fire, reserving five rounds each. A reinforcement of French ammunition from the magazine we had taken when we first landed, was brought across the harbour in the ferry-boat. Our fire began again. The enemy retired.

This action lasted about three hours, having begun at eight in the morning, and ended at eleven. The grenadiers had but eighty-seven killed and wounded. The loss of the light infantry in every way was sixty odd; that of the fifth regiment was eighteen. Few of the wounded were disabled.

From the spot on which we stood we scarcely could see a single Frenchman dead; but when we went down into the field, we then indeed beheld a horrid scene. None of us had ever seen so many dead upon so small a spot.

Four hundred men at least lay there. The effects of the artillery are not to be described. The mangled portions of the human frame lay scattered round on every side. The dying were confounded with the dead, and added to the scene their piercing agony and groans, which even by the roughness of the British soldiers nature could not be resisted, nor beheld without concern. They now forgot they were their country's enemies; and we, the officers, who half an hour before could

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behold

behold with joy a cannon ball take place, and sweep away a rank of men, were shocked at the various examples now before our eyes, of the calamities to which mankind are liable in the events of war.

Many of our soldiers were employed in giving the assistance they required to these afflicted men; and next the burial of the dead became our care; but this our General was resolved the French should do themselves, and waited for a while before he sent a flag of truce.

He had been wounded in the arm, but continued to go round, to see whatever might be necessary; and when the action ended, visited every wounded officer himself, praised their behaviour till they forgot their pain, and saw that the wounded soldiers had the proper assistance, at the very time he stood in need of it himself. He was much pleased with the reply of Lieutenant Gomm of the 46th grenadiers. This gentleman had been wounded in the eye; and in the heat of the action the General saying, "Sir, I hope you have not lost your eye;"—"I believe I have, Sir," he answered, "but with the other I shall see you victorious this day."

At four o'clock the flag went out, and by a mistake was fired upon, the light infantry bugle horn having been employed to sound a parley, instead of a drum, which is the custom. Every apology was made for this by the party which received them, which a Captain from the enemy brought down. Many compliments passed between Cap-
tain

tain Courtney* and him. The French spoke first. "You have shewn by the defence that you have made, that you are Englishmen." And the reply to this was, "You have shewn in your attack that you are worthy of the name of French."—Some of their young officers spoke much about revenge; and the material message being given, the conference broke off, after they had said that they would fire three guns before hostilities commenced again. To this it was replied, that we should be very happy to have the honour of another visit, and were at all times prepared for their reception.

They were inquisitive to know if they were actually our chasseurs which we had had in front, for the French chasseurs are never supposed to make any serious resistance; "but they retired, (said they,) and they advanced—they broke, and they rallied; and when we no longer saw a single man, we received a heavy fire in every direction." It must be observed, that the light infantry themselves say, that they did not charge as we imagined when the enemy gave way. Probably this unexpected method of defence had struck the enemy with consternation. A novelty can never fail to have a great effect in action.

This circumstance alone may serve to prove the truth of an observation frequently made, "that

* This accomplished young gentleman was one of the first who fell a sacrifice to the climate.

“any two persons giving an account of an engagement, will often differ essentially even in material circumstances.” Every battalion, however, can tell exactly what happens to themselves; and thus, by carefully collecting the component parts, the figure of the whole may be accurately ascertained.

Captain Downing's conduct was remarkable. He and his Lieutenant, Mr. John Waring, and three men of the 55th light company, by names Rose, Duffy, and Hargrove, defended a narrow path against the French for a considerable time, till most of the five companies had made good their retreat. These officers and soldiers parried the bayonets of the French grenadiers for some time. Mr. Waring was at length run through the body, and Captain Downing would soon have shared the same fate, if a French officer had not advanced, and slightly touched his sword, which Captain Downing instantly surrendered. He and his three faithful soldiers were immediately escorted prisoners to the old redoubt, where they found Count D'Estaing. Captain Downing here experienced most extraordinary treatment. The coat he happened to have on was not exactly new, nor was the appearance of it probably the better for the soaking it had had for many days and nights. He wore no shoulder knot, it being often the custom of our light infantry officers to wear, instead of them, a sort of fringe, called wings. In short, they believed, or pretended to believe, that he was
not

not an officer, and tied him back to back with one of his own men. This gentleman has often, with much good humour, described his feelings in this ludicrous situation, and the distress of the poor fellow, who certainly never expected to have experienced so close an intimacy with his captain.

This piece of insolence, in supposing that French customs must be those of all the world, is not unworthy of remark; but at the same time it would be easy to bring many arguments to shew that their method of marking the different ranks of their officers by a distinguishing badge, is perfectly judicious, especially when we consider how much men are apt to be guided by externals.

Captain Downing was unbound before the French retired, their civility having apparently been improved by their adventures. He was carried to Martinico, and some time afterwards received a visit from *Monf. de Latterette*, the French officer who saved his life. He expressed great satisfaction, and added, with elegance of manners, that he was certain, whenever the fortune of war enabled him, he would do the same by a French officer.

Mr. Waring was run through the lungs. He was deemed to be the captain, an honour which had nearly cost him his life. Several messages had been sent from us by flags of truce, desiring that Captain Downing might be sent back and exchanged. This, at length, they thought they had complied with. Four French soldiers came to our post, carrying a bier, on which, to our great sur-

prise, we found Mr. Waring. The motion brought on a fever, which had nearly destroyed him; but he recovered, to the great satisfaction of his brother-officers, who had much regard for him. He informed us, that nothing could exceed the good regulations of the French hospitals, but that the number of their wounded was by far too great to be accommodated in houses.

Among ourselves, the comparison occurred between this action and that of Bunker's-hill.

The attack in both affairs was made by troops who had never seen an enemy before. Both actions happened on peninsulas. Like young soldiers, both halted under the enemy's fire, and both severely suffered for it. But there was this difference:—

At Bunker's-hill a small body attacked an infinitely larger one, entrenched in works, and moving on again after the first check, they gained their point, and put the enemy to flight. Here the numbers had attacked the few without a work, and were repulsed. The events were different, and the reader will draw his own conclusion.

On the 19th, a flag came in the morning from the enemy; they were as anxious as ourselves to know the fate of Byron. Our Admiral had declared that the Pearl frigate had brought a letter from him, saying, that he knew D'Estaing had sailed, and that he certainly should follow him on the 19th of November; a great relief to us, if we could give implicit credit to the report; but it seemed probable that this was framed to keep up
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our spirits; for where was the Pearl frigate to be found? At Barbadoes it was said. But now the French affirmed that they had authentic accounts of his having actually sailed; that a violent hurricane had totally dispersed his fleet; that the Somerset was wrecked; and that almost all the rest of his ships were totally disabled.

Nor could we say if this were true or not. It was a mystery from first to last. How came it that D'Estaing escaped? and the grand question was, how Byron could know whither he had gone? Our danger was the same as ever. The provision was much reduced; and probably would have failed before this time, if General Grant, just before we sailed from New-York, had not obtained, though with some difficulty, the addition of a fortnight's supply. Our stores were at Antigua; and the swiftest sailing frigates were dispatched to bring as much as they with safety could, as nothing but superiority in sailing could prevent their being taken by the enemy.

Had it not been for the victory the troops had gained, their spirits would have sunk; and they were now employed in throwing up a work, each company before itself, in case the enemy attacked again, which they gave out they certainly would do. The advantage of such a measure had been conspicuous. Captain John West, of the 4th grenadiers, having been detached with his company to an hillock in our front, and on our right flank, having contrived to find a couple of spades and a pick,

pick-axe, told his men that they would probably be attacked in the morning, and that if they wished to have *whole bones*, they would work hard. He traced out the front; they completed the breast-work; and only one man of the company was wounded. General Medows now gave out an order, that he expected the grenadiers would shew themselves as famous for making as for taking works, or defending a hill without works.

After the conference, the enemy sent down a party of four hundred men in answer to our flag, in order to inter their dead. A number of our men soon mixed among them, rather with a dangerous degree of familiarity, to which our officers soon took care to put a stop, by ordering them away. They were above six hours employed, but did not complete their work; many of the bodies still remained exposed, and few of them were completely covered. A French soldier observed, that as the wind always blew in that direction unto our post, the effluvia would be too noxious to be endured. This soon became apparent in this very hot climate, and we applied the only remedy, by completing the interment.

In every other point of view, their behaviour was remarkably polite. Their chief surgeon was sent in to offer General Medows his assistance. The general's horse strayed out, they sent him back. Captain West, in giving his assistance to a wounded man, had dropped a silver hilted sword; their working party carried it away; it was brought back by the next flag, and no money was suffered
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to be given to the soldier in return. Their sentries often, when they saw our soldiers passing near, would point to their arms, shake their heads, and laugh; but never fired: A very different stile of war from that which we had been used to in America.

Their officers agreed with us most feelingly, that the climate was most villanous; that if we staid much longer here, both armies would perish; and that the island was not worth the fighting for.

But we rather were inclined to alter our opinion, when Colonel Musgrave, the Quarter-Master-General, came over on the morning of the 20th.

This experienced and able officer had been here the day before the landing of the French, by orders from General Grant, most probably with a view of bringing back a more minute account of the post than he could have by viewing it from the place where he stood. From him we learned, that the fertility of the island was remarkable; that it was as large as Dominica, and better cultivated every where than the part we saw, and that it contained a considerable number of inhabitants. We learned farther, how the enemy had lately been employed. Thirty of their sloops had sailed the day after the action, carrying a considerable body of their troops. These they landed with some mortars below our shipping, with a view of seizing upon some heights that surrounded the bay, and by throwing shells among our crowded ships, to oblige them to quit a station which they had found so advantageous, or else to set fire to them.

But

But parties from the 35th and 40th regiments, detached by the vigilance of Sir Henry Calder, forced through the woods which grew upon the declivity, and gained the top. The enemy, finding that they were prevented, immediately returned to the place from whence they came. It is extraordinary that Count D'Estaing's first attempt by land was not in this quarter.

According to their own accounts, they had lost fifteen hundred men in the late action, in killed or badly wounded. The disproportion between our loss and theirs will not appear extraordinary, when it is considered in the first place how much more numerous they were; secondly, that they were in solid columns, which the nature of the ground positively required in passing over the neck of land; and lastly, that the fire of our troops was concentrated upon them like the focus of a burning glass.

There cannot be a doubt that our fire would have been much more destructive, but for a most extraordinary instance of neglect; namely, the badness of our flints. We have always had the same cause of complaint. The French flints are excellent, though their powder is bad. What can the reason be, that every effort shall be rendered in some measure vain, as well the labour of the soldier, as the counsel of the chief? From what and how? From the badness of a pebble stone? In the attack, the bayonet is always a remedy for this deficiency; but to find in a defence that one-third of your men are useless from this cause, is indeed
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extraordinary; it is by no means impossible that the fact itself must have escaped the scrutiny of government, for the remedy can be easily applied *.

Upon the subject of complaint, another fact occurs, which, to an individual who, perhaps, is not informed of every circumstance, appears well worthy the attention of government. The army, in time of war, ought to be supplied with shoes by government, or leather, where there is time and opportunity to make shoes. Can a soldier march without shoes? Are they not the most necessary article of clothing? Two-thirds of the army upon St. Lucie are this day, February 4th, 1780, confined to their tents for want of shoes, because the merchants did not run the risk of coming with the fleet. When they do arrive, they will be allowed, as was the case in America, to charge the soldiers whatever price they please. Can a soldier afford two dollars (nine shillings) for a pair of shoes, which will not last him six weeks; and his linen to be purchased from his pay in the same proportion? If government would furnish this

* It is now thirteen years since this was written, yet the flints are as bad as ever. On a review-day the Captains buy flints at their own expence. It was a common saying among the soldiers in America, that a Yanky flint was as good as a glass of grog. The government flints will often fire five or six shots very well, but they are of a bad sort of flint, and are too thick. The black flint, such as is sold for gentlemen's fowling-pieces, or a trifle larger, is the proper flint for the soldier's musquet; and the springs of the locks are probably too strong.

extensive branch, and her servants pay the attention to the public good, which it is their duty to do, the soldier would be more *certainly*, more *cheaply*, and more *sufficiently* supplied. His provisions are served out to him, for which he pays two-pence-halfpenny a day. Why should not his shoes and shirts be served out to him upon service, in like manner, and as the other parts of his clothing are, upon his paying prime-cost for them?

But to proceed from this digression, or rather transgression, of a military murmur.

After the action we received the following orders:

*Copy of a letter from the Commander in Chief to
Brigadier-General Medows.*

SIR,

I cannot express how much I feel myself obliged to you, and the troops under your command, for repulsing with so much spirit and bravery so great a body of the enemy. I own it was just what I expected from you and them; and I am sure under your command they will always behave as will do honor to you, themselves, their King, and the country which they serve; and I must beg of you to express my thanks to them in the strongest manner.

Brigadier-General Medows has the highest satisfaction in communicating so flattering a letter from the Commander in Chief to the troops under his command; and begs leave to mark to the officers

cers and men his admiration of their gallantry and good conduct in the affair of the 18th. He feels too much to be able to add more, than that at the head of such a corps he must be pleased to live, or proud to die.

We now observed the enemy employed in raising batteries on every little height, and were in daily expectation of a new attack. We saw multitudes employed in dragging guns and mortars; and the enemy gave out that, under cover of a bombardment, and a heavy cannonade, they would again attack our hill.

BRIGADE ORDERS, *December 21.*

Whenever the picquet is attacked, the drums are to beat to arms, and the lines are immediately to be manned. As soon as our gallant and generous enemy are seen to advance in great numbers, the troops are to receive them with three huzzas, and then to be perfectly silent and obedient to their officers. Whilst they are cool by day, and alert by night, they have nothing to fear. If the enemy want our arms, let them come and take them. During the attack, some of the drummers, to assemble round the colours of the fifth regiment at the flag-staff, and beat the grenadiers march.

On the 24th, towards break of day, a rebel floop of war anchored near our ships. A boat from her came on board of Admiral Barrington, and

and the person who commanded it beginning to speak French as he came up the side of the ship, the officer upon deck seeing that they had mistaken our fleet for that of the French, took care not to undeceive the boat's crew till he got the whole on board. The sloop of war had come to an anchor; but at day-break discovering her mistake, she slipped her cable, and would have escaped, had not a battery on shore, at the very first shot, struck her between wind and water, which obliged her to surrender, lest she should sink.

This was the battery which had struck two of our ships when we were landing, and the same guns, under Lieutenant Garstin of the artillery, did material service when D'Estaing attacked our ships, for which the General and Admiral had given him their thanks. The sloop which now was taken by his means, was called the Bunker's-hill, had lately sailed from Boston, and reported that Byron had sailed on the first day of December; but we could hardly be convinced he had not sailed for England. This sloop was now named the Surprise, and the intelligence which she brought served to keep alive our hopes, and made us pass a more chearful Christmas-day than otherwise we should have done.

Our belief was increased, when on the 26th we saw the French sail out, and form a line. They went almost out of sight, but soon returned to their former station.

By land we were astonished not to have a single battery opened upon our hill; but we judged that
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the longer they delayed, the more formidable and numerous their artillery would be. We found the rainy season now somewhat beginning to abate, and saw, what would have been before a matter very hard to have convinced us of, that it was the greatest friend we had, for the only water on the post was supplied by the rain.

Good fortune had attended us throughout. We learned now that the sloop which carried the horses of the field officers of our little army had fallen in with the enemy six hours after she had separated from our fleet. Her commander, Mr. Thomas Middleton, was immediately carried on board Count D'Estaing's ship, where every argument was used to no purpose, persuasion, promises, and threats, to make him disclose our place of rendezvous. He told that he had opened his instructions before he struck, and had instantly destroyed them; that no person in his sloop (the Betsey) knew this but himself; but that nothing should prevail upon him to make the discovery. As they were proceeding to put him in irons, he said, "Since they must know it, Antigua was our destination." Upon this Count D'Estaing immediately directed his course thither, sending off a ship to Martinico, with orders to collect all the troops which could be brought together, to embark them, and immediately to proceed with them to join him. Had Mr. Middleton informed him that Barbadoes was our place of rendezvous, or even if we had staid there one day longer, there cannot be a doubt that our fleet and army must have fallen into the hands of the French, as the harbour

bour of Barbadoes is an open road affording no protection for shipping. Had D'Estaing succeeded in his attempts upon this little army, the loss of every one of the Leeward Islands must have been the certain consequence.

This sea manœuvre of D'Estaing appeared quite inconsistent with the labours he was forwarding on shore. We began to think it not impossible he might retreat; and on the 29th we found that we had not prophesied in vain.

At break of day the soldiers saw and soon called out that the Musquetoe Fleet was gone. This was the name which they had given to the sloops. A prodigious fire appeared the evening before on Martinico. We had seen two days before that they were making preparations to retire, and now two companies were sent out to reconnoitre; but every enemy was gone. Byron was now expected every hour; could he but get between the enemy and Martinico, and Barrington slip out, and shut them up between their fleets: but no, the long-lost, long wished-for Byron was not to be found.

It was no unpleasing task for us to go beyond our lines, to tread upon the ground which it was before so dangerous to approach*, and view the prodigious works they had thrown up at the very time we were entrenching against them.

* Juvat ire et Dorica castra,
Desertosque videre locos litusque reliqua.

VIRGIL.

This

This was their employment, instead of sailing off, availing themselves of their superiority by sea, and landing the overplus of their land force on our defenceless islands.

GENERAL ORDERS, *December 29.*

“ The capitulation is signed. The inhabitants
“ are to take the oath of allegiance, and are
“ therefore to be allowed to go where they please.”

The same terms were granted here which the French had given upon Dominica; that is to say, the utmost liberty and protection which the constitutions of the different kingdoms will permit, and they will soon perceive which has the preference. The English laws were already in force, as may appear from

BRIGADE ORDERS, *January 3, 1779.*

“ The lines to be manned to-morrow morning
“ at eight o'clock for the execution of John Blank.
“ The bravest troops, when they forget their discipline, and degenerate into a lawless banditti, are
“ a curse upon the country which they come to
“ serve. However, such a corps as the reserve can
“ never be disgraced by such an individual.”

Four inhabitants had come into the lines complaining that they had been robbed and maltreated the night before by a soldier whom they described. The troops were drawn out, and one by one, as each complainant had done, these people were brought from a small house upon the post, and each as they came near this man instantly singled him out as the person. He was a man of remarkably

good character, brave, sober, obedient, and till then had been reckoned strictly honest; but though his absence from his company had not been perceived, and though he persisted to the last in denying the charge when tried by a general Court-martial, yet he was executed by their sentence, upon this remarkable testimony. It was extraordinary to see how much the soldiers were affected at the sight of death in this shape, who so often had beheld it without concern.

What had we to think of now but Byron, or what the French were now employed about? A ship was sent to Martinico to treat about the prisoners of war upon a flag of truce, and was there detained for a considerable time. As for Byron he was no longer expected.

But on the morning of the sixth of January, the moment that we thought of him the least, his fleet appeared. He soon got in, and we then found that he had been straining every nerve. The very day we first saw D'Estaing from St. Lucie, and not before, he failed to follow him. For after he had repaired his ships and masts, shattered by the storm which had driven him off from Boston-bay, and let D'Estaing escape, he could not quit America till he was assured by dispatches sent to every port, that the French fleet was actually gone. After he was satisfied of this, and ready to depart, the wind was contrary for ten days, and would not suffer him to sail. He had long given us up for lost, but was determined that it should not be his fault.

And

And now that we can say, Britannia rules the waves, long may her arms controul her enemies by land.

The annexed plan was drawn by Major Hart, now of the 77th regiment, and serving in the East Indies. The writer and he were at that time Captains in the same regiment. It was with the greatest difficulty that Mr. Thomas Middleton's name, and that of his sloop, were obtained by the writer, although the fact of his very proper conduct was universally acknowledged. The commander in chief of the expedition had mentioned it in the handsomest manner in the House of Commons; it was even said that he had received a reward, but what it was no person could say. The circumstance was unknown at all the public offices. At last it was suggested by a gentleman at the Treasury, that his name would be found at Lloyd's coffee-house, where a list of all prizes is kept. Upon obtaining the name, and turning alphabetically to the books, it appeared that Mr. Middleton had received five hundred pounds reward. How do we know but that there may be many such actions, and even so rewarded, which are totally forgotten for want of publicity, which surely would greatly enhance the value of the reward, and operate as an encouragement to such honourable and patriotic conduct? Why should there not be a book at the Treasury, appropriated to the commemora-

tion of rewards, to which the historian might have recourse in future times? To such a person as Mr. Middleton, the having his name recorded is of more value than any pecuniary reward, as is evident from the most unquestionable authority: for his supreme ambition was to be made a lieutenant in the navy; but whether it was that his time of service as a midshipman had not been long enough, (for he had served in that capacity,) or from whatever other cause, all his applications to that end were ineffectual.

This seems no improper place for the writer to make mention of a few anecdotes that have come to his knowledge.

Mr. Matthew Hayes, serjeant in the 52d grenadiers, having been taken prisoner at the affair of Lexington, found means some time afterwards to make his escape into New York, immediately before the British governor, General Tryon, quitted it; and being put in possession of the light-house upon Sandy Hook, which guards the right-hand side of the harbours mouth, maintained it for above six weeks, notwithstanding repeated attacks in which the enemy suffered considerable loss. This piece of service was of great importance; for the entrance into the harbour is completely commanded by that light-house, and the British fleet and army at length arrived. Two years afterwards, in the retreat from Philadelphia, the army came by Sandy Hook, and amongst others, the battalion of grenadiers in which Mr. Hayes was at that time
serjeant

serjeant major, and in which the writer also served. Every body went to see Governor Hayes's citadel, which gratified him exceedingly, and he was soon afterwards promoted to the adjutancy of a regiment of provincials.

It may not be improper here to remark, what extraordinary chances sometimes occur in military affairs. The transports had got round from Philadelphia the day before our arrival, by which means the army in a few hours embarked and sailed up to New York. The very next day the French fleet, under Count D'Estaing, came and anchored there, to our great astonishment, for we knew nothing of a French war. Had the transports been delayed by contrary wind or otherwise, or had Count D'Estaing arrived but one day sooner, it is probable that the whole army must have surrendered. The ships of war completely raked the low lying ground of Sandy Hook; and Mr. Washington's army was posted opposite to the narrow neck of land, which also had been separated from the main land some days before by a storm, and was then passable only by a narrow bridge of boats, which not more than six men a-breast could pass.

The next anecdote, although unattended with brilliant consequences, yet may serve as an example of good conduct.

II. Corporal Elton, of the 16th regiment of light dragoons, was sent by General Howe from Brandewine, to the head of Elke, carrying to Lord Howe intelligence of the victory that had been

been obtained, with six dragoons under his command. He arrived where the fleet lay, and sent his message on board. He had nearly one hundred miles to return through an enemy's country. He fell in with a line of baggage belonging to the enemy, and perceived a body of them marching in the same direction at a little distance. He had had the precaution to make his men turn their jackets with the lining outwards, by which their uniforms became white turned up with blue, which was the same as that of Washington's dragoons. He rode up without hesitation to the line of baggage, and seeing the name of a Colonel Brown written upon the tilt of one of the waggons, he called out to the men, "that Colonel Brown had sent him to give them orders to drive quicker, and passed along their line, calling to the men to keep up." He performed his patrol in an incredibly short time, and brought every man and horse to Philadelphia. Not a doubt, there might be many very interesting and instructive anecdotes related of individuals, of the two regiments of light dragoons in America, namely the 16th and 17th. This species of service, especially in that woody country, required conduct as well as courage. Men sent out upon patrols had frequently to run the gauntlet of a number of lurking fellows, who lay behind trees to fire at them.

III. When Lord Rawdon commanded an army in Carolina, a soldier coming with intelligence, was fired at from behind a tree, and feeling himself mortally wounded, galloped his horse as fast as he could,

could, and got into a house a few moments before the enemy overtook him. They came, but could not find his dispatches, which, as is the custom upon such occasions, were rolled up in a very small scrawl. They went away, and some women of the army coming that road, the poor fellow, a little before he died, expressed his great satisfaction that he had saved his dispatches, which he had stuffed into the wound in his groin. This man's name was Dennis O'Lavorey, and Lord Rawdon has ordered a monument to be erected to his memory in one of the churches of Dublin.

IV. In the siege of Gibraltar a shell fell into a cave where a serjeant was upon guard with twelve men of the 73d, or Lord M'Leod's regiment of Highlanders, in which the writer had the rank of Major. The shell killed or wounded most of them. The officer from whose guard the serjeant was detached, running up, heard the poor serjeant, whose name was M'Ewan, calling to the men that it was unsoldier-like to make a noise when they were wounded; yet he himself was so badly hurt that he died next day.

V. Some days before the engagement with Don Langara's Squadron, the 2d battalion of the 73d regiment were taken out of their transports, and were embarked on board the fleet to assist in fighting the battle which was expected. Sir George Rodney, at a meeting of his captains, signified his thanks to the Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment for their behaviour upon that occasion, but omitted making mention of the regiment in his public letter.

letter. What follows is more worthy of notice : A Spanish ship of 74 guns having struck, Lieutenant Williams, with a midshipman and fifty sailors, was put on board of her. She had been so much shattered in the engagement, that it had been necessary to take her in tow of a British ship of the line. The wind was high and upon a lee shore ; it was almost dark, and consequently impracticable to remove a single prisoner. Mr. Williams, seeing what was likely to happen, instantly ordered every prisoner below decks, except the Spanish officers ; and his people complaining that the Spanish sailors below were shoving them about and interrupting them, he ordered his men to come up, and let the Spaniards pump the ship or not as they pleased. There were seven hundred of the enemy. He then pointed two of the quarter-deck guns down into the hold ; and there being one of his sailors who spoke Spanish, he informed them, that the first man who attempted to come up, he would fire down into the hold, and sink the ship. The British ship had cast them off to consult her own safety, as they were driving fast into the bay of Cadiz. Mr. Williams thus abandoned, and with so very small a force compared to that of the enemy, was yet determined that the ship should not fall entire again into the hands of the Spaniards, and he continued steering for the breakers. In this situation the sailor who spoke Spanish turned traitor, and proposed to the Spanish officers, that if the Lieutenant and Midshipman could be secured, that the men would do exactly as they were desired.

This

This the Spanish officers heard with the greatest abhorrence, as they considered that their parole of honour had been given. Mr. Williams ran the ship upon the rocks, and then turning to the Spanish captain, told him that he and his people were now his prisoners. They were very honourably sent on shore in the first boats, and the two officers were soon afterwards sent into Gibraltar, where the writer had the pleasure of being in company with them. The Spanish ship was irrecoverably lost, and Lieutenant Williams was soon after promoted to the command of a British ship of the line.

SOME ACCOUNT
OF THE
Assault on GIBRALTAR

In 1782.

In a LETTER to the Earl of BALCARRES.

GIBRALTAR, Sept. 14, 1782.

Parole, King George and Victory.

I Sit down with no small satisfaction to inform you, that last night and this morning we have defeated the attack of France and Spain, and that their Armada, so long in preparing, is totally destroyed before the eyes of their whole combined fleet and army.

We have experienced various sensations during the last four and twenty hours, and I seize the very first moment of leisure to relate to you the events as they happened, in as plain and concise a manner as my imagination will allow, in speaking of the grandest and most awful objects which perhaps were ever exhibited.

In

In my two last letters, I gave you a full detail of their immense preparations; they had nearly forty thousand men before the place, and piles of ammunition, which, to appearance, could never be all expended, even by their innumerable and heavy ordnance: I also described, as they appeared to us across the bay, their long labours upon ten large ships, mounting nearly two hundred pieces of heavy cannon. On these, by our information from various quarters, they had tried numberless experiments, and had clearly demonstrated to their people, that they were impenetrable to cannon ball and shells; that it was impossible to burn them; and that they could not be sunk. The truth of these assertions we found to be incontestible for many hours. Such was the situation of our affairs on the 11th instant, when my last letter to you was sent. On the 12th, a large fleet appeared in the Streights from the West, but the morning being hazy, it was not till they approached very near, that we discovered them to be the combined fleets of France and Spain; consisting of forty-four sail of the line, including those that were here before, with three fifties, and several frigates and fire-ships.

It must not now be denied, that their arrival, which was totally unexpected, had some effect upon the spirits of the garrison. The numerous assaults which the enemy would now be enabled to make on every side at once, could not fail, as was almost generally thought, to divide and distract our very inferior numbers; consisting, on the 1st of September,

September, of five thousand seven hundred and one men, including seventy-two Corsicans, to which must be added near eight hundred seamen. Or if this should not be the mode of attack, still it appeared to many, that their repeated efforts could not fail to wear down the garrison with fatigue, when no man could ever quit his alarm-post, or, if he did, could obtain rest in his tent, exposed on every quarter to the cannon of the enemy.

In short, a degree of uneasiness existed until the hour of action was at hand; and those who had beheld the Duke de Crillon's formidable force by land, and frequently had stood his cannonade and bombardment, from nearly two hundred guns and mortars, with firmness of mind, were startled at the addition of a force greater than had been ever brought against any place in the history of the world; and at inventions, which, though new, promised to be of a most extraordinary nature, and had inspired the enemy with the most unbounded confidence.

But on the memorable 13th of September, at eight in the morning, (the anniversary of the day when General Wolfe fell, and Quebec was won,) they appeared in motion on the other side, and all ideas of doubt or apprehension instantly gave way to others of a very different nature. The wind was strong at north-west, and their vessels had been so stationed, that it was now directly in their stern.

Our

Our artillery and additional gunners instantly repaired to their alarm-posts, till it should be seen at what and how many points of the garrison the efforts were to be directed. We then saw, what we could not have believed, that these unwieldy looking machines sailed and steered with as much quickness and precision as the lightest ships, so that before nine o'clock they were at their station. Their admiral, Don Buena Ventura Moreno, did not bring up till his vessel had brushed the ground; they then all followed his example, and were anchored and moored almost instantaneously, without the least confusion; their right extending a little beyond the King's Bastion, their left nearly opposite to Water-port. Our batteries could not open upon them more than about ten minutes before they began their fire, seconded with all Monsieur de Crillon's artillery. The regiments remained undisturbed spectators, on their respective parades to the south, except such officers as chose from curiosity to risk reprehension, and to be eye-witnesses of the gallantry of the artillery, or to animate, by their presence, if necessary, the men of their respective corps employed on the batteries, or on duty in the ruins of the town.

But no man stood in need of encouragement; and yet it may be affirmed, that such a shower of shot and shells, in various directions, would have prevented any soldiers from doing their duty with effect, but such as had been in the daily habit of being exposed to danger for near two years.

Yet,

Yet, after many hours of this trying situation, their efforts still appeared to be unsuccessful; they had long found the range of the battering ships of war, but now, when it was near sun-set, their fire, and that from the enemy by land, continued still incessant, unabating, and well directed; penetrating through the merlons of the old thin wall between the bastions, killing and wounding numbers there, and, most probably, shaking the foundations in places which we did not see.

Our well-directed fire appeared, even at that hour, to have no effect: Our balls seemed to rebound into the sea, and even such shells from the thirteen inch mortars as struck, glanced off the shelving roofs, composed of logs, and did them not the least apparent injury; yet shells of this nature, when loaded, weigh above two hundred pounds upon the ground, and where they fall from their elevation, as that weight increases every instant of the fall, we might suppose the shock to be irresistible; accordingly, wherever they fall on our most solid fortifications, they never fail to make such havock as requires time and prodigious labour to repair. Of what sort of materials, it was then naturally asked, can these formidable engines be made, to possess a repelling and elastic power to so very wonderful a degree?

It occurred to many, that our artillery-men must soon be exhausted with mere bodily fatigue, and now, that the wind had subsided to a breeze, and the sea was smooth, their whole train of gun and mortar-boats, and all their ships of war, were

every hour expected; they however never appeared, and the men declared, that had they but a short refreshment, they could stand to the guns for eight and forty hours, whatever might be apprehended. One hundred sailors now arrived to their assistance, and their refreshment was a draught of water from the fountain, and such salt provisions as could be brought. After this short abatement, their fire was renewed with redoubled vigour, and red-hot shot continued to be wheeled from the furnaces, and were put into the guns with the same speed and dexterity as if they had been cold. A little before dark, the enemy hoisted a chequered flag, which inspired some hopes that all might not be quite so well with them on board; some lucky shot entering their embrasures, were heard to ring against their cannon, and several ten-inch shells, sent with a fortunate horizontal direction from our howitzers, were seen to enter in the same manner, and some at last to stick in their sides, and afterwards explode: a considerable and increasing smoke was seen to issue from the vessel of their admiral, but was soon extinguished. To what purpose then was all our fire? It was directed against masses composed of cork, of wool stuffed hard, of the largest cables laid the one above the other, and of earth rammed in to fill up every chink. The very wood, it was said, was soaked in alum piece by piece, and wherever it was exposed, was covered with strong plates of tin: as to the effect of alum upon wood, we were entirely ignorant; but each of the other materials were such as every one knew could scarcely

scarcely be made to catch the flames ; and the same truth, it was feared, was but too applicable to the solid mass which they composed, six feet in thickness.

With these unflattering ideas in the mind of almost every person in the garrison, the night came on ; the regiments and their officers retired to take repose, not knowing how soon they might be called upon to withstand the enemy's assault ; and the Duc de Crillon had often publicly declared, that one half of his army should be sacrificed, were it necessary, in order that the other might obtain his point ; and that in such case, no quarter should be given to the garrison : the Marquis de Santa Cruz, from whose book all these operations have received almost implicit directions, strongly inculcates the same principle—that only the chief officers should be spared. Such declarations would have served our purpose well, and could not have failed, if the trial had been made, to have produced the most desperate resistance from every individual, when the principle of self-preservation was so intimately connected with their duty to their king and country ; they were not lost for want of industry on the part of the officers in spreading them amongst the people.

It soon appeared, however, that ours was not a situation in which we could expect repose, and events, very different from what we expected, soon occurred to interrupt every disposition of that nature.

First,

First, About eleven at night a boat was seen approaching to the shore, which, on its coming near, was discovered to be floating on its side, with twelve French soldiers and a Spanish officer upon it. The assistance they implored was sent to them, and they were received into the garrison. We learnt, that the slaughter of the enemy on board had been so great, that a reinforcement had been necessary; that they had been volunteers for that purpose; and had almost reached the vessel they were destined for, which was manned entirely by the French, when a shot from the garrison overset the boat, which had fourscore men on board; that they had floated above four hours in the water, between both the fires; that the tide had driven them in beneath our walls, where they every instant expected destruction; but being received in a different manner, and treated with great humanity, they seemed thankful for their preservation; and on being asked, they shook their heads, and said, that if we thought to destroy the battering ships by our artillery, or by fire, we might spare ourselves the trouble of making the attempt; that whatever numbers we might kill on board, could be of no avail, for their whole army and their fleet would eagerly crowd to supply the places of the slain, well knowing that it could not require any great length of time to make a sufficient breach. Nor were these opinions given with an air of gasconade: they appeared nothing more than the creed with which the enemy were universally inspired.

But the hour was at hand when these their sanguine expectations were to be as universally disappointed; for the admiral's ship burst out in flames a little after twelve, and the cannonade from all of them began to slacken, while ours increased. Another soon, and then a third took fire, not in the same manner as the admiral's, but slowly, and with a progress hardly visible for nearly two hours, till the flames gradually insinuated, and established to a certain pitch, then rapidly increased in fury.

Then were heard the shrieks of horror, of agony, and despair, rendered more striking from the perfect stillness of the night, the scene illuminated to a distance and at hand as bright as day, closed in the back-ground with the rugged declivity of Gibraltar, towering to the sky, and projecting upon every side defiance to two haughty nations.

The dawn was now approaching fast, and our twelve-gun boats being manned, Captain Curtis of the navy sallied forth with them, directing their fire against the approach of boats which might attempt to carry off the people from the ships; but nearly all of them had already retreated, and day-light increasing, discovered only three boats just putting off from them, and several already at a distance. One of these three immediately was taken, one escaped, the third attempted to row off, but was struck by a ball from our boats, which wounded five men and pierced her sides.

But the attention of Captain Curtis was soon called to objects of a far more interesting nature,

to

to humanity; the entreating cries and gestures of the people that were still on board; and every ship was now on fire but one; he listened only to the dictates of his feelings, and not to the suggestion that the gunpowder in the ships would soon catch fire. He was already in the midst of them, when one of them did actually blow up with a prodigious explosion, totally enveloping our boats, and involving the whole garrison in a state of prodigious anxiety and suspense on their accounts: this was not without cause, for one of them immediately was sunk; the people in her was saved, though not unhurt. Captain Curtis's helmsman was killed; fortunately he himself received no injury, and still persevered in his design of saving the lives of the enemy. He sent his boats on board of every ship, and near four hundred were rescued from destruction. He even ransacked the holds of several, and removed the wounded. Some infatuated wretches were employed in drinking spirits, and in search of plunder, losing thereby the opportunity of being saved. Of these there were in number three, who afterwards appeared upon the decks cured of their intoxication by the terrors of approaching death, in the various choice of horrible appearances, whether by the flames, by drowning, or explosion of the powder. In vain they stretched their supplicating hands, falling on their knees, entreating our assistance, uttering the yells of despair, and at length of madness. No boat durst venture to approach them; the most positive orders had been

given that no one should attempt it, and the boats had been hauled on shore. Captain Curtis had well nigh been destroyed a second time, another vessel having blown up the moment after he had taken out the prisoners, some of whom were up to the neck in water to relieve them from the scorching heat; and, strange to say, the enemy directed every mortar they could bring to bear upon our boats, while they were thus laudably employed. On these three wretches then the eyes of thousands were engaged for nearly an hour, forming a thousand fruitless wishes for their preservation, till two of them were seen at length to throw themselves reluctantly into the sea, and one remained the only victim. He retreated from the fire to various quarters of the vessel. He appeared repeatedly as if he was preparing some materials to float upon, and as often laid the enterprize aside. At length he was obliged to take refuge on the bow, still followed by the flames. He was at last compelled by them to quit his hold, which he contrived however to regain, after floundering in the water like a drowning man: he hardly was replaced when the wreck blew up, and he was seen no more. The other two were saved; one, though it appeared he could not swim, yet gained a piece of wood and paddled with his hands, assisted by the tide, till he gained the Spanish shore, none of our sentries offering to fire upon him. The other, by being a remarkably good swimmer, had well nigh lost his life: he at first depended too much upon himself, and being soon hurried out of the reach

reach of the floating materials, swam half way to Spain; he most likely would have gained his point, one deserter having swam into the garrison during the siege, the distance being about two miles; but the tide turned, and hurried him back among the burning ships. Having fortunately gained a barrel, he was taken up by our boats, after being above six hours in the water. His joy at being saved, and indeed that of all the prisoners, was next to being frantic.

When they were saved, there then remained nothing to interrupt our attention to the vessels burning on the water, and the prodigious-explosions which they formed, particularly one, which contained their magazine. After it had burnt almost an hour, we felt every thing near us tremble; there was a thunder from it which was dreadful; but the cloud which it formed was beyond all description, rolling its prodigious volumes one over another, mixed with fire, with earth, with smoke, and heavy bodies innumerable, on which the fancy formed various conjectures while they rose and fell; till the whole arriving at its height in a gradual progress of near ten minutes, the top rolled downwards, forming the capital of a column of prodigious architecture, which the first-rate painter must have been eager, though perhaps unequal to have imitated*. Thus perished seven of their vessels

* Of all the painters who have since attempted the subject of Gibraltar, not one has in any degree succeeded in the point

vessels before twelve at noon, and two were burnt down, the enemy having themselves drowned the powder. One remained entire, and we flattered ourselves that we should possess her as a trophy; but, for reasons unknown, a boat was sent on board of her by the Governor's command, with an officer of the navy on board of her, and she was set on fire, blazing out in a far more sudden manner than any of those which had been burnt by the red shot.

The Governor took his place on the King's Bastion during almost the whole of the attack; the Lieutenant Governor on the South Bastion.

Such is hitherto the event of the long and immense preparations against Gibraltar; towards which, we flatter ourselves, the eyes of all Europe have been turned for some time past; a glorious recompence to the garrison for three years of a situation irksome and disagreeable from many causes, which shall now be nameless. I hope you will receive satisfaction from this account, which I have written for your information; if you do, it will, I assure you, greatly add to that of, &c. &c. &c.

In continuation.—October 2d.

Every opportunity has hitherto failed of sending any vessel, however small, from this place, with the accounts of our success, by the lightness of the nights, and the numberless cruising vessels

of time here alluded to. Patoun's four pictures, in the possession of Alderman Boydell, and which also are engraved, are by far the best, and indeed are excellent, except the morning scene.

from

from the grand combined fleet, which has continued ever since to lie dormant on the other side. Three days afterwards, every ship saluted at one and the same time in the evening, when it was nearly dark, repeating the salute a second time after a short interval, which afforded a very grand appearance; and we imagine it was a compliment to the two princes of the royal blood of France, d'Artois and Bourbon, and likewise perhaps to the Prince of Nassau, on setting out upon their return to France *. I can now add some particulars to what I have above related. The prisoners say they were sent on board five days before the attack; some volunteers, but most in the ordinary tour of duty; that there were about five thousand men on board; that the ships mounted one hundred and fifty-eight new brass twenty-six pounders, and had several spare guns in each. Two-thirds of each crew were below, under the surface of the water, and relieved the decks alternately; they were there almost suffocated for want of air. They mention that several of our shells entered at the ports or embrasures, and killed and wounded between thirty and forty men each time. A frigate cruised behind as an hospital ship. They complain bitterly of their countrymen having left them to perish in the flames. By the way, most of them are Frenchmen; and they say the Spanish officers shoved them aside on that account. The

* A piece de Theatre about this time was represented in almost every town in France, called The Taking of Gibraltar.

antipathy between the two nations is infinite: the Spaniard hates from the bottom of his soul the Frenchman, who in his turn only does the other the honour to hold him in supreme contempt. They had however all intended to make a much longer stay in these vessels, having ten days provisions on board. They had a priest on board of every ship; one of whom, according to the French reports, was so frightened a little before coming on, that he let the Bon Dieu fall into the water, and that many attributed their failure to that piece of unintended sacrilege. Whether this was merely a French jeu d'esprit or not, it is certain that two of the priests remained in the exercise of their functions, and were made prisoners. Our balls, though they glanced off at first, yet they say at length so shook the fabrick of the ships, as to make way for the red-hot shot. A certain signal of lights which was fixed upon in case of the extremity of distress, being hoisted at midnight, occasioned the utmost consternation in the fleet; three boats were instantly ordered from every ship to carry off the people. The boat of the Terrible, a Spanish seventy-four, was one of those that was taken. They were all made to believe, that we could not fire above one red shot in an hour from a gun, and that it was against the rules of war. Not one accident happened to any of our men in firing red-hot shot that day, and but one during the siege.

In continuation.—October 18.

A number of events are yet to be related:—A Spanish ship of the line of 70 guns taken by this rock; her name is the San Miguel; their whole combined navy a good deal put out of order, and in the greatest danger of being destroyed at anchor by a prodigious storm, which drove the ship in here: Lord Howe with the grand fleet of Great Britain weathering that storm near their land, coming in next evening in perfect order through the Straits, but at a time when this garrison, as it happened, no way stood in need of such assistance; driven to leeward with nearly the whole convoy by the current, and prevented by a westerly wind from working up: An alarming train of consequences apprehended, not the less by the combined fleet failing out two days after their arrival (which was on the 11th of October) superior to ours by twelve sail of the line, three being disabled by the storm.

It then appeared very evident that Lord Howe either must abandon his convoy, or if he kept them with him, that he would so embarrass his manœuvres as to fight with great disadvantage. Accordingly he made a signal for his convoy to sail from him to the eastward, as the west wind still prevailed; half of it either did not see, or did not attend to that signal, and got in here; the other half with one ship of the line sailed off the next day; after they had separated, the wind came easterly. Our fleet still continued near. The combined fleet was out
of

of fight; we then concluded that they had followed the convoy. This was a chapter of perplexities, which for one complete week had agitated the minds of every officer and soldier in this garrison. On the 17th however a termination was put, in a manner we did not expect, to our apprehensions for the convoy. Two ships getting in, told us that the whole were in sight; and accordingly, in two hours the whole got in, excepting one brig which had separated in the night, and had fallen into the hands of the enemy, carrying the women and children, and all the heavy baggage of the 25th and 59th regiments. These two regiments were landed here in the space of half an hour, and the ships of war which brought them instantly sailed out again to Lord Howe. It seems impossible to account for the conduct of the combined fleet under Cordova. In a narrow sea to let that convoy pass him and get in here, is acting in a manner which we landmen cannot comprehend.

Lord Howe then steered for the straits; the combined fleet followed at the distance of about two miles; we soon lost sight of both, and we remain ignorant of the event.

The paper which here follows is curious in this respect:—The French have given it out that they are the inventors of the machines which were sent against the walls of Gibraltar in 1782. In their book “*Sur l’Evenement de Gibraltar*,” which contains
near

near four hundred pages, with Mons. D'Arçon's narrative, correspondence, &c. the whole "pour servir d'instruction pour les sieges," it is said, "Among the variety of inventions proposed none appeared so good as that of Mons. D'Arçon," &c. &c. Now whatever the merit of the invention may be, it appears from the following paper that it certainly does not belong to the French. The book from which it is extracted fell into the writer's hand about six weeks before the attack. He translated this part of it, and sent it to the governor immediately. The Spaniard who wrote the book avows, that he took a great part of it from Santa Cruz.

Translation of Part of a Chapter in a Book entitled, "Principios de Fortificacion," published in the Year 1772, by Don Pedro Lucuzé, Major General in the King of Spain's Army, and Director of the Royal Military Academy at Barcelona.

" ATTACK of a MARITIME PLACE.

" In the attack and defence of a maritime place,
 " an important use may be made of floating bat-
 " teries, of which there are three different sorts.
 " The first, which fire when under sail, such as the
 " ships of war: Others, which batter when at an-
 " chor. These must have a rampart, proof against
 " cannon ball, and must be either made on purpose,
 " or

“ or otherwise the hulks of old ships may be employed. Their masts must be cut down, they must have lining on the side, and the intermediate space being filled with wool, earth, cork, or any other light materials, will cause the balls from the enemy’s cannon to lose their force, and preserve the floating battery from being destroyed. The third fort must be of a lesser nature, carrying two or four guns, with a view to throw their fire to any particular place as occasion may require, and therefore must be capable of advancing with rapidity, or retiring by means of oars, and being towed by lesser vessels. All of these must not only be furnished with mariners, artillery men, and ammunition proper for the battery, but likewise with troops, which, with swivels, grenadoes, artificial fires, as well as with their usual arms, may oppose any enemy which shall endeavour to take possession or destroy them; and for greater security it will be proper to escort them with galleys, galleons, and xebecs, to counteract such light armaments as the enemy may form.

“ These sorts of batteries must be constructed by ship-builders; and in order that they may give the right proportions to them, they must take into consideration the use which is to be made of them, and the circumstances of the place against which they are to be employed, which may be open, or embayed, or sheltered from particular winds.

“ In

“ In an undertaking against a maritime place,
“ a naval superiority both of light and heavy ar-
“ maments is much to be recommended, although
“ some occasions should occur, when, by possessing
“ commanding points for anchoring, &c. an in-
“ vestiture may be found practicable with an in-
“ ferior force. But it would be acting with great
“ uncertainty to trust to winter weather during
“ the time of the expedition, or to imagine that
“ storms will of themselves prevent the enemy
“ from introducing frequent succours, for they will
“ take advantage of the uncertainty of the ocean
“ itself; nor will they wait until the place is near
“ extremity, before they endeavour to throw in
“ all succours necessary for the defence.

“ We have already said, that the principal at-
“ tention in the siege of any place should be to
“ prevent the introduction of succours. There-
“ fore, although you are superior by sea, you must
“ take possession of any neighbouring or interme-
“ diate roads for shipping open to the enemy, and
“ preserve them by a garrison and good artillery,
“ otherwise they will deposit their secret succours
“ there, and watch for an opportunity when the
“ stationed ships are driven off by a storm, &c.*”

* * * * *

* Tangier is here alluded to; and the Spaniards gave the Emperor of Morocco a large sum of money to permit them to establish a post there.

Of the SWÉDES and of the SQUARE.

From Colonel TEMPELHOFFE.

THE Swedish army were in want of every thing. Their soldiers did not receive half the necessary quantity of bread, nor had they any salt. The condition of these troops, who indeed deserved a better fortune, was very dismal. The want of raiment, and the total want of shoes and stockings, was added to the calamity of hunger. The sick in their little army were more than three thousand, the greatest part of whom, from the want of attendance, and of every necessary, seemed devoted to certain death. The horses of their artillery and train were so very bad, that they took five or six hours to go as many miles, although they had neither hills nor bad roads to pass.

Yet in Sweden they expected that this army was to make great conquests. They had powder, balls, and bayonets, it was said: as if an army without pontoons, without a bakery or any stores, also without money, and with wretched arms, as if such an army could march whithersoever they chose. Those who view the great tragedies of war seated

at

at their ease, amidst the blandishments of wit and pleasure, without caring what may pass behind the curtain, can hardly form a just conception of military conduct. Yet such are commonly the first to raise their note of censure, which often is the loudest when they are the least possessed of every talent of discrimination*.

The operations of their commander Count Hamilton were fettered by the presence of the Marquis de Mont Alembert the envoy from France, and by the orders of the Imperial Counsellor Hopkins, whose character it was to be always embarrassed when decisive measures were requisite, nor could any of the Swedish generals repose any confidence in him. The orders which he issued always bore a double meaning, and from thence they concluded that he would interpret them to his own advantage in every event. To this was added a very just cause of dissatisfaction in the uncivil and often dishonourable opinions of their operations openly given by his attendants. Count Palenstein wrote to Stralsund, "They have entered their enemy's country like a fox, and have run back from it like a hare." This severe expression never left their memory.

On the 25th of September (1758) General Wedel continued his march to Fehrbelling. Hav-

* "Here," said a critic with a map before him, "you might have passed the river." "True," replied Marshal Turenne, "but your finger is not a bridge."

ing learnt that a Swedish detachment under General Ralling had advanced towards that place, he took the hussars of Mohring and the dragoons of Pletterberg, and moved ten miles in full trot to Tarnow, to which place the reserve of the Swedish detachment had marched up. This reserve consisted of one hundred cavalry of the Schmaland regiment, and two hundred infantry, who had placed themselves upon the plain. The Swedish cavalry advanced against the hussars with much resolution, but were thrown into disorder, and were surrounded; part were cut down, part were taken, and not a man of them escaped. Their infantry then formed a square, and withdrew with so much coolness and good order, that the Prussian dragoons and hussars, who attacked them with the greatest impetuosity, and followed them to Fehrbelling, found it impossible to break through them. The dragoons came up to the points of the bayonets, and an under officer of the name of Witman seized a Swedish officer by the hair of the head, and tore him out of the ranks. Notwithstanding all, however, they were beaten back, and the enemy gave their fire with such effect in their renewed attacks, that the Lt. Colonel, with two under officers and twenty-two dragoons, were left dead upon the spot, and the Major and eighty men of that regiment were wounded.

The hussars, who were determined to cut their way through the square, were not better treated. The foremost actually did cut down several of the enemy's infantry in the ranks, but found their death

death upon the bayonets. Major Zetman, who commanded them, was shot through the body, and they lost two officers and twenty-one men.

Their determined valour gained these infantry immortal honour. They vindicated the fame of their ancestors, and deserved to fight under Gustavus Adolphus, or Charles the Twelfth.

This action also shews that the advantages attributed to a square, are not imaginary, but founded in reality. We shall find more cases in the history of this war, where infantry threw themselves into a square, and opposed a superior number of cavalry, without suffering considerable loss, or without its being possible to break through them, even when the greatest resolution was shewn, and even when the cavalry, after being beaten back, returned with redoubled vigour to the charge. These squares were but small; the largest amounted to at most but three weak battalions, which probably contributed to their success, as they could march the more easily. Cavalry cannot attack a small square in many places; and even if they draw up squadron behind squadron, the second cannot renew the shock so soon when the first is beaten back, but that the infantry, who have given part of their fire, will have time to load again, and beat off the second as they have done the first. Therefore, when an infantry, consisting of many battalions, happens to be in a situation which requires their retiring before a superior cavalry, it appears better that every battalion should form a se-

parate square, than to compose one or two of the whole line.

Small squares are soon formed, but large squares require much time in the formation, and the enemy will most probably be upon us before we are ready for his reception. Small squares can move more easily and much quicker than large ones; they can be drawn up so as to support each other, and even should the enemy succeed in breaking through one or more of the squares, their advantage will stop there; but if they once penetrate into a great square, the whole will fall immediately into disorder, and will be cut to pieces by an active cavalry.

OBSERVATION.

With a view to follow the Author's ideas, let us consider in what manner several squares should be drawn up, so as best to support each other: and it seems probable that a sudden and effectual defence against a superior cavalry might be obtained by a combination of the square and echelon, whether from line or column.


Suppose our column of march, composed of companies from the right, to come unexpectedly in presence of a superior cavalry; were we first to form the line, as is the custom, before we form our squares, moments of importance might be lost.

The following method of forming squares from the column of march will be found speedy and simple:

Having halted the whole column, if we mean that our squares should consist of a battalion each, we should cause the companies of the left wing of each battalion to face to the left, to file clear of those in their front, to march up parallel to them and halt; the two front companies then to stand fast; the two in rear to come to the right about; the rest to wheel outwards, and the squares are formed. Should we chuse to form larger squares, we have only to divide the body of which we mean to form each square into two equal parts, which the commanding officer can do at full gallop: the same method will equally serve, only that we must bring more companies into the front and rear faces.

Having thus formed our squares in about three minutes, the most quick method of getting them into the echelon position will be, to cause the center square to stand fast; those in front to march to the right, those in rear to the left; and each square to halt and front when clear of that which is nearer to the center. The squares will then afford each other mutually a flanking fire. If the manœuvre be done from line, the squares, instead of moving to right and left, must move to front and rear of the center square. It cannot be denied that this position as well as that of the echelon would be liable to the objection of the flank being the weakest part: but all flanks are so; and we must strengthen ourselves with some point
of

of support, such as a wall, or water, a gully, or any obstacle which presents itself. Should no such point of protection appear, still it will not be in the power of cavalry to make any impression upon infantry that are firm, that oppose a small and compact front, and that know their safety depends upon their preserving their order.



Were we to take the ultimate position expressed by the dotted lines, it is evident we should command the men of the interior faces to order their arms. From either posture the column of march might be quickly resumed.

THE END.





A List of the French Ships of the Line.

Ships	Commanders	Guns	Men
LAVUEDEOC	Count d'ESTAING	80	1283
Tonnant	De Brueys	80	1283
Caesar	De Brueys	74	844
Manille	De Brueys	74	844
Zelee	De Brueys	74	844
Proteus	De Brueys	74	844
Guemier	De Brueys	74	844
Hector	De Brueys	74	844
Valant	De Brueys	74	844
Pantheus	De Brueys	74	844
Procer	De Brueys	74	844
Sagittaire	De Brueys	74	844

French Troops Encamped after the Attack on the Vigie are marked A coloured blue.

- French Works thrown up to secure their retreat after the Attack.
- B. a Mortar Battery
- C. a seven Gun Battery
- D. a Three Gun Battery to defend the road leading to the Vigie.

BRITISH TROOPS EMPLOYED ON THIS SERVICE

FIRST BRIGADE,

Commanded by Brigadier General FRESQUET,

4th Regiment commanded by Lt Col Ogilvie

13th Lt Col Stopford

28th Lt Col Enoch Marham

40th Lt Col Enoch Marham

55th Lt Col Enoch Marham

SECOND BRIGADE,

Commanded by Brigadier General Sir HENRY CALDER,

27th Regiment commanded by Lt Col Mitchell

35th Lt Col Cockburne

40th Lt Col Cockburne

49th Lt Col Cockburne

References to the Buildings on Moune Fortune.

N^o 1. The Governor's House Head Quarters. N^o 4. Coten

2. Barracks

3. Magazine of Provisions

5. Hospital

6. Powder Magazine

Names of the People whose Houses are marked on the Plan.

Monsieur La Tr

Monsieur De Lecomte

Monsieur Clair

Count Leale

Doutur LeNue

Monsieur Vard

Madame La Balle

Monsieur De Jannon

Monsieur Jami Ortis

Monsieur Cole

Le Chevalier Du Brysey.

THE RESERVE, Commanded by Brigadier General MEDOWS,
Consisting of the Grenadiers of the ARMY Commanded by Major Harris, and the Light Infantry
Commanded by Sir James Murray with the 5th Regiment.

The figures at the lines which point out the principal directions of the guns on the different Batteries erected by the French show the weight of Metal each Gun carried at the time the Island was taken.

N^o 8. Old Redoubt near which Capt. Downing was posted. — N^o 9. Post of Capt. John Well. 4th for King's own Grenadiers



Count D'ESTAIN'S Fleet of Men of War at Anchor

The Island with Inlets

DESTINY

with an Ship of the Line the first attack on Admiral BARRINGTON

Admiral BARRINGTON'S Fleet

Pointe du Cul de Sac

Pointe de Marigot

ALVCE DU CHOC

French transports at Anchor

Met du Choc

THE VIGIE

O ARENAGE

GRAND CUL DE SAC

MARIGOT DE ROSEAUX

